dinsdag 9 februari 2010

Meelfabriek Gaza getroffen bij gevechten IDF met Hamas


In onderstaand artikel in Trouw staat onterecht dat Israel de 'vernietiging' van de meelfabriek van Gaza niet onderzocht.
Hieronder de reactie van het Israelische leger op dit incident.
 
Een foto van de vernietigde fabriek/molen:
 
Al Bader flourmill January 11 2009
 
Als Israel de fabriek bewust had willen vernietigen en onbruikbaar maken voor de Palestijnen, had ze hem wel wat zwaarder getroffen, zou je zeggen. Hoe komt het dat er niet meer schade is aangericht? Dit lijkt verre van het resultaat van een bom van 500 kg., waarvan restanten zouden zijn gevonden.
Het volgens onderstaand artikel niet bestaande Israelische onderzoek geeft uitsluitsel:
 
163. With respect to the allegation of deliberate targeting of the el-Bader flour mill, the IDF conducted a command investigation, which gathered evidence from numerous sources, including relevant commanders and officers and ground and aerial forces. In addition, the investigator received information from the Israeli CLA, which was in direct contact with the owner of el-Bader flour mill, Mr. Rashad Hamada. The command investigation included several findings, which are delineated below.

164. From the outset of the Gaza Operation, the immediate area in which the flour mill was located was used by enemy armed forces as a defensive zone, due to its proximity to Hamas's stronghold in the Shati refugee camp. Hamas had fortified this area with tunnels and booby-trapped houses, and deployed its forces to attack IDF troops operating there. For example, 200 meters south of the flour mill an IDF squad was ambushed by five Hamas operatives in a booby-trapped house; 500 meters east of the flour mill another squad engaged enemy forces in a house that was also used for weapons storage; and adjacent to the flour mill, two booby-trapped houses exploded.

165. The IDF ground operation in this area began on 9 January 2009, during night time. Before the ground operation, the IDF issued early warnings to the residents of the area, included recorded telephone calls, urging them to evacuate. Such telephone calls were made to the flour mill as well.

166. While preparing for the operation, the commanders identified the flour mill as a "strategic high point" in the area, due to its height and clear line of sight. Nevertheless, in the planning stage, it was decided not to pre-emptively attack the flour mill, in order to prevent damage to civilian infrastructure as much as possible.

167. In the course of the operation, IDF troops came under intense fire from different Hamas positions in the vicinity of the flour mill. The IDF forces fired back towards the sources of fire and threatening locations. As the IDF returned fire, the upper floor of the flour mill was hit by tank shells. A phone call warning was not made to the flour mill immediately before the strike, as the mill was not a pre-planned target.

168. Several hours after the incident, and following a report about fire in the flour mill, the IDF coordinated the arrival of several fire engines to fight the fire.

169. The Military Advocate General reviewed the findings and the records of the command investigation and other materials. In addition, the Military Advocate General reviewed the information included in the Human Rights Council Fact-Finding Report, as well as the transcript of the public testimony of Mr. Hamada to the Fact-Finding Mission.

170. Taking into account all available information, the Military Advocate General determined that the flour mill was struck by tank shells during combat. The Military Advocate General did not find any evidence to support the assertion that the mill was attacked from the air using precise munitions, as alleged in the Human Rights Council Fact-Finding Report. The Military Advocate General determined that the allegation was not supported in the Report itself, nor in the testimony to the Fact-Finding Mission by Rashad Hamada, who had left the area prior to the incident in response to the IDF's early warnings. Photographs of the mill following the incident do not show structural damage consistent with an air attack.

171. The Military Advocate General found that, in the specific circumstances of combat, and given its location, the flour mill was a legitimate military target in accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict. The purpose of the attack was to neutralize immediate threats to IDF forces.

172. The Military Advocate General did not accept the allegation in the Human Rights Council Fact-Finding Report that the purpose of the strike was to deprive the civilian population of Gaza of food. In this regard, he noted the fact that shortly after the incident, the IDF allowed Palestinian fire trucks to reach the area and extinguish the flames, as well as the extensive amount of food and flour that entered Gaza through Israel during the Gaza Operation.

173. Although the Military Advocate General could not conclusively determine that the flour mill was in fact used by Hamas's military operatives, there was some evidence of such use. The Military Advocate General noted that Mr. Hamada testified before the Fact-Finding Mission that after the operation he found empty bullets on the roof of the flour mill. This could not have been the result of IDF fire, since – as was evident from the findings of the command investigation – the IDF forces which occupied the mill's compound three days after the incident did not occupy the roof of the mill, where they would have been exposed to enemy fire.

174. Accordingly, the Military Advocate General found no reason to order a criminal investigation regarding the case.
 
Bovenstaande verklaring komt veel meer overeen met de aangetroffen schade en met andere feiten, zoals het feit dat Israel hielp bij het blussen van de brand, iets dat zij zeker niet gedaan zou hebben indien het doel was om zoveel mogelijk schade toe te brengen zodat de burgerbevolking geen meel meer zou hebben.
Het Goldstone rapport zit vol met dit soort onlogische en onterechte aantijgingen, maar in tegenstelling tot het klimaatrapport van het IPCC dringt die kritiek niet door in de media en politiek. Goldstone heeft gesproken en is deskundig en dus zal het allemaal wel kloppen, is de teneur.
 
RP
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'Onderzoek naar Gaza-offensief niet afdoende'
Trouw - 7 februari 2010
 
 
(Novum/AP) - Israël is er niet in geslaagd om een onpartijdig onderzoek te doen naar de beschuldigingen dat het tijdens het Gaza-offensief van vorige winter oorlogsmisdaden heeft gepleegd. Dat zegt de mensenrechtenorganisatie Human Rights Watch zondag.

De onderzoeken van het Israëlische leger zouden zich vooral op mogelijke fouten van individuele soldaten hebben gericht. Naar beslissingen die op hogere niveaus werden genomen is volgens de organisatie niet gekeken. Door die beslissingen vielen veel burgerdoden. Zo werd besloten om een dichtbevolkt gebied te bestoken met artillerie.

Ook het vernietigen van de enige molen die bloem kan verwerken in Gaza is niet onderzocht. Het Israëlische ministerie van buitenlandse zaken zegt dat het leger 'in volle transparantie alles onderzoekt dat moet worden onderzocht'.

Onderzoekers van de Verenigde Naties concludeerden eerder dat beide zijden de oorlogswetten hebben overtreden. Hamas vuurde raketten op Israëlische burgers af, Israël zou buitenproportioneel geweld hebben gebruikt en met opzet burgers tot doelwit hebben gemaakt.

Israël begon het Gaza-offensief nadat militanten jarenlang vanuit Gaza het zuiden van Israël met duizenden raketten hadden bestookt. Bij het Israëlische offensief kwamen ongeveer 1400 inwoners om. Waaronder honderden burgers. Aan Israëlische zijde vielen dertien doden.

 

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