Israëls desastreuze oorlog in Libanon (Michael Oren)

Zou Olmert moeten aftreden vanwege de Tweede Libanon Oorlog? Sommigen redeneren dat er geen betere leiders zijn om hem op te volgen, en hij daarom net zo goed kan blijven zitten. Maar de essentie van aftreden zit hem in het nemen van verantwoordelijkheid, en de erkenning dat je grove fouten hebt gemaakt. Door te blijven zitten schendt Olmert het vertrouwen van de bevolking, en van degenen die de oorlog in worden gestuurd om het land met hun eigen leven te verdedigen.

 

 

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Wall Street Journal
Israel's Lebanon Disaster

By MICHAEL OREN
January 30, 2008; Page A16

I had fought in war before but had never seen such intensive fire -- tracer bullets, rockets, artillery shells -- nor been assigned a more horrific detail. My unit was escorting the bodies of Israeli soldiers killed on the last night of the Second Lebanon War, a few hours before the U.N. cease-fire agreement took effect. None of us understood the purpose of this last-minute offensive or, indeed, many of the government's disastrous decisions during the war. We agreed that the burden of these failures would be borne by our leaders, military and civilians alike.

Now, a year and a half later, veterans of the war are demanding that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert accept responsibility for its conduct -- or risk unraveling the consensus on which Israel's survival depends.

The war began on July 12, 2006, when Hezbollah gunmen ambushed an Israeli border patrol, killing eight and kidnapping two. Mr. Olmert's response, a large-scale campaign intended to crush Hezbollah and secure the soldiers' release, was supported by most Israelis until serious mismanagement of the war surfaced. While receiving inadequate or faulty equipment -- my rifle literally fell apart in my hands -- Israeli forces were denied permission to invade Southern Lebanon and neutralize the katyusha rockets that were pummeling Israeli cities. Instead, Israeli jets bombed the Lebanese routes through which Syria resupplied Hezbollah and destroyed the organization's Beirut headquarters.

These attacks obliterated much of Hezbollah's infrastructure and killed a fourth of its fighters, but they also laid waste to a large part of Lebanon, killing civilians and squandering Israel's initial international backing. Hundreds of rockets, meanwhile, continued to smash into northern Israel, displacing a half-million civilians. Only on Aug. 13, after a month of fighting and with a U.N. ceasefire already approved, did the government authorize a ground offensive into Lebanon. The operation achieved nothing, either militarily or diplomatically, and cost the lives of 33 Israeli troops.

In another country, perhaps, such blunders might result in the resignation of senior officers but not necessarily elected officials. In Israel, though, no one is above blame. Accountability for decision making is a tenet of the Zionist ethos on which the Jewish state is based and, unlike most nations, Israel has a citizens' army in which the great majority -- politicians included -- serve. Most uniquely, Israel confronts daily security dangers and long-term threats to its existence. Israelis can neither condone nor afford a prime minister who passes the buck to their army or shirks the onus of defense. The person who sends us into battle cannot escape responsibility for our fate.

No sooner had the war ended than Israelis began demanding an official inquiry into its handling. Why did the government set unrealistic goals for the operation? Why were no orders given for an invasion, and why were no measures taken to protect the home front from missile attack? Above all, Israelis insisted on knowing why Mr. Olmert authorized a final offensive with no apparent objective other than enhancing his image.

Mr. Olmert resisted these demands, but public pressure forced him to appoint an investigative panel headed by Supreme Court Justice Eliyahu Winograd. While not empowered to recommend resignations, the commission issued a preliminary report that compelled Defense Minister Amir Peretz and Chief of Staff Dan Halutz to step down. The second Winograd report, scheduled for publication tomorrow, will focus on the prime minister's performance during the war, but Mr. Olmert has sworn not to cede power, irrespective of its findings. At stake is not merely the government's future but rather the fabric of Israeli society.

Israel lacks a constitution but is bound by an unwritten social contract. Israelis defend their country with their lives and their leaders' pledge not to send them to war heedlessly. Prime Ministers Golda Meir and Menachem Begin resigned in the aftermath of disappointing wars, though both were exonerated of incompetence. By ignoring these precedents, Mr. Olmert, whose culpability began before the war, when he appointed a defense minister devoid of military experience, threatens to break the contract. Israelis will think twice before following his orders -- and perhaps those of future prime ministers -- into battle. The cohesiveness that enabled Israel to survive 60 years of conflict will unwind.

Thousands of Israelis are calling for Mr. Olmert's resignation. Rightists convinced that the prime minister cannot safeguard the country's security have joined with leftists who understand that leaders who fail at war will never succeed at peacemaking. All are united by a willingness to shoulder the burden of Israel's defense. This was the commitment that united us that last night in Lebanon, as we took up the stretchers bearing the remains of somebody's son, somebody's husband, and brought them home for burial.

 

Mr. Oren is a senior fellow at the Shalem Center in Jerusalem and the author of "Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present" (Norton, 2008).

Source

Arabisch stadje Shfaram viert mee op Israëls onafhankelijkheidsdag

Gelukkig nemen sommige Arabische leiders in Israël afstand van de opruiende woorden van sommige van hun collega's en spreken zich duidelijk voor Israël en voor coëxistentie met de Joodse meerderheid uit.

 

 

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Arab town plans big celebration for Israel's Independence Day

 

Shfaram mayor decides to include his town in festivities for Israel's 60th anniversary; says 'we feel we are a part of Israel, we don't want our children to hate the country'

Sharon Roffe-Ofir YNET

Published: 02.01.08, 09:03
www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3501480,00.html

Unlike most of the Arab sector, the Arab town of Shfaram has decided to take part in Israel's celebrations of its 60th anniversary this year, and hold ceremonies to mark the occasion.

The town's mayor Ursan Yassin and other local officials met with members of the state committee in charge of the celebrations Thursday to discuss the nature of the festivities to be held in town.

Yassin recently spoke with the committee chairman, Minister Ruhama Avraham-Balila, and stressed to her that while many in the Arab community felt unconnected to the historic date, Shfaram had no plans to be left out of the party.

Yassin told the committee that he objected to the incitement against the state among the Arab sector. "This is our country and we completely disapprove of the statements made by the Higher Monitoring Committee. I want to hold a central ceremony in Shfaram, raise all the flags and have a huge feast.

"The 40,000 residents of Shfaram feel that they are a part of the State of Israel," Yassin added. "The desire to participate in the festivities is shared by most of the residents."

The mayor stated, "We will not raise our children to hate the country. This is our country and we want to live in coexistence with its Jewish residents."

The committee members praised Yassin's words and vowed to include the town in plans for the state-wide events, including a traveling exhibit featuring Israel's achievement in the 60 years since its inception.

Minister Avraham-Balila also lauded Yassin's "courageous statements, saying it was time for the leaders of Israel's Arab community "to express what a large part of their public feels." The 60th anniversary events "are an excellent opportunity to emphasize the unifying aspects shared by all sectors in the country," she added.

Winograd rapport verklaart Olmert ongeschikt voor leiderschap in oorlog

Het Winograd rapport dat woensdag uitkwam is geen reden tot opluchting voor premier Olmert, aldus Haaretz. Zowel het leger als de politiek hebben serieuze fouten gemaakt in de Tweede Libanon Oorlog, en Olmert was 'unfit to conduct a war'.

 

Nog negatiever is Ami Isseroffs analyse van wat er allemaal mis ging en wie (mede) schuldig zijn aan het fiasco.

 

Saillant detail is dat Olmert zelf de commissie benoemde die de gemaakte fouten tijdens de oorlog onderzocht. Wat was de uitkomst geweest als Netanyahoe of Sarid (leider van het linkse Meretz) deze commissie had benoemd? Of, om realistischer te blijven, een onafhankelijke instantie?

 

 

Ratna

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Worse than the partial report
By Haaretz Editorial 31 January 2008
www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=949760&contrassID=2&subContrassID=4&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y

Because they were so preoccupied with the final 60 hours of the war, and because of the fact that the Winograd Committee exonerated Ehud Olmert from an implied accusation that he decided on a ground operation at the last moment only in order to improve his political position, people seem to have failed to hear the extraordinarily serious remarks read out by Judge Eliyahu Winograd in his summarizing announcement to the public. The blood libel against Olmert was removed from the agenda, but on the other hand, the committee declared him unfit to conduct a war.

The prime minister has no reason to rejoice, certainly not to drink a toast, and it is doubtful whether he has a right even to breathe a small sigh of relief. The final Winograd report is worse than the partial one because it asserts that after the failure of the first days, no conclusions were drawn, no changes were made, there was no improvement in either the level of decision making or in the performance of the government or the Israel Defense Forces, and all this in spite of the fact that the government and the military command had 34 days to pull themselves together.

The IDF's advantage vis-a-vis a small fighting organization was not exploited. Israel did not win. The government did not choose between the two operational military alternatives on the agenda - a short and painful blow, or a thorough ground operation - but instead equivocated and let itself be "dragged" until the end of the war. The level of decision-making on all levels: political, military and the interface between them, was unacceptable.

The war was a "serious missed opportunity," which ended without an Israeli victory even though Israel had everything it needed to win. The IDF did not provide a solution to the rocket fire, the fabric of life in the north of the country was disrupted, and all these findings are "very troubling," as the committee says, because of their far-reaching implications for Israel and the entire region.

At no stage were strategic thinking and planning in evidence, the war's management was flawed, performance was flawed and there was no intelligent and effective use of the power at the country's disposal. The IDF failed, says the committee, but the blame cannot necessarily be placed on the army, and the political echelon cannot be absolved of responsibility.

In the short announcement to the public, the committee repeatedly emphasized the failure of the political echelon, the military echelon and the interface between them. The IDF did not provide the political leadership with a suitable military achievement, and responsibility for this outcome lies mainly with the IDF, "but the misfit between the mode of action and the goals set by the political echelon share responsibility."

The committee also considers the final ground operation a failure, although the decision to embark on a ground attack was "almost inevitable" in light of the fact that Katyushas continued to fall on Israel and Hezbollah was seen as the victor. But here too, at the final stage, there were no serious consultations, the question as to whether there was a reasonable chance of achieving something was not asked, there was no follow-up of the details of the fighting on the part of the political leadership, and it is not at all clear how and when the decision to stop the operation was made.

The committee asserts that Israel lost the war with Hezbollah. It lost due to flawed management rather than objective circumstances, since it embarked on the war out of choice, at a time that it determined. The abstract of the final Winograd report points to a prime minister who lacks the ability to conduct a country at war.

Egypte arresteert 12 Hamas terroristen die aanval in Sinai planden

Eén van de gevolgen van een open grens tussen de Gazastrook en Egypte. Hoeveel lopen er nog vrij rond?

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Egypt arrests 12 Hamas planning Sinai attack
http://www.jta.org/cgi-bin/iowa/breaking/106752.html

 

 

Published: 02/01/2008

Egyptian authorities arrested 12 Hamas terrorists planning an attack on Israelis in the Sinai Desert.

Israeli reports quoted Egyptian media as saying on Friday that the men, from two separate terrorist cells, were arrested with weapons and explosives near Egypt's breached border with the Gaza Strip.

They were planning attacks on Israelis who flock to the Sinai's Red Sea shore.

Hamas gunmen blew open the border last week to allow Palestinians in the blockaded Gaza Strip to leave. Israel has blockaded Gaza in a bid to stop rocket attacks on Israel's south.

Soon after the breach, Israel issued its citizens a travel warning advising against Sinai travel.

Palestijnse ambassadeur: Iran helpt Jeruzalem te bevrijden van Zionistisch regime

Een ambassadeur vertegenwoordigt zijn land, en spreekt doorgaans namens de regering in zijn land. Het is dus officieel Palestijns beleid om het Zionistische regime te bestrijden en uit hun land te verdrijven.

Welwillende mensen (en die zijn er veel) zullen hierin wellicht lezen dat het alleen om de bezette gebieden gaat, en dat 'strijden' ook met vreedzame middelenen kan, maar zo klinken zijn woorden niet. "To fight the Zionist regime" klinkt niet naar het oplossen van het conflict door vreedzame onderhandelingen.


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Palestinian Ambassador To Iran: Iran Helping Liberate Jerusalem
http://www.thememriblog.org/iran/blog_personal/en/4949.htm

 

Palestinian Ambassador to Iran Salah Al-Zawawi said on January 29 that Iran was helping to liberate the holy Qods (Jerusalem) and to ease the sufferings of the Palestinian people.

He added that Iran did not support a specific group in Palestine.

Al-Zawawi was speaking at a seminar on "Recent Developments in the Gaza Strip From The Viewpoint Of International Law."

He also stressed that through the unity of the Muslim countries, the Palestinian people will be able to push the Zionist regime out of their territory, and that unity between Palestinian groups and Islamic countries could give them enough strength to fight the Zionist regime.

 

Source: IRNA, Iran, January 30, 2008
Posted at: 2008-01-30

VN rapporteur uit kritiek op religieuze intolerantie in Gaza en ongelijkheid in Israël

Het religieus-fundamentalistische karakter van Hamas krijgt in de Nederlandse media niet veel aandacht, maar zelfs een VN rapporteur wijst op de problemen voor vrouwen en christenen in de Gazastrook.

 

 

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UN envoy: Women in Gaza feel coerced into covering their heads
By Barak Ravid  Haaretz Last update - 10:33 30/01/2008
http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/949340.html

The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief says women in the Gaza Strip have recently felt coerced into covering their heads, while Christians there have faced rising intolerance.

The UN envoy, Asma Jahangir, visited Israel and the Palestinian Authority last week and published a report on her eight-day trip.

"Women seem to be in a particularly vulnerable situation and bear the brunt of religious zeal. I was informed about cases of honor killings carried out with impunity in the name of religion," she added.

Jahangir met with Chief Rabbi Shlomo Amar and Minister of Religious Affairs Yitzhak Cohen, as well as many others involved in religious affairs.

The UN representative expressed surprise to Amar that women were not allowed to serve as religious court judges. Amar answered that the study of religious law is a burden that women are exempt from, but this did not satisfy Jahangir, who said human rights were advancing and religions were remaining behind.

She also criticized the Orthodox religious establishment in Israel.

"There are concerns that the state gives preferential treatment to the Orthodox Jewish majority in Israel to the detriment not only of other religious or belief communities but also of other strands of Judaism," she said. "For example, conversion to Judaism within Israel is only recognised if performed by the Orthodox Rabbinate."

Jahangir added: "I find it difficult to understand that under domestic law persons can be deemed to be 'unmarriageable'," referring to the 200,000 Israeli citizens and residents who have problems marrying since they have no official religion. She and Minister Cohen disagreed on the matter.

She said that "freedom of religion or belief also includes the right not to believe."

Foreign Ministry officials who accompanied Jahangir were surprised when she said Israeli roadblocks not only impede Christians and Muslims from accessing their holy places. They also prevent Jewish Israelis from praying at their holy places such as the Temple Mount.

She faintly praised Israel, saying: "During my talks with members of religious minorities in Israel, my interlocutors have by and large acknowledged that there is no religious persecution by the State. Within the Israeli democracy, I would like to emphasize the important role that the Supreme Court has played in the past and can play for safeguarding freedom of religion or belief."

Israëlisch-Arabische leider aangeklaagd voor racisme en opruiing

Salah, een Israëlisch-Arabische leider zei onder andere het volgende tijdens een rally in Jeruzalem een jaar geleden:

 

"We have never allowed ourselves to knead [the dough for] the bread that breaks the fast in the holy month of Ramadan with children's blood," he said. "Whoever wants a more thorough explanation, let him ask what used to happen to some children in Europe, whose blood was mixed in with the dough of the [Jewish] holy bread."
 
"Great God, is this a religion?" he asked. "Is this what God would want? God will deal with you yet for what you are doing."

 

"Whoever wants to build a house of God should not do so while our blood is still on his clothes, on his doorposts, in his food, in his drink, being passed along from one terrorist general to the next terrorist general," he said.

 

"You are inciting against us, do not let the ranks on your shoulders tempt you," he continued. "These ranks and stars on your shoulders were made from the skulls of our martyrs. They are ranks of shame, not ranks of splendor. These are ranks of disgrace, not ranks of honor."

 

 

Hij verklaarde voor de rechter ieder woord te willen herhalen en dat het gesprokene zijn diepste overtuigingen zijn.

Hij beschuldigde Israël er ook van de Al Aqsa Moskee in gevaar te brengen en de Joodse Tempel te willen herbouwen.

 

Om de een of andere reden ben ik niets hierover tegengekomen in Nederlandse kranten of op het journaal, er was slechts aandacht voor de graafwerkzaamheden van Israël aan de zogenaamde Mugrabi voetgangersbrug, die de aanleiding voor deze beschuldigingen vormden. Beschuldigingen, die erg serieus werden genomen ondanks het feit dat de werkzaamheden minimaal 60 meter van de Al Aqsa Moskee vandaan plaatsvonden en het eerder juist de Islamitische Waqf was, die zonder toestemming werkzaamheden in de Tempelberg verrichtte, waarbij verschillende Joodse artefacten en restanten van een antieke muur zijn beschadigd. Over dat laatste mocht ik echter vreemd genoeg weer niks in onze media vernemen...

 

 

Ratna

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Last update - 15:19 29/01/2008    

 

Islamic Movement head charged with incitement to racism, violence 
By Yoav Stern, Haaretz Correspondent 

 

The head of the Islamic Movement in Israel's Northern Branch, Ra'ad Salah, was charged Tuesday in Jerusalem Magistrate's Court with incitement to violence and racism, over a fiery speech he gave a year ago in which he invoked the blood libel.

 

During the speech at the February 16, 2007 protest in the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Wadi Joz, Salah accused Jews of using children's blood to bake bread.

 

"We have never allowed ourselves to knead [the dough for] the bread that breaks the fast in the holy month of Ramadan with children's blood," he said. "Whoever wants a more thorough explanation, let him ask what used to happen to some children in Europe, whose blood was mixed in with the dough of the [Jewish] holy bread."
 
"Great God, is this a religion?" he asked. "Is this what God would want? God will deal with you yet for what you are doing."

 

The rally was called to protest the planned Mughrabi bridge construction in Jerusalem's Old City. Addressing the 1,000-strong crowd and assembled press, Salah accused Israel of attempting to rebuild the Jewish Temple on the Temple Mount while drenched in Arab blood.

 

"Whoever wants to build a house of God should not do so while our blood is still on his clothes, on his doorposts, in his food, in his drink, being passed along from one terrorist general to the next terrorist general," he said.

 

"You are inciting against us, do not let the ranks on your shoulders tempt you," he continued. "These ranks and stars on your shoulders were made from the skulls of our martyrs. They are ranks of shame, not ranks of splendor. These are ranks of disgrace, not ranks of honor."

 

Following the speech and Friday prayers, the crowd began rioting and throwing stones at police. According to the prosecution, Salah's speech constituted a "call to commit acts of violence and encouragement of acts of violence, which given the content and context, there was a real possibility that it could lead to acts of violence."

 

The prosecution said Salah made the remarks "with the objective of inciting racism."

 

In an interview with Ashams radio, Salah said in response that, "I am willing to repeat before the court all the things I said at the Friday sermon in Wadi Joz or any other meeting with journalists."

 

"Our statements are the products of conviction, and I will not recant," he continued.

 

Salah said the decision to indict him, along with Sunday's decision to close the case against officers involved in the deaths of 13 Israeli Arabs in the October 2000 riots, was part of an attempt to pressure and threaten Israeli Arab society. "They want us to be good little boys," he said.

 

Salah was released from prison in 2005 after serving some two years for having contact with a foreign agent, as well as financial crimes related to the Islamic Movement.

 

 

Source

 

Dromen van een Joodse staat in het getto van Lodz

Als Israël 10 of 20 jaar eerder was opgericht, hadden honderdduizenden of zelfs miljoenen Joden in Europa aan de Shoa kunnen ontsnappen. Helaas was de meerderheid toen nog niet overtuigd van de noodzaak of de haalbaarheid van een Joodse staat, en verzetten Arabische Palestijnen zich tegen de Joodse immigratie, een druk waaraan de Britse regering uiteindelijk toegaf en immigratie drastisch beperkte.

 

Tijdens de wereldwijde economische crisis van de jaren '30 waren Joodse vluchtelingen vrijwel nergens ter wereld welkom. Het lot van de St. Louis, een schip vol vluchtelingen dat in 1939 werd teruggestuurd naar Europa, is maar één van de vele schrijnende voorbeelden. Dat was echter niet alleen vanwege de economie: in landen als Nederland en de VS waren de autoriteiten ook bang dat een te grote toestroom van Joden het antisemitisme zou aanwakkeren. Antisemitisme was ook deze landen niet vreemd...

 

 

Wouter

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Twee Joodse vluchtelingetjes uit Duitsland aan boord van de St. Louis in Antwerpen.

Zionist manifesto: Lodz ghetto victim dreamed of Jewish State

 

Last update - 09:48 28/01/2008    

 

Zionism in the Holocaust: Lodz Ghetto Jew dreams of statehood 

By Eli Ashkenazi, Haaretz Correspondent

 

 

"A Jewish nation is something the world needs, and that is the reason it will be formed. If only one man thought so, one could call it an insane notion, but the idea of a Jewish state is certainly acceptable and feasible. It will become reality without special difficulty. In the Jewish state, the young generation will discover a future of light, freedom and dignity."

 

This passage appears in a previously unreleased document from the Lodz Ghetto in 1941 outlining the formation of a future Jewish state. The document, which predates Israel's Declaration of Independence by seven years, will soon be shown to the public at the Kibbutz Lohamei HaGetaot museum in the western Galilee.

 

The author is anonymous, but the Polish-language declaration is written on the official stationery of the Lodz Ghetto Judenrat, the Jewish administrative body. Signed at the bottom is Mordechai Chaim Rumkowski, head of the Lodz Ghetto Judenrat. The document is dated May 18 and 19, 1941.

 

"We will form a single legion based on the example of the French Legion d'honneur and we will name it Jewish Honor. Its symbol will be a yellow ribbon, thus transforming the symbol of our shame to our new emblem of newfound pride," reads the ninth and final clause in the three-page document. The museum announced the document yesterday, International Holocaust Memorial Day.

 

According to the museum's director general, Simcha Stein, the handwritten document includes detailed plans for the formation of a Jewish state. Stein says it also lists the reasons such a state was needed and names the bodies responsible for its establishment. It also contains suggested sanctions for people who violate the state's basic laws.

 

The declaration was written on the back of papers that listed the people eligible to receive clothes and food, alongside people who were taken off that list. Being on the list could make all the difference between life and death at the Lodz Ghetto, which was the second largest ghetto after the Warsaw Ghetto for Jews and Roma in German-occupied Poland.

 

About 200,000 people vied for survival on the ghetto's area of four square kilometers. Some 43,500 of them died of starvation, hypothermia and disease. Anyone who approached the ghetto's walls risked being shot by the Nazi German guards.

 

Originally intended as a temporary gathering point for Jews, the ghetto became an industrial center of sorts, providing supplies for Nazi Germany. Its remarkable productivity allowed the ghetto to survive until August 1944.

 

The ghetto became the last ghetto in Poland to be liquidated when its remaining prisoners were transported to Auschwitz, along with Rumkowski and his family. They were eventually deported to Auschwitz, where they died on August 28, 1944.

 

"Even if we have long, aquiline noses in our promised land, even if we grow black or red beards and walk on crooked legs, we shall not be the object of ridicule and scorn," the document reads. "At last, we will live there as free men and women, and we would die in our homeland in peace. There we will receive recognition for our tremendous achievements."

 

The declaration, which the museum's archive manager Yossi Shavit says might have been a draft, goes on to say: "We will live there with the consent of the world at large. Our emancipation will in turn serve to emancipate the world. Our richness will enrich the world, and our greatness will lend itself to the world. The word zyd [zhid] which was used as an insulting and humiliating term, will become a source of pride, as other people pride themselves in being called German, English or French."

 

Shavit says that any piece of paper in the Lodz Ghetto was a valuable possession, let alone the list that appeared on the other side of the "declaration of independence." Paper, he said, was valuable for heating, padding, insulation and shoes.

 

The writing style makes Shavit suspect that the author was Oskar Singer, who often wrote during his stay at the Lodz Ghetto. Some of his signed works can be found in the records of the museum, The Ghetto Fighters' House- Itzhak Katzenelson Holocaust and Jewish Resistance Heritage Museum.

 

Oskar Singer died after the ghetto was liquidated.

 

"This is a man of extraordinary stature and vision. I would call him a second Herzl," says Shavit. "He had to struggle to survive by then. Food was scarce, and everyone was trying to get their hands on a crumb of bread, or a piece of wood for fire to keep warm. And here this man was able to retain his humanity, create and think clearly."

 

Stein, the museum's director, says what impressed him most about the document was that as the Jewish people of Poland and Europe were being rounded up and murdered en masse, "there were still those who believed in the triumph of the Jewish people in their own land. Releasing this hopeful and optimistic document on the 60th year of Israel's existence carries a special significance."

 

 

Source

 

Gaza begraven onder het meel

Zo komen de cijfers en de statistieken in de kranten, die vervolgens klakkeloos worden overgenomen door anderen.

 

Een maand geleden stond in een interview in NRC met Megevand Roggo, de directeur voor het Midden-Oosten van het Internationale Rode Kruis, dat 43% van de Gazastrook uit Israëlische veiligheidszones bestaat waar Gazanen geen toegang toe hebben. Op mijn vraag aan de redactie of men zo'n absurd percentage niet even had moeten checken, kreeg ik als antwoord dat men geen enkele noodzaak zag een dergelijke bewering gedaan door een gezaghebbende organisatie als het Rode Kruis in twijfel te trekken. Maar zijn de media er niet juist om het gezag kritisch te volgen?

Of geldt dit alleen voor Israëlisch gezag?

 

 

Ratna

 

 

Zie ook: Amazing fact about Gazans

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Gaza buried in flour

 

http://sandbox.blog-city.com/gaza_buried_in_flour.htm

posted Monday, 28 January 2008

 

 

The Boston Globe has just run an op-ed under the headline "Ending the Stranglehold on Gaza." The authors are Eyad al-Sarraj, identified as founder of the Gaza Community Mental Health Program, and Sara Roy, identified as senior research scholar at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University. The bias of the op-ed speaks for itself, and I won't even dwell on it. But I do want to call attention to this sentence:

Although Gaza daily requires 680,000 tons of flour to feed its population, Israel had cut this to 90 tons per day by November 2007, a reduction of 99 percent.

You don't need to be a math genius to figure out that if Gaza has a population of 1.5 million, as the authors also note, then 680,000 tons of flour a day come out to almost half a ton of flour per Gazan, per day.

A typographical error at the Boston Globe? Hardly. The two authors used the same "statistic" in an earlier piece. They copied it from an article published in the Ahram Weekly last November, which reported that "the price of a bag of flour has risen 80 per cent, because of the 680,000 tonnes the Gaza Strip needs daily, only 90 tonnes are permitted to enter." Sarraj and Roy added the bit about this being "a reduction of 99 percent."

Note how an absurd and impossible "statistic" has made its way up the media feeding chain. It begins in an Egyptian newspaper, is cycled through a Palestinian activist, is submitted under the shared byline of a Harvard "research scholar," and finally appears in the Boston Globe, whose editors apparently can't do basic math. Now, in a viral contagion, this spreads across the Internet, where that "reduction of 99 percent" becomes a well-attested fact.

What's the truth? I see from a 2007 UN document that Gaza consumes 450 tons of flour daily. The Palestinian Ministry of Economy, according to another source, puts daily consumption at 350 tons. So the figure for total consumption retailed by Sarraj and Roy is off by more than three orders of magnitude, i.e. a factor of 1,000. No doubt, there's less flour shipped from Israel into Gaza--maybe it's those rocket barrages from Gaza into Israel?--but even if it's only the 90 tons claimed by Sarraj and Roy, it isn't anything near a "reduction of 99 percent." Unfortunately, if readers are going to remember one dramatic "statistic" from this op-ed, this one is it--and it's a lie.

Sarraj is a psychiatrist, but his co-author, Sara Roy, bills herself in her bio as a "political economist." Her research, the bio reports, is "primarily on the economic, social and political development of the Gaza Strip." You would think someone with this claim to expertise would know better than to copy some impossible pseudo-statistic on the consumption of the most basic foodstuff in Gaza. Indeed, in a piece she wrote a decade ago, she herself put Gaza's daily consumption of flour at 275 tons. Did she even read her own op-ed before she sent it off to Boston's leading paper? If she did, what we have here is a textbook example of the difference between a "political economist" and an economist.

 

Arabieren in Jeruzalem verhuizen naar Joodse buurten vanwege muur

"Their intentions are good," the woman said of her Jewish neighbors renting or selling to Arabs. "But will there be consequences later? That is the concern."

Racisme, of legitieme zorgen dat je wijk verkleurt? Een resident verwoordde haar onbehagen treffend:

 

 

"It is just weird sometimes when you go, for example, to the shopping center and it seems like there are only Arabs there," said one longtime resident of French Hill who did not want her name used. "It does not particularly bother me that there are a lot of Arabs here now, but the thing that strikes me is that I did not come from the United States 37 years ago to become a minority. When I start feeling like a minority it is unsettling."

 

 

Ratna

----------

To avoid fence, Jerusalem Arabs are making move to Jewish areas
By Dina Kraft Published: 01/24/2008
www.jta.org/cgi-bin/iowa/news/article/2008012420080124jerusalem.html


JERUSALEM (JTA) -- At Cafe Malcha in this city's French Hill neighborhood, Hebrew and Arabic newspapers sit on the counter and both languages are spoken amid the din of espresso machines and customers' laughter.

The cafe's back room is a well-known meeting place for Jewish and Arab businessmen, some of whom live in French Hill, a quiet neighborhood of stone apartment buildings and pine trees around Hebrew University's Mount Scopus campus.

"They live here and there are no problems whatsoever," Moshe Feldman, a retired Israeli army colonel and long-term French Hill resident, said of the Arabs in his neighborhood.

"It does not matter to me whether they are Jews or Arabs but whether or not they live according to the law," added Feldman, a former military governor of Ramallah.

The number of Arabs moving into French Hill, as well as other Jewish neighborhoods of Jerusalem, is rising.

Wanting to be on the Israeli side of the West Bank security fence, which in the vicinity of Jerusalem is mostly a concrete barrier some 20 feet high, thousands of Jerusalem Arabs are heading to the west side of the fence.

Those who cannot find housing in the traditionally Arab eastern part of the city, where demand has soared and prices have risen as the fence has severed Arab suburbs from Jerusalem, are moving in increasing numbers to Jewish neighborhoods of the Israeli capital, where homes are more affordable.

Ziad al-Hamouri, the head of the Jerusalem Center for Economic and Social Rights, said Palestinian newspapers now carry advertisements for homes in Jewish neighborhoods.

"It's very expensive to move into the eastern part of the city, and at the same time there is an increase in unemployment and poverty," he said. "This is leading Palestinians to seek out less expensive housing."

As a consequence, outlying Jerusalem neighborhoods like French Hill, Neve Yaakov and Pisgat Zeev -- which are on the Israeli side of the West Bank fence but east of the Green Line and therefore technically part of the West Bank -- are becoming mixed Arab-Jewish neighborhoods.

This shift, wrought by the security fence, is profoundly changing the city's character. In some cases it is prompting Jewish Jerusalemites unhappy with the changes to talk about leaving their neighborhoods or the city entirely.

Yisrael Kimche, an urban planner and senior researcher at the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, long has warned that Arab Jerusalemites eventually would start looking for housing in Jewish neighborhoods.

"Once such a process begins, Jewish residents will start leaving these neighborhoods," he wrote in a recent study about the implications of the security fence. "Processes of this kind are known the world over; seam neighborhoods tend to be the most severely affected. Should the phenomenon continue to spread, it may have consequences for the future of Israeli Jerusalem as the capital of the Jewish state."

Jerusalem's Jews seem to have mixed feelings about the changing demographics of their neighborhoods. Jews in some neigborhoods are setting up committees to prevent Arabs from moving in, and some are circulating fliers in synagogues against selling or renting homes to Arabs, according to Israeli media reports.

"It is just weird sometimes when you go, for example, to the shopping center and it seems like there are only Arabs there," said one longtime resident of French Hill who did not want her name used. "It does not particularly bother me that there are a lot of Arabs here now, but the thing that strikes me is that I did not come from the United States 37 years ago to become a minority. When I start feeling like a minority it is unsettling."

Most Jerusalem-area Arabs are not Israeli citizens but have permanent-resident status. They say they are moving to Jewish Jerusalem for two main reasons: long waits at checkpoints coming into the city and the possibility that their Israeli identity cards could be revoked if they live beyond the fence for an extended amount of time.

Furthermore, they say, if Jerusalem eventually is divided as part of a future peace deal and they end up on the Palestinian Authority side of the fence, they would lose access to the benefits of having an Israeli identity card -- including health care, Social Security payments, freedom of movement and access to jobs.
Jalah Hussein, an electrical engineer who works in Jerusalem but lives on its outskirts in the Shuaffat refugee camp, is among those looking for a home in a Jewish area. He says he has started looking for an apartment in Pisgat Zeev.

"Everyone is moving," he said.

The security fence "bothers all of us," Hussein said. "If I want to travel to work, or get the kids to school or a medical clinic, it is very difficult."

He said crossing the checkpoints into Jerusalem can take minutes or hours, depending on the level of security alert.

As for his six children adjusting to life in a Jewish area, he said, "They will have to get used to something new."

Benita Raphaely, an agent at Jerusalem Homes Realty, which sells properties in French Hill, said more Israeli Arabs are seeking her office's assistance. She described the potential buyers and renters as mostly professionals who have children in Israeli schools and are fully integrated residents of the city.

"We encounter apartment sellers who tell us that they only want to sell to Jews and those who don't mind who buys their property," Raphaely said. "There is a difference in people's willingness to contemplate selling to Christian Arabs and Armenians rather than to Muslims. Like most things in this country, very fine distinctions are made."

Shlomo Sirkus, a retired Bank of Israel executive, said he is considering leaving Jerusalem to be closer to his children who live elsewhere. For years he has lived in a cluster of upscale townhouses in French Hill where about a quarter of the owners are now Arabs, including some from the Galilee. Among them are doctors who work at the nearby Hadassah hospital.

"I think only Arabs will buy my house because at this point most Jews would not consider buying in a development where there is such a large number of Arabs," Sirkus said.

Another longtime resident of French Hill who asked that her name not be used said she fears that it will become increasingly difficult to find Jewish buyers in the neighborhood.

"Their intentions are good," the woman said of her Jewish neighbors renting or selling to Arabs. "But will there be consequences later? That is the concern."

Internationaal recht, de Gazastrook en Israëls recht op zelfverdediging

Het volgende essay is mogelijk wat eenzijdig, maar niet eenzijdiger dan al die eeuwige aanklachten tegen Israël als de enige mensenrechtenschender in het conflict. Sommige bevindingen zijn zeer verfrissend en zouden meer aandacht verdienen in de media, bijvoorbeeld wat betreft de vraag naar de status van de Gazastrook:

 

However, there is no legal basis for maintaining that Gaza is occupied territory. The Fourth Geneva Convention refers to territory as occupied where the territory is of another "High Contracting Party" (i.e., a state party to the convention) and the occupier "exercises the functions of government" in the occupied territory. The Gaza Strip is not territory of another state party to the convention and Israel does not exercise the functions of government-or, indeed, any significant functions-in the territory. It is clear to all that the elected Hamas government is the de facto sovereign of the Gaza Strip and does not take direction from Israel, or from any other state.

 

Moreover, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that foes of Israel claiming that Israel has legal duties as the "occupier" of Gaza are insincere in their legal analysis. If Israel were indeed properly considered an occupier, under Article 43 of the regulations attached to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, it would be required to take "all the measures in [its] power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety." Thus, those who contend that Israel is in legal occupation of Gaza must also support and even demand Israeli military operations in order to disarm Palestinian terror groups and militias. Additionally, claims of occupation necessarily rely upon a belief that the occupying power is not the true sovereign of the occupied territory. For that reason, those who claim that Israel occupies Gaza must believe that the border between Israel and Gaza is an international border between separate sovereignties. Yet, many of those claiming that Gaza is occupied, like John Dugard, also simultaneously and inconsistently claim that Israel is legally obliged to open the borders between Israel and Gaza. No state is required to leave its international borders open.

 

 

Israël is, net als alle andere staten, verplicht actie te ondernemen tegen terroristen: 

 

The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism requires Israel (like other state parties to the convention) to prevent the collection of funds intended to support terrorist attacks. The Palestinian attacks fall under the definition of terrorist attacks under Article 2(1)(b) of the convention because they are aimed at Israeli civilians in violation of the rule of distinction, and they are intended to kill or seriously injure civilians in order to intimidate a population. If Gaza is considered "territory of [the] state" of Israel, Israel is legally required to establish jurisdiction over Palestinian terrorist crimes under t he convention; if Gaza is not Israeli territory, Israel is permitted to establish jurisdiction over the terrorist crimes.

 

Under a related convention, the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, it is a crime to bomb public places (such as city streets) with the intent to kill civilians, by persons who are non-nationals of the state of which the victims are nationals. Under this convention too, the Palestinian attackers must be considered international terrorists and Israel is either required or permitted (depending on whether Gaza is Israeli "territory") to assume criminal jurisdiction over the Palestinian terrorists committing these acts. Additionally, other states signed on the convention-such as the United States, Russia, Turkey and France-must cooperate in helping to combat such Palestinian terrorist acts.

 

Finally, Security Council Resolution 1373 requires states to "deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens" and "prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups." The resolution was adopted under Chapter VII and is therefore apparently binding on all states, although some have argued that the resolution is not binding because the Security Council is not authorized to enact quasi-legislation. While the resolution does not define terrorism, it references the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, making it clear that the Palestinian attackers from Gaza fall within the scope of the international terrorists covered by the resolution. Consequently, if binding, this resolution requires Israel to take steps to deny safe haven to Palestinian attackers from Gaza and to prevent their free movement.

 

 

Volgens deze analyse heeft Israël niet alleen het recht om de terroristen te bestrijden, maar ook de plicht, en komt zij juist daarmee haar plichten onder het internationale recht na. Ongetwijfeld valt op het een of ander dat in het artikel wordt betoogd wel wat af te dingen, maar het wordt tijd dat deze discussie eens serieus gevoerd wordt in plaats van de eindeloos herhalende beschuldigingen en het eindeloos napraten van Israëls critici wat betreft schijnbare Israëlische schendingen van het internationale recht. Zoals zo vaak in ingewikkelde kwesties, zijn wetten op meerdere manieren uit te leggen, spreken verschillende wetten elkaar tegen en worden soms vage omschrijvingen als 'proportionaliteit' en 'excessief' gebruikt.

 

 

Ratna

----------

 

Jerusalem Issue Brief

 

Institute for Contemporary Affairs

founded jointly with the Wechsler Family Foundation

 

Vol. 7, No. 29    28 January 2008

 

 

 

International Law and Gaza: The Assault on Israel's Right to Self-Defense

 

Abraham Bell

 

 

·      International law authorizes Israel to initiate military countermeasures in Gaza. If Gaza is seen as having independent sovereignty, Israel's use of force is permissible on the grounds of self-defense. If Gaza is seen as lacking any independent sovereignty, Israel's use of military force is permissible as in other non-international conflicts. 

·      The rule of "distinction" includes elements of intent and expected result: so long as one aims at legitimate targets, the rule of distinction permits the attack, even if there will be collateral damage to civilians. The rule of "proportionality" also relies upon intent. If Israel plans a strike without expecting excessive collateral damage, the rule of proportionality permits it. Israeli attacks to date have abided by the rules of distinction and proportionality. 

·      Israel's imposition of economic sanctions on the Gaza Strip is a perfectly legal means of responding to Palestinian attacks. Since Israel is under no legal obligation to engage in trade of fuel or anything else with Gaza, or to maintain open borders, it may withhold commercial items and seal its borders at its discretion. 

·      The bar on collective punishment forbids the imposition of criminal-type penalties to individuals or groups on the basis of another's guilt. None of Israel's actions involve the imposition of criminal-type penalties.  

·      There is no legal basis for maintaining that Gaza is occupied territory. The Fourth Geneva Convention refers to territory as occupied where the territory is of a state party to the convention and the occupier "exercises the functions of government" in the territory. Gaza is not territory of another state party to the convention and Israel does not exercise the functions of government in the territory. 

·      The fighting in Gaza has been characterized by the extensive commission of war crimes, acts of terrorism and acts of genocide by Palestinians, while Israeli countermeasures have conformed with the requirements of international law. International law requires states to take measures to bring Palestinian war criminals and terrorists to justice, to prevent and punish Palestinian genocidal efforts, and to block the funding of Palestinian terrorist groups and those complicit with them.

 

 

Since Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in August 2005, Palestinian groups including Hamas, Fatah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Popular Resistance Committees have launched thousands of rocket attacks at Israel. All the attacks have been on civilian targets, with no more than a handful of possible exceptions. The brunt of the Palestinian assault has been borne by the town of Sderot. The attacks have killed several residents and injured dozens, struck houses and public buildings like kindergartens, and so traumatized residents that three-quarters of all Sderot children between the ages of 7 and 12 su ffer from post-traumatic anxiety.

 

 

Faulty Arguments Made by Opponents of Israel

 

Unsurprisingly, in the wake of Israeli countermeasures, persistent critics of Israel have strongly objected to Israel's defensive actions to date, while remaining mostly mute on the crime under international law committed daily by the Gazan militias' attacks on Israeli civilians. As will be explained below, it is evident that the criticisms are without legal basis. Israeli responses to the Palestinian terror attacks emanating from Gaza correspond to the requirements of international law, and the claims that Israel has violated international law are without merit.

 

One widely reported criticism came from John Dugard, a professor of international law who has accepted a permanent appointment as special rapporteur on human rights in the "occupied Palestinian territories" from the discredited UN Commission on Human Rights and its successor UN Human Rights Council. Dugard has publicly and repeatedly interpreted his mandate as requiring him to criticize only Israel and, true to form, Dugard criticized Israeli defense measures for alleged illegality in the high-profile Sunday New York Times (Jan. 20, 2008).

 

First, Dugard claimed that Israel's attack on Hamas headquarters in a Palestinian Interior Ministry building in Gaza was illegal because the target was "near a wedding venue with what must have been foreseen loss of life and injury to many civilians." However, contrary to Dugard's insinuation, the building was certainly a legitimate target under the international humanitarian legal rule of distinction as it makes a definite contribution to Hamas' hostilities. That one Palestinian civilian lost her life in the Israeli strike is unfortunate, but not a violation of the rule of proportionality, which authorizes collateral damage to civilians where justified by military necessity.

 

Second, Dugard asserted that Israel's closure of its borders with the Gaza Strip constitutes illegal "collective punishment." Yet there is nothing in international law that requires Israel to maintain open borders with such a hostile territory, whatever its sovereign status. Exercising legal counter-measures against a hostile entity does not constitute "collective punishment" under international law. Dugard's refusal to level the same charge against Egypt, which also kept closed its border with the Gaza Strip, underlines the bias that accompanies the legally inaccurate statement.

 

Dugard was not alone. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour denounced Israel's "disproportionate use of force." UN Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe told the UN Security Council that collective penalties were prohibited under international law (Financial Times, Jan. 22, 2008). UNRWA Commissioner General Karen Koning Abu Zayd joined the chorus by criticizing Israel's "sporadic" electricity supply to Gaza and its border closures and called on the international community to act (Guardian, Jan. 23, 2008). Unfortunately, these skewed assertions and misstatements of international law by UN officials framed how international public opinion views the illegal Palestinian actions in Gaza and the merits of Israeli defensive actions, and especially Israel's legal right to defend itself.

 

Some parties had the courage to reject the one-sided and faulty arguments. In the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, Canada, a state that prides itself in making the defense of human rights and international law a significant factor in its foreign policy, voted against a resolution condemning Israel for the Gaza fighting. While the European state members abstained in the Human Rights Council vote, some European officials, such as Franco Frattini, European Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security, correctly defended the legality of the Israeli actions, and others, such as Dutch Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen, criticized UN bias against Israel. Finally, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Zalmay Khalilzad told the UN Security Council on January 22, 2008, that Hamas was "ultimately responsible" for the current situation in Gaza.

 

This essay nevertheless attempts to construct a rational legal basis for evaluating Israeli behavior and potential criticisms. This is no easy task as many of the criticisms of Israel's conduct are made in conclusory fashion, without reference to legal doctrines or legal materials in support of the charges, or, alternatively, based on a misunderstanding of the requirements of the law and the factual context.

 

This essay examines, in turn, the six distinct bodies of law that could potentially affect the legality of Israeli counterstrikes:

 

1. the laws of initiating hostilities (jus ad bellum);
2. international humanitarian law, which governs the conduct of military actions;
3. the laws of occupied territory, which some have argued applies to Israeli actions against Gaza-based terrorists;
4. human rights laws;
5. laws on genocide; and
6. anti-terror laws.

 

A careful examination of the relevant law demonstrates that Israeli counterstrikes to date, and its potential future counterstrikes (both economic and military), conform to the requirements of international law. Moreover, Palestinian commission of war crimes and acts considered under international conventions to be terrorist acts and acts of genocide require Israel and other countries to take steps to punish Palestinian criminals for their acts in the Gaza fighting.

 

A final preliminary note is in order. The legal status of the Gaza Strip is an extremely complex puzzle in international law and is beyond the scope of this essay. Fortunately, it turns out that many of the legal conclusions regarding the Gaza fighting are not affected by the precise nature of Gaza's status. The essay notes those instances where Gaza's status does affect the ultimate legal determination.

 

 

1. The Legality of Israeli Military Actions under Jus ad Bellum

 

The law of jus ad bellum, as codified by the UN Charter, prevents using military force against another state. However, Article 51 of the Charter excludes self-defense from this ban on the use of force. Furthermore, jus ad bellum does not restrict the use of force in non-international conflicts.

 

Israel's right to use force in defending itself against Palestinian attacks from Gaza is clear, notwithstanding the uncertain legal status of the Gaza Strip, which makes it difficult to determine the grounds on which Israel's actions should be analyzed. If Gaza should be seen as having independent sovereignty, Israel's use of force is permissible on the grounds of self-defense. On the other hand, if Gaza is properly seen as lacking any independent sovereignty, Israel's use of military force is permissible as in other non-international conflicts.

 

 

2. The Legality of Israeli Military Actions under International Humanitarian Law

 

International humanitarian law regulates the use of force once military action is underway, irrespective of its legality under jus ad bellum. The two most basic principles of international humanitarian law are the rules of distinction and proportionality. Israel's counterstrikes have abided by both these rules.

 

Distinction:

 

The rule of distinction requires aiming attacks only at legitimate (e.g., military and support) targets. The rule of distinction includes elements of intent and expected result: so long as one aims at legitimate targets, the rule of distinction permits the attack, even if there will be collateral damage to civilians and even if, in retrospect, the attack was a mistake based on faulty intelligence. Israel has aimed its strikes at the locations from which rockets have been fired, Palestinian combatants bearing weapons and transporting arms, Palestinian terrorist commanders, and support and command and control centers. Locations such as Interior Ministry buildings from which Hamas directs some military activities are objects th at make a contribution to Hamas' military actions and are therefore legitimate targets, even though they also have civilian functions.

 

By contrast, the Palestinian attacks are aimed at Israeli civilians and therefore violate the rule of distinction. Moreover, one of the corollaries of the rule of distinction is a ban on the use of weapons that are incapable, under the circumstances, of being properly aimed at legitimate targets. The rockets and projectile weapons being used by the Palestinian attackers are primitive weapons that cannot be aimed at specific targets, and must be launched at the center of urban areas. This means that the very use of the weapons under current circumstances violates international humanitarian law.

 

Proportionality:

 

The rule of proportionality places limits on collateral damage. While collateral damage to civilian and other protected targets is permitted, collateral damage is forbidden if it is expected to be excessive in relation to the military need. Prosecutions for war crimes on the basis of disproportionate collateral damage are rare, and it is difficult to see how a credible claim can be made that any of Israel's counterstrikes have created disproportionate collateral damage. Moreover, like distinction, the rule of proportionality relies upon intent. If Israel plans a strike without expecting excessive collateral damage, the rule of proportionality pe rmits it, even if, in retrospect, Israel turns out to have erred in its damage estimates.

 

All reported Israeli strikes in the latest round of fighting have been aimed at legitimate targets and none has caused excessive collateral damage. Legal advisors attached to Israeli military units review proposed military actions and apply an extremely restrictive standard of both distinction and proportionality, in accordance with expansive Israeli Supreme Court rulings. It is thus likely that future Israeli measures will continue to abide by the rules of distinction and proportionality.

 

Retorsion:

 

Israel's imposition of economic sanctions on the Gaza Strip, such as withholding fuel supplies and electricity, does not involve the use of military force and is therefore a perfectly legal means of responding to Palestinian attacks, despite the effects on Palestinian citizens. The use of economic and other non-military sanctions as a means of "punishing" other international actors for their misbehavior is a practice known as "retorsion." It is generally acknowledged that every country may engage in retorsion so long as the underlying acts are themselves legal. Indeed, it is acknowledged that states may even go beyond retorsion to carry out non-belligerent reprisals-non-military acts that would otherwise be illegal (such as suspending flight agreements) as countermeasures. Since Israel is under no legal obligation to engage in trade of fuel or anything else with the Gaza Strip, or to maintain open borders with the Gaza Strip, it may withhold commercial items and seal its borders at its discretion, even if intended as "punishment" for Palestinian terrorism.

 

Collective Punishment:

 

While international law bars "collective punishment," none of Israel's combat actions and retorsions may be considered collective punishment. The bar on collective punishment forbids the imposition of criminal-type penalties to individuals or groups on the basis of another's guilt. None of Israel's actions involve the imposition of criminal-type penalties.

 

Examples of retorsions are legion in international affairs. The United States, for example, froze trade with Iran after the 1979 Revolution and with Uganda in 1978 after accusations of genocide. In 2000, fourteen European states suspended various diplomatic relations with Austria in protest of the participation of Jorg Haider in the government. Numerous states suspended trade and diplomatic relations with South Africa as punishment for apartheid practices. Obviously, in none of these cases was a charge raised of "colle ctive punishment."

 

 

3. The Legality of Israeli Military Actions under the Laws of Occupation

 

Some groups have claimed that the Gaza Strip should be considered "occupied" by Israel according to the Fourth Geneva Convention, in which case Israel would be required to "ensure the food and medical supplies of the population," as well as "agree to relief schemes on behalf of the...population" and maintain "public health and hygiene."

 

Due to internal political considerations as well as rulings by the Israeli Supreme Court, Israel continues to maintain the flow of basic humanitarian supplies such as food, medicine and water to the Palestinian population of Gaza. In a recent case (Albassiouni v. Prime Minister, HCJ 9132/07), the Israeli Supreme Court implied that it interpreted domestic Israeli administrative law to require the Israeli government to maintain a minimum flow of Israeli-supplied necessary humanitarian goods when engaging in retorsional acts such as cutting off the Israeli supply of electricity to Gaza. Thus, even if there were a legal basis for considering Gaza Israeli-occupied territory, Israel would be fulfilling its duties under the Fourth Geneva Convention.

 

However, there is no legal basis for maintaining that Gaza is occupied territory. The Fourth Geneva Convention refers to territory as occupied where the territory is of another "High Contracting Party" (i.e., a state party to the convention) and the occupier "exercises the functions of government" in the occupied territory. The Gaza Strip is not territory of another state party to the convention and Israel does not exercise the functions of government-or, indeed, any significant functions-in the territory. It is clear to all that the elected Hamas government is the de facto sovereign of the Gaza Strip and does not take direction from Israel, or from any other state.

 

Some have argued that states can be considered occupiers even of areas where they do not declare themselves in control so long as the putative occupiers have effective control. For instance, in 2005, the International Court of Justice opined that Uganda could be considered the occupier of Congolese territory over which it had "substituted [its] own authority for that of the Congolese Government" even in the absence of a formal military administration. Some have argued that this shows that occupation may occur even in the absence of a full-scale military presence and claimed that this renders Israel an occupier under the Fourth Geneva Convention. However, these claims are clearly without merit. First, Israel does not otherwise fulfill the conditions of being an occupier; in particular, Israel does not exercise the functions of government in Gaza, and it has not substituted its authority for the de facto Hamas government. Second, Israel cannot project effective control in Gaza. Indeed, Israelis and Palestinians well know that projecting such control would require an extensive military operation amounting to the armed conquest of Gaza. Military superiority over a neighbor, and the ability to conquer a neighbor in an extensive military operation, does not itself constitute occupation. If it did, the United States would have to be considered the occupier of Mexico, Egypt the occupier of Libya and Gaza, and China the occupier of North Korea.

 

Moreover, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that foes of Israel claiming that Israel has legal duties as the "occupier" of Gaza are insincere in their legal analysis. If Israel were indeed properly considered an occupier, under Article 43 of the regulations attached to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, it would be required to take "all the measures in [its] power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety." Thus, those who contend that Israel is in legal occupation of Gaza must also support and even demand Israeli military operations in order to disarm Palestinian terror groups and militias. Additionally, claims of occupation necessarily rely upon a belief that the occupying power is not the true sovereign of the occupied territory. For that reason, those who claim that Israel occupies Gaza must believe that the border between Israel and Gaza is an international border between separate sovereignties. Yet, many of those claiming that Gaza is occupied, like John Dugard, also simultaneously and inconsistently claim that Israel is legally obliged to open the borders between Israel and Gaza. No state is required to leave its international borders open.

 

 

4. The Legality of Israeli Military Actions under International Human Rights Law

 

Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Israel is required to ensure the protection of certain rights "within its territory" including the right to life. The application of the covenant to Israeli activities in the Gaza Strip is questionable as it is unlikely that the Gaza Strip should be considered Israel's territory. Nonetheless, Israel has abided by the requirements of the convention, if it applies to Gaza. In combat situations the meaning of t he rights in the convention is established by the rules of international humanitarian law. Thus, Israel is protecting the human rights of Palestinian residents of the Gaza Strip by abiding by international humanitarian law.

 

 

5. Duties of Israel under the Genocide Convention

 

Article Two of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide defines any killing with intent "to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such" as an act of genocide. Given expressions of intent by some of the Palestinian terrorist groups to kill Jews as a group due to their ethnic identity (such as the Hamas charter's call for an armed struggle against all Jews until judgment day), all the members of such groups who carry out killings are guilty of the crime of genocide under the convention. Under Article One of the convention, Israel and other signatories are required to "prevent and punish" not only persons who carry out such genocidal acts, but those who conspire with them, incite them to kill, and are complicit with their actions. The convention thus requires Israel to prevent and punish the terrorists themselves, as well as public figures who have publicly supported the Palestinian attacks.

 

 

6. Duties of Israel under Anti-Terrorism Conventions

 

The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism requires Israel (like other state parties to the convention) to prevent the collection of funds intended to support terrorist attacks. The Palestinian attacks fall under the definition of terrorist attacks under Article 2(1)(b) of the convention because they are aimed at Israeli civilians in violation of the rule of distinction, and they are intended to kill or seriously injure civilians in order to intimidate a population. If Gaza is considered "territory of [the] state" of Israel, Israel is legally required to establish jurisdiction over Palestinian terrorist crimes under t he convention; if Gaza is not Israeli territory, Israel is permitted to establish jurisdiction over the terrorist crimes.

 

Additionally, the convention establishes that Israel is not only permitted to impose certain economic sanctions on the de facto rulers of the Gaza Strip, it is required to do so.

 

Under a related convention, the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, it is a crime to bomb public places (such as city streets) with the intent to kill civilians, by persons who are non-nationals of the state of which the victims are nationals. Under this convention too, the Palestinian attackers must be considered international terrorists and Israel is either required or permitted (depending on whether Gaza is Israeli "territory") to assume criminal jurisdiction over the Palestinian terrorists committing these acts. Additionally, other states signed on the convention-such as the United States, Russia, Turkey and France-must cooperate in helping to combat such Palestinian terrorist acts.

 

Finally, Security Council Resolution 1373 requires states to "deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens" and "prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups." The resolution was adopted under Chapter VII and is therefore apparently binding on all states, although some have argued that the resolution is not binding because the Security Council is not authorized to enact quasi-legislation. While the resolution does not define terrorism, it references the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, making it clear that the Palestinian attackers from Gaza fall within the scope of the international terrorists covered by the resolution. Consequently, if binding, this resolution requires Israel to take steps to deny safe haven to Palestinian attackers from Gaza and to prevent their free movement.

 

 

Conclusion

 

The Palestinian-Israeli fighting in Gaza has been characterized by the extensive commission of war crimes, acts of terrorism and acts of genocide by Palestinian fighters, while Israeli countermeasures have conformed with the requirements of international law.

 

International law requires states to take measures to bring Palestinian war criminals and terrorists to justice, to prevent and punish Palestinian genocidal efforts, and to block the funding of Palestinian terrorist groups and those complicit with them.

 

*     *     *

 

Dr. Avi Bell is a member of the Faculty of Law at Bar-Ilan University, Visiting Professor at Fordham University Law School, and Director of the International Law Forum at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

 

 

 

 

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