zaterdag 21 juli 2007

Soedanese vluchtelingen in Israël

Zie ook het eerdere (Engelstalige) bericht over de Soedanese vluchtelingen en de absurde beschuldigingen van de Soedanese regering.
_______________________________

Israël: Uittocht uit Darfur
http://www.elsevier.nl/magazine/artikel.asp?artnr=161202&jaargang=63&week=29

Elsevier - 21 juli 2007

Soedanezen zoeken asiel in Israël. Ze oogsten er sympathie door berichten over genocide in Darfur

Door Gerbert van der Aa

Israël heeft te kampen met een groeiende stroom Soedanese vluchtelingen, die vanuit het buurland Egypte illegaal het land binnenreizen. De Soedanezen, voor een deel afkomstig uit de onrustige regio Darfur, worden door Egyptische bedoeïenen door de Sinaï-woestijn de grens over gesmokkeld. Sinds begin dit jaar zijn enkele honderden Afrikanen op die manier in Israël aangekomen.

De standaardprocedure van de Israëlische autoriteiten is om de Soedanese vluchtelingen te arresteren. Soedan, dat het bestaan van Israël niet erkent, is officieel een vijandelijke staat. Maar de vluchtelingen mogen blijven als ze kunnen aantonen afkomstig te zijn uit Darfur, waar een oorlog woedt die sinds 2003 naar schatting 200.000 mensen het leven heeft gekost. Anderen worden teruggestuurd.

De Soedanese vluchtelingen verblijven met name in de zuidelijke stad Beersheba. Particuliere Israëlische hulporganisaties spannen zich voor hen in. Ze hebben een hotel afgehuurd om de Soedanezen op te vangen en brengen hen in contact met de VN-vluchtelingenorganisatie UNHCR. Ook is er voor ongeveer tweehonderd Soedanese vluchtelingen werk geregeld op kibboetsen, de collectieve boerenbedrijven in Israël.

De vluchtelingen uit Darfur raken een gevoelige snaar in Israël. De claim van sommige activisten dat de moordpartijen in Darfur een genocide zijn, levert de vluchtelingen veel sympathie op in Israël. Dat het merendeel van de vluchtelingen uit Darfur moslim is, hoeft geen belemmering te zijn. Israël gaf zo'n tien jaar geleden ook asiel aan gevluchte moslims uit Bosnië.

Israël vangt steeds vaker niet-joodse vluchtelingen op. Behalve aan mensen uit Darfur en Bosnië gaf het land ook asiel aan enkele honderden Afrikanen die op de vlucht waren voor het geweld in Ivoorkust. Ook vluchtelingen uit Eritrea, Turkije en Georgië zijn de afgelopen jaren opgevangen.

Doghmush clan en machtstrijd in Gaza

De Doghmush clan in de Gazastrook werd rijk en machtig door met name wapensmokkel, importmonopolies en losgeld voor ontvoerde buitenlanders, en door haar omvang. In maart ontvoerde het de Britse journalist Alan Johnston. 
Gaza staat bekend om haar hoge geboortecijfer, dat samen met de opname van vluchtelingen uit de 1948 oorlog ertoe geleid heeft dat het één van de dichtstbevolkte streken ter wereld is.
 
Met weinig werkgelegenheid in de strook, maar de zekerheid van voorzieningen van de UNWRA en andere internationale steun, is de bevolking de laatste 60 jaar enorm toegenomen. Het geboortecijfer wordt als wapen gebruikt in de demografische oorlog tussen Palestijnen en Joden, maar ook voor de clans onderling geldt: hoe meer kinderen, hoe meer macht.
 
Abby
________________________________________

Saturday, July 21, 2007
Notorious Gaza clan vows to avenge killings by Hamas
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=2&article_id=83972
Mehdi Lebouachera
Agence France Presse

GAZA CITY: Inside his heavily fortified compound, the head of Gaza's most notorious clan offers insight into his sprawling family that until recently was little known outside the territory.

"We have all the factions in our ranks," Salah Doghmush said of his clan, which shot to international notoriety recently when a group founded by one of its own kidnapped BBC journalist Alan Johnston.

"Fatah, Hamas, Popular Resistance Committees, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Army of Islam," he added, listing some of the main Palestinian factions. "We have them all." "But to remain united, not talking politics has become law within the family," said the head of a clan with an estimated 3,500 members inside Gaza and 1,500 abroad.

Boosted by their numbers, money and arms, the Doghmushes have become one of the most powerful of Gaza's clans over the past several years.
The clan compound lies in the Sabra district of Gaza City, with each entrance featuring a checkpoint guarded by heavily armed men.

"No armed stranger can enter here," said Salah.

"Those who don't know Doghmush criticize us. But those who know us say that we are the best family" in the Gaza Strip, he added, smiling.
One of the people to know the family is Kamel, the 70-year-old head of the Badawi clan linked to the Doghmushes by marriage.
"It's a family that instills fear because there are so many of them and they have a lot of money," said the wrinkled badawi, reclining in his luxurious garden.

"They have managed to establish a monopoly on the import of rubber into Gaza, and they also own a number of garages and work in construction," he added.

The Doghmushes are also suspected of having earned a large part of their fortune in arms smuggling, and Palestinian security services say their pockets have been lined with ransoms paid to free foreigners kidnapped by clan members.

The most infamous kidnapping was that of BBC's Alan Johnston. The veteran newsman was held for nearly four months - by far the longest a kidnapped Westerner was held in Gaza - before being freed unharmed on July 4.

The group that took responsibility for his abduction, the Army of Islam, was founded in 2005 by Mumtaz Doghmush, a high-school dropout who at one point has been associated with Fatah, Hamas and the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC).

Army of Islam is the latest addition to the myriad of factions represented among the Doghmushes, and uses language and symbolism usually associated with Al-Qaeda.

Prior to the Johnston kidnapping, the Army of Islam was mainly known for participating, along with Hamas and the PRC, in the cross-border raid last June in which militants killed two Israeli soldiers and seized a third who remains in captivity.

Salah Doghmush had little to say about them.

"Whatever Mumtaz is up to has nothing to do with the family. It's not something we know about," he said brusquely.

"I don't want to ask. It's none of my business."

Indeed, for several months now, Doghmush has had other business on his mind, amid ongoing tensions with Gaza's new masters, Hamas. The strains began in December, when two Doghmushes loyal to the secular Fatah movement - Mahmoud and Ashraf - were killed by the Islamists during factional clashes in Gaza.
The family vowed to avenge the deaths. "We know that there were 18 people who participated in the attack," Salah Doghmush said. "We have killed three. The others will have to pay. An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth."
The tensions with Hamas further increased during the Johnston kidnapping. Hamas, eager to show to the outside world that it would introduce a measure of law and order to chaotic Gaza, surrounded the Doghmush compound to put pressure on Mumtaz to free the journalist.

"There is no more confidence between us and Hamas," said a senior Army of Islam official, declining to identify himself.

"We could never believe Hamas could kill Mahmoud and Ashraf, after all that Mumtaz had done for them. There will be no forgiveness," he warned.

Minister van huisvesting overweegt bevriezing sloop Bedoeïnenhuizen

Een Israëlische onderzoekscommissie gaat zich buigen over het probleem van de 'niet-erkende' Bedoeïnendorpen in de Negev woestijn. Hopelijk komen hier wijze aanbevelingen uit, en volgt er daarna daadwerkelijk een beter beleid ten opzichte van de Bedoeïnen.
 
De Bedoeïnen leidden van oudsher een grotendeels nomadisch bestaan in de woestijnen van Noord-Afrika en het Midden-Oosten. In de loop van de 20ste eeuw kwam hieraan voor de meeste stammen een einde door de vestiging van natie-staten, moderne transportmiddelen en oliewinning en toenemende droogte, die de bewegingsvrijheid en bestaansmiddelen van de Bedoeïnen drastisch beperkten. Velen zagen zich gedwongen naar de steden te vertrekken.
 
Na de oprichting van Israël moesten de Bedoeïnen van de Negev zich in de noordoosthoek van de Negev vestigen, en vanaf eind jaren '70 werden ze voor een groot deel gehuisvest in 7 daarvoor gebouwde steden met doorgaans slechte voorzieningen en weinig werkgelegenheid. In de tientallen door hen zelf gestichte maar niet door de staat erkende dorpen zijn geen overheidsvoorzieningen en mogen geen permanente huizen gebouwd worden.
 
Abby
______________________________
 
Fri., July 20, 2007 Haaretz
Housing minister seeks halt to Bedouin house demolitions
By Mijal Grinberg
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/883846.html

Housing Minister Ze'ev Boim is considering suspending demolitions of Bedouin houses in the Negev for a year, during which time a public committee will work out a solution to the dispute over Bedouin land ownership.

Earlier this week, the council of unrecognized Bedouin villages set up a refugee camp in the Wohl Rose Garden near the Knesset to protest the ongoing demolitions of homes in Bedouin villages. In the past year alone, the authorities have demolished 110 Bedouin houses.

Boim yesterday asked Mazuz to approve his initiative to suspend the demolitions for a year, on condition that the Bedouin halt their construction during this period.

The Bedouin community and Israel have been embroiled in a historic controversy over the ownership of lands where Bedouin live in the Negev.

The Bedouin are demanding that the state recognize 34 villages, inhabiting some 80,000 people with no running water or electricity.

The Bedouin claim ownership of 800,000 dunam, constituting some 6 percent of the Negev area. In 1948, numerous Bedouin fled from Israel. Others remained on their land, while another group was transferred by the state to other lands.

Over the years, Israel has transferred the Bedouin, a nomad people, to seven permanent communities. Bedouin ownership claims on some of these communities' lands has prevented their development and consequently these towns suffer from a severe lack of infrastructure. The Bedouin community's main complaint is that living in the towns makes it impossible for them to be farmers.

Earlier this week, the cabinet decided to set up a body to examine the Bedouin villages in the Negev and formulate a report to settle the controversy.

woensdag 18 juli 2007

Egypte en de Zionistische verdeel en heers politiek

Al Ahram is een Engelstalige Egyptische krant die de Egyptische regering steunt. Over het algemeen worden in de Engelstalige versie gematigdere artikelen gepubliceerd dan in de Arabische. Toch staan hier geregeld artikelen in die de 'ware Zionistische intenties' onthullen, Israel met nazi Duitsland vergelijken, en Israel verantwoordelijk houden voor alle ellende in het Midden-Osten. In onderstaand artikel baseert Hassan Nafaa zich op een 'studie' uit 1982 van Oded Yinon die in het Engels is vertaald door Israel Shahak, een Joodse antisemiet.

Niet het beleid van de Israëlische regering of de programma's van de politieke partijen die er deel van uitmaken maken duidelijk wat de intenties zijn van de Zionistische beweging, maar deze 25 jaar oude 'studie'. Er zijn talloze studies over het Zionisme verschenen, en vaak hebben ze weinig van doen met het beleid van Israël of de Zionistische organisaties in de diaspora. Waarom we deze studie als een 'practisch manifest van de Zionistische beweging' moeten zien, blijft dan ook onduidelijk.
 
Volgens Yinon wil Israël verdeeldheid tussen de Koptische Christenen en de Moslims in Egypte zaaien, en de Sinai terugveroveren:

It is not hard, however, to see through this argument. Yinon points, both implicitly and explicitly, to a long-term strategy. Sinai is a sparsely populated area and suitable for urban development. Sinai is an area that could be used to absorb the population growth among the Palestinians of Gaza, or even to offer a lasting solution to the refugees' problem. Alternatively, Sinai could be used to house those Jewish immigrants who -- once Israel becomes the region's dominant power -- would start arriving from other parts of the world.

As to the Coptic issue, Yinon advises Israel to sow sedition between Egypt's Muslims and Copts with the ultimate aim of creating a dominantly Sunni Muslim state in the north and a dominantly Christian one in the south. Yinon sees this option as the best way to weaken the central state in Egypt and deprive the Arab world of the one country that could hold it together. Once Egypt is divided, Libya and Sudan would fall apart, even without foreign intervention, he says.


Maar dit is natuurlijk nog maar het begin. Israël is erop uit om overal in de moslim wereld verdeeldheid te zaaien. Nadat de plannen wat betreft Egypte waren mislukt vanwege het Libanese en Palestijnse verzet, probeert men zijn geluk nu in Irak.

I would like to remind the young people in this country that Israel's strategy was foiled only by the steadfastness of the Lebanese resistance, by the ability of that resistance to bring down the May 1983 treaty, and by subsequent Intifadas in Palestine. This course of events is what protected Egypt, however temporarily, from the designs that Israel had in mind. Israel's failure in Lebanon has saved the entire region from the partitioning Yinon talks about, and I will discuss this point further in my next article.
But Israel's failure didn't stop it from trying. So it tried its luck once again in Iraq -- also to no avail. Still, Israel hasn't given up, and it is not going to give up. So I urge all our young people to read what Yinon wrote. Read his exact words and not just the account I am giving here.

De jonge lezers van Al Ahram moeten weten dat alle ellende in de Arabische wereld komt door Israël en haar plannen voor het Midden-Oosten. Ze zouden anders zomaar kunnen denken dat sommige problemen te maken hebben met de incompetentie van Arabische leiders, en dat moeten we natuurlijk niet hebben. Dat Israël en Egypte vrede hebben gesloten, dat Israël nooit iets heeft gedaan of gezegd dat in de verste verte hint op een nieuwe oorlog of verovering van de Sinai, dat Egypte jaarlijks miljarden van de VS krijgt als 'beloning' voor deze vrede, dat weerhoudt Egyptische media niet van het publiceren van dergelijke opruiende artikelen.

Ratna
-------------------

Egypt and the Zionist plan of division
In his second article on key principles of Zionist strategy, Hassan Nafaa* describes how keeping Egypt weak is a lynchpin of Israel's regional ambitions
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/853/op2.htm
In the first instalment of what I intended would be a short series of articles, I wrote that Oded Yinon's 1982 study entitled "A Strategy for Israel in the 1980s" is the most detailed account so far of the Zionist mindset; how it works and how it aspires to manage conflict with the Arab world in a way that leads to the creation of a dominant Jewish state in the region. My contention is that Yinon's study should be regarded as a practical manifesto of the Zionist movement, and not just the opinion of an obscure Jewish writer or a former Israeli diplomat.

Yinon's study appeared in Hebrew in Kivunim (or Directions), a publication dedicated to Jewish questions and the Zionist movement in general. The Association of Arab American University Graduates took a special interest in this study following Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982. It asked Professor Israel Shahak, a well-known Israeli activist, to translate it into English. The study was republished with a foreword and epilogue by Shahak and given the title "The Zionist Plan for the Middle East", in order to show that Yinon wasn't just expressing a personal opinion.

The most disturbing thing about the Yinon's paper is Egypt's central role in the Zionist movement's strategy to dismember the Arab world. Although the study was written about five years after former President Anwar El-Sadat visited the Knesset, four years after Egypt signed the two Camp David agreements, and three years after the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty went into effect, and although Yinon was fully aware that Egypt's signing of a peace treaty with Israel had cost it dearly, isolating it from the rest of the Arab world and undermining its standing in the international arena, this didn't change in any way how the Zionists regarded Egypt.

Yinon was clearly convinced that no strategy to divide the Arab world would succeed without first weakening the one country that has one-third of the Arab population and that is the region's acknowledged leader. So Yinon makes a point of proving that Egypt is weak, divisible, and nothing more than a paper tiger. Egypt, he maintains, won't be able to protect the Arab world against dismemberment and ultimate downfall. To prove his point, Yinon proffers three assumptions.

The first assumption concerns the nature of the Egyptian political system. Yinon tries to prove that the Egyptian regime is incompetent, bankrupt and generally hapless. The state apparatus in Egypt is so bureaucratic and complex, according to Yinon, that it couldn't possibly take any initiative or achieve anything significant in any field. Although Yinon admits that the Egyptian army is an exceptional case, as it can sometimes break from the terrible grip of Egyptian bureaucracy, as it did in 1973, he claims that the rest of the country's sectors are in a miserable shape, fighting for mere survival and reproducing past mishaps in a manner that renders the entire country semi-incapacitated.

The second assumption concerns the nature of Egypt's socio-economic system. Yinon argues that Egypt is overpopulated, short of resources, and technologically and scientifically backward to the point that it cannot provide for its population who live on a tiny geographical slice of the country's total territories. US aid has helped Egypt stay afloat, but this aid is linked to the peace process and therefore temporary. Yinon claims that the Egyptian social system is class-based and so discriminatory that a small part of the population is getting richer while the rest is getting poorer. Because Egypt's system of services, especially in education and health, is barely functioning, the country is unlikely to achieve real development in the foreseeable future, he notes.

The third assumption concerns Egypt's stability and sectarian coexistence. Egypt, Yinon claims, is unstable because a significant Coptic minority is persecuted, marginalised, and excluded from any participation in public life. The Copts make up almost 10 per cent of the population. They are a majority in some parts of the south and have developed a tendency for isolation following the rise of fundamentalist Islam. The Copts are mostly ready for secession and would consider independence a good option, he concludes.

Based on these three assumptions -- which Yinon treats as indisputable facts -- Yinon surmises that Egypt is superficially a strong country but is actually fragile and weak. The country's weakness became apparent in 1956 and a fact known to all after the 1967 defeat, which slashed Egypt's capabilities by at least 50 per cent. Yinon says that Egypt's restoration of Sinai, with its considerable natural resources, especially in oil and gas, gave it some respite. He adds that Israel should do everything it can to prevent Egypt from fully recovering.

As part of its quest to divide the Arab world, Israel should follow a two-pronged approach to Egypt. First, it should regain control of Sinai. Secondly, it should encourage the creation of a dominantly Coptic state in Upper Egypt, Yinon suggests.

Concerning the first objective, Yinon warns Israel against adopting a policy of compromise and territorial concessions. He advises Israel against giving up any of the land it occupied. Interestingly, Yinon makes none of the conventional arguments related to Israel's biblical claims. Instead, he offers arguments of a mainly economic nature. He says that Israel needs an increasing supply of energy, especially oil and gas, and some of the mineral resources of Sinai. Those resources, he argues, are essential to Israel's strategy and independence.

It is not hard, however, to see through this argument. Yinon points, both implicitly and explicitly, to a long-term strategy. Sinai is a sparsely populated area and suitable for urban development. Sinai is an area that could be used to absorb the population growth among the Palestinians of Gaza, or even to offer a lasting solution to the refugees' problem. Alternatively, Sinai could be used to house those Jewish immigrants who -- once Israel becomes the region's dominant power -- would start arriving from other parts of the world.

As to the Coptic issue, Yinon advises Israel to sow sedition between Egypt's Muslims and Copts with the ultimate aim of creating a dominantly Sunni Muslim state in the north and a dominantly Christian one in the south. Yinon sees this option as the best way to weaken the central state in Egypt and deprive the Arab world of the one country that could hold it together. Once Egypt is divided, Libya and Sudan would fall apart, even without foreign intervention, he says.

I would like the young generations of Arabs, especially in Egypt, to note the timing of Yinon's study. This study came out in February 1982, which is a few weeks after the assassination of Sadat and ahead of Israel's withdrawal from Sinai, which was completed on 25 April 1982. Israel withdrew from Sinai in the scheduled time but only after it created a phoney dispute over Taba; a dispute that it hoped it could use as pretext to recapture Sinai. A few months after Yinon's study was released, Israel invaded Lebanon on 5 June 1982. It besieged Beirut, installed one of its allies in power, and forced him to sign a peace treaty on 17 May 1983.

Had things gone according to plan in Lebanon, and had Israel been able to impose its hegemony on the Arab world, it would have turned against Egypt once more and found a pretext to recapture Sinai. Then it would have interfered in Egyptian domestic affairs and driven a wedge between Copts and Muslims.

I would like to remind the young people in this country that Israel's strategy was foiled only by the steadfastness of the Lebanese resistance, by the ability of that resistance to bring down the May 1983 treaty, and by subsequent Intifadas in Palestine. This course of events is what protected Egypt, however temporarily, from the designs that Israel had in mind. Israel's failure in Lebanon has saved the entire region from the partitioning Yinon talks about, and I will discuss this point further in my next article.

But Israel's failure didn't stop it from trying. So it tried its luck once again in Iraq -- also to no avail. Still, Israel hasn't given up, and it is not going to give up. So I urge all our young people to read what Yinon wrote. Read his exact words and not just the account I am giving here.

* The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.
 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ontvangen via:
Subscribe - mail to mewbkd-subscribe@yahoogroups.com

Het Anti-Zionisme van 'progressieve' Joden

Een interview met de Amerikaanse Alvin Rosenfeld over de trend onder sommige progressieve Joden om Israël bijzonder hard aan te vallen. Nadat hij hier een paar maanden geleden een artikel over schreef is hij ervan beschuldigd alle kritiek op Israël af te doen als antisemitisme.

"In their work, we often see an extreme version of rhetorical inflation, which sometimes goes so far as to link Israel with history's worst regimes, such as Nazi Germany or apartheid South Africa. Some of their pronouncements resemble anti-Zionist hate speech employed by the worst anti-Semites."

Daar kunnen we hier in Nederland over mee praten. Een Ander Joods Geluid schept er een bijzonder genoegen in om Israël met de nazi's te vergelijken. En omdat de voorzitter, Hajo Meyer, zelf een slachtoffer van de Holocaust is, mag het. Over misbruik van de geschiedenis gesproken.

Nee, niet iedereen die links of progressief is is anti-Israël, legt ook Rosenfeld uit, gelukkig maar, en eigenlijk zijn er heel veel redenen voor linkse mensen om op zijn minst net zo kritisch naar de Palestijnen en Arabische staten te zijn.   

Ratna
_________________________________________
Ynetnews interviews
Professor Alvin Rosenfeld, author of controversial article that noted growing trend of rhetoric resembling 'anti-Zionist hate speech employed by the worst anti-Semites' among progressive Jewish academics
Noa Levanon Published: 07.16.07, 16:20 / Israel Jewish Scene

Were you surprised by the controversy surrounding your article, "'Progressive' Jewish thought and the new anti-Semitism "? What do you think caused it?

The New York Times ran a story about my article entitled "Essay Linking Liberal Jews to Anti-Semitism Sparks a Furor." It was really after this article that the furor began.

The article linked anti-Semitism with "liberal Jews", a term I had not used. That disturbed a lot of people, for perhaps 85 to 90 percent of Jews in America think of themselves as liberals.

Additionally, the AJC was erroneously labeled a "conservative advocacy group," which it is not. So, unfortunately, the article played into the current culture wars in the United States between right and left, liberal and conservative opinion.

In an explanatory article that you wrote for The New Republic, you emphasized the fact that your choice of the word "progressive" was self-chosen by the individuals whose work you examined. Could you define some generalized characteristics of the term, and what distinguishes it from liberalism, in your opinion?

The terms "liberal" and "liberalism" have fallen casualty to the culture wars, so some now use "progressive." In some sense, "progressive" is a more radical version of "liberal." But, in many cases, it's merely an honorific adopted by people who want to be on the "right-thinking side of things".

For some, to be counted as a member of the progressive camp, anti-Zionism is a necessary part of the equation - as well as anti-capitalism, anti-globalization, anti-Americanism, etc. It's part of a whole ideological package.

In many respects, I regard myself as a liberal, especially on domestic US issues such as healthcare and public education. But, when it comes to foreign policy, if being a liberal means being anti-Zionist, I'd quickly count myself out.

Some so-called "progressives" are pro-Israel, but the momentum right now is not with them. Instead, many who see themselves in this camp have become so radical as to routinely accuse Israel of rampant racism, ethnic cleansing, even genocide. They are angry and bitter in their denunciations of Israel.

In their work, we often see an extreme version of rhetorical inflation, which sometimes goes so far as to link Israel with history's worst regimes, such as Nazi Germany or apartheid South Africa. Some of their pronouncements resemble anti-Zionist hate speech employed by the worst anti-Semites.

How do you think the anti-Zionism of some progressive Jews relates to their Jewish identity?

It varies a good deal. For some, being anti-Israel defines their core Jewish identity. They feel the need to negate Israel in order to validate a newly affirmed Diaspora identity, similar to the rejection of the Diaspora in Israel, especially during the nation's early years.

Some of those in the leadership of the British effort for an academic boycott of Israel are Jews, including Israelis or ex-Israelis living in Great Britain. They dislike Israel intensely. Some also claim to be acting in accord with prophetic teachings and what they see as a higher Jewish ideal. They find their Jewish affirmations in opposition to the Jewish state.

Also, you find people who don't want any Jewish connection at all. Many Jewish academics who think of themselves as Marxists, for example, refuse to be associated with religious or national identities, either Judaism or Israel.

Within the political sphere, Marxism is by and large a spent force, but Marxist ideas and loyalties hang on in universities and sometimes express themselves in fierce opposition to or outright rejection of Israel.

Moving from margins to mainstream
In line with these adversarial postures, Prof Rosenfeld alluded to a movement of extreme anti-Zionist thinking into the mainstream, noting that books by some of Israel's foremost Jewish detractors have been picked up by major publishing houses.

One example, which he cited in his original article, was British academic Jacqueline Rose's book, "The Question of Zion", published by Princeton University Press.

"What was disturbing about this," he said, "is that the book is full of egregious factual errors, as well as badly distorted by ideological bias.

"Rose claims Adolf Hitler and Theodore Herzl attended an opera by Wagner on the same night in Paris, which supposedly inspired both of their ideas, although Hitler did not come to Paris until 1940, long after Herzl had died. Rose also calls Israel to task for the 'razing' of Jenin, which never happened.

"The fact that such a book carries the Princeton University stamp may show a troubling movement of radical anti-Zionist ideas from the margins into the mainstream. And Rose's book is hardly alone.

"Norman Finkelstein's most recent tirade against Israel was published by the University of California Press, and Jimmy Carter's best-selling tarring of Israel with the apartheid brush came out with Simon & Schuster.

"These are seriously flawed, deeply tendentious books, but they carry the imprimatur of some of America's most highly respected publishing houses. That's worrisome."

Can any legal recourse be taken, in light of such blatant factual errors?

I've been accused of advocating censorship, even of wanting to bring us back to the age of McCarthyism, but none of that is true.

Here, simply put, is what I believe: biased, erroneous, and irrational criticism must be met by all of the power of lucid argument and rational criticism. Any writer who publishes his or her ideas is subject to the latter.

What I and others are attempting to do is expose the poverty of some of these malicious ideas, including those that unfairly attack Israel and its supporters. But in the realm of public opinion, short of committing outright defamation, I don't think legal recourse can or should be taken.

So, is that the way you believe we should combat the globalization and evolution, as you called it in your article, of anti-Semitism?

Let's separate between anti-Semitic acts and anti-Semitic utterances. The first are illegal, so if one is caught firebombing a synagogue or physically accosting Jews, those people are liable for prosecution.

Anti-Semitic books, articles, and the like are something else altogether, especially in the United States where free speech is constitutionally protected.

If writers really think Israel resembles apartheid South Africa or Nazi Germany, there is no question of throwing the legal book at them. However, those are scurrilous accusations, and they need to be exposed as such.

It's not easy, for we are involved today in a war of ideas, and there are some very bad ideas out there, many of them directed against Israel. It's imperative to combat them with good ideas. We need more people to step forward and show the errors in that kind of thinking.

Intellectually and politically, it's an intense war and will not quickly fade, and there are Jews on both sides. Hearing Israeli voices on the anti-Zionist side is especially troubling. Avraham Burg, for example, can now be cited by Israel's enemies as validating some of their most damning charges.

If a state can validly be compared to Nazi Germany - and Burg apparently makes such comparisons in his new book - its existence should be called into question.

I don't think Israel can be legitimately compared to the Third Reich or apartheid South Africa. But when some Israelis make these analogies, it becomes harder for those of us on the outside to contest them.

There have been parallel rises in violence on the streets and intellectual aggression against Jews. How much are these two trends related? If progressives ceased their verbal attacks on Israel, would you expect there to be less physical violence from anti-Semites?

It's best to look at this matter country by country. Within Europe, the most vociferous anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism, on the street, in the public media, and in academia, are found in England and France.

Do I think anti-Semitic violence would disappear in those countries entirely, in the absence of anti-Zionist rhetoric? No.

But anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist utterances help to underwrite or abet anti-Semitic violence. Such hate speech provides a kind of license to street thugs to hit out at Jews, they feel freer to behave aggressively if they know public opinion in the countries in which they reside regularly condemns the Jewish state in the harshest of terms. It makes it easier for them to then target local Jews and Jewish institutions.

So the more we can dampen down rhetorical abuse directed against Jews, the better the chances of containing violence against them.

Alvin Rosenfeld is a professor of English and the director of the Borns Jewish Studies Program at Indiana University.

He has authored the books 'Imagining Hitler' and 'Double-Dying: Reflections on Holocaust Literature', as well as editing several books, including 'Confronting the Holocaust: The Impact of Elie Weisel' and 'Thinking about the Holocaust after half a century'.
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ontvangen via:
Subscribe - mail to mewbkd-subscribe@yahoogroups.com

Joden integreerden niet

Het is inderdaad een fabeltje dat integratie vroeger altijd zo spoedig verliep, en het is frappant dat vroeger tegen de Joden gedeeltelijk dezelfde argumenten werden gebruikt als nu tegen moslims. Er is wel een belangrijk verschil (of eigenlijk twee), en dat is het feit dat het nu - zowel absoluut als procentueel - om veel grotere aantallen moslims gaat en dat bemoeilijkt de integratie. Een tweede verschil is dat door de globalisering en internet het contact van moslims en migranten met het land van herkomst veel gemakkelijker is, en de landen van herkomst en radikale imams uit deze landen aanzienlijke invloed over de migrantengemeenschap houden, ook waar het tweede en zelfs derde generatie migranten betreft. 

_______________________________

http://www.nu.nl/news/1157383/1201/Joden_integreerden_niet.html
http://www.anno.nl/anno/anno/i004034.html

Joden integreerden niet

Uitgegeven: 17 juli 2007 07:59
Laatst gewijzigd: 17 juli 2007 11:11

De opname van joden in de Nederlandse samenleving is voor minister Vogelaar het bewijs dat ook de integratie van moslims zal slagen. Maar die integratie verliep juist moeizaam: pas door de Tweede Wereldoorlog leerden joden en Nederlanders elkaar echt kennen.
Door Anno.

Opgejaagd door de Spaanse Inquisitie vluchtten eind zestiende eeuw de eerste joden naar Nederland. Vooral de rijke en bloeiende handelsstad Amsterdam trok. Hier werden zij minder vervolgd dan in veel andere landen: ze hoefden geen onderscheidende kleding te dragen, en officiële getto's waren er niet. Maar toch stond ook hier niemand te juichen bij de grens als er weer een groep joden arriveerde.

Hoewel de joden hun geloof niet openlijk mochten uiten, werd het jodendom wel gedoogd in het streng gereformeerde Nederland. Zo mochten ze begin zeventiende eeuw een eigen begraafplaats aanleggen in Ouderkerk aan de Amstel. Maar soepele medewerking van de overheid was er zeker niet: Ouderkerk lag op twee uur reizen van Amsterdam, waar de meeste joden woonden. Dichterbij lukte niet: Amsterdam wees begin zeventiende eeuw meerdere aanvragen af.

Eeuwenlang waren joden minderwaardige burgers in Nederland: ze mochten bijna geen beroepen uitoefenen, stadsbesturen maakten hen het leven moeilijk en ze werden belachelijk gemaakt in spotprenten en liedjes. Pas in 1796 kreeg de Nederlandse jood burgerrechten. Maar ook dat ging niet zonder slag of stoot: "Ze spreken niet eens de taal, en we kunnen niet controleren wat er gepredikt wordt," argumenteerden de tegenstanders. Toch begonnen de joden langzamerhand te integreren: ze konden uit meer banen kiezen en leerden Nederlands. Maar pas na de ramp van de Tweede Wereldoorlog kwam de integratie echt op gang.

De column Anno NU geeft wekelijks een stukje geschiedenis bij het nieuws.
Reageren? Ga naar www.anno.nl.

(c) NU.nl/Anno

dinsdag 17 juli 2007

Nahoel de Bij vervangt Farfoer de Mickey Mouse figuur op Hamas Al-Aqsa TV

Farfoer Muis wordt opgevolgd door Nahoel de Bij:

Following the "martyrdom" of Hamas's Al-Aqsa TV's Mickey Mouse-like character Farfour at the hands of an Israeli soldier 
on the Pioneers of Tomorrow children's show, the show introduced a new character, Nahoul the Bee, who vowed to continue in Farfour's path of "Islam, heroism, martyrdom, and the mujahideen."

Op de vraag wat Nahoul wil gaan doen, antwoord hij onder andere: 'me wreken op de vijanden van de islam en de moordenaars van de profeten'.
 
Dit laatste is een duidelijke verwijzing naar de Joden, die er in de Koran van worden beschuldigd profeten te hebben vermoord.
_____________________________
The following are excerpts from the Pioneers of Tomorrow show featuring Nahoul the Bee, which aired on Al-Aqsa TV on July 13, 2007.


TO VIEW THIS CLIP:
http://www.memritv.org/search.asp?ACT=S9&P1=1510

Saraa, child host: Who are you, and where did you come from?
Nahoul the Bee: I am Nahoul.
Saraa: Nahoul who?
Nahoul: I'm Nahoul, Farfour's cousin.
Saraa: What do you want?
Nahoul: I want to continue the path of my cousin Farfour.
Saraa: How do you want to do this?

Nahoul: I want to be in every episode with you on the Pioneers of Tomorrow show, just like Farfour. I want to continue in the path of Farfour – the path of Islam, of heroism, of martyrdom, and of the mujahideen. Me and my friends will follow in the footsteps of Farfour. We will take revenge upon the enemies of Allah, the killer of the prophets and of the innocent children, until we liberate Al-Aqsa from their impurity. We place our trust in Allah.

Saraa: Welcome, Nahoul...

Fatah militieleden ontwapend voor amnestie

In ruil voor het inleveren van hun wapens zal Israël 180 gezochte terroristen van de aan Fatah geliëerde Al Aqsa Martelaren Brigades amnesty verlenen. Nou ja, inleveren, ze krijgen volgens onderstaand bericht goed betaald voor hun wapens:

"Palestinian officials told Ynet that the Palestinian Authority would pay gunmen up to NIS 60,000 for an M-16 rifle and NIS 15,000 for a Kalashnikov. Smaller guns are purchased for up to NIS 24,000."

Dat is meer dan € 10.000 voor een M-16 en bijna € 3.000 voor een Kalashnikov. Ik durf te wedden dat de prijzen op de zwarte markt een stuk lager liggen. Verder zijn deze mensen verzekerd van een inkomen want Abbas biedt ze een baan in een van zijn veiligheidsdiensten aan. Als dit alles leidt tot een einde aan het geweld tegen Israël dan is het de prijs zeker waard. Maar het is je op de een of andere manier moeilijk voor te stellen dat mensen die vorige week nog luid verkondigden dat zij een onvervreemdbaar recht op gewapend verzet tegen Israël hebben zolang de bezetting voortduurt, nu Abbas gaan helpen om anderen die dit nog steeds zeggen op te sporen en hun acties te verijdelen. Moet Israël nu met Palestijnse veiligheidsdiensten samenwerken en informatie delen waarin mensen zitten die jarenlang gewapende strijd leverden tegen Israël?
Amnesty regelingen zijn in meer conflicten toegepast en kunnen bijdragen aan een oplossing, maar zijn doorgaans onderdeel van een vredesregeling waar alle partijen mee in hebben gestemd. De ex-rebellen moeten daarbij op zijn minst aangeven deze regeling te accepteren en beloven niet meer tot gewapende strijd over te gaan. In dit geval echter heeft Abbas hen met torenhoge prijzen 'verleid' om mee te werken. Geen goed teken. Waarschijnlijk wordt van dit geld over een paar weken een veelvoud aan wapens op de zwarte markt aangeschaft.

Ratna
________________________________

Fatah gunmen disarm under amnesty deal

Dozens of Fatah gunmen hand over their arms to Palestinian security forces as part of deal with Israel granting amnesty to 180 wanted terror suspects, including Zakaria Zubeidi

Ali Waked
Ynet - Published: 07.15.07, 10:49 / Israel News
www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3425455,00.html

Dozens of Fatah gunmen on Sunday handed over their arms to the Palestinian security forces as part of a deal with Israel granting amnesty to 180 wanted terror suspects.

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert signed the deal on Saturday evening as Israel pushed ahead with efforts to galvanize President Mahmoud Abbas after his Fatah faction's defeat at the hands of Hamas in Gaza last month.

The Prime Minister's Office confirmed Sunday that the head of Fatah's military wing in Jenin, Zakariya Zubeidi, was on the list.

Zubeidi was responsible for a series of terror attacks against Israeli targets.

Aware that Israel would scrap the deal if the gunmen did not disarm, Abbas was trying to lure renegade activists by offering to buy their weapons.

Palestinian officials told Ynet that the Palestinian Authority would pay gunmen up to NIS 60,000 for an M-16 rifle and NIS 15,000 for a Kalashnikov. Smaller guns are purchased for up to NIS 24,000.

Under the deal, the Palestinian Authority will integrate dozens of wanted Fatah gunmen into its security forces. Israel preserves the right to pursue those whom it suspects of terror activities.


Ronny Sofer contributed to this report

maandag 16 juli 2007

Hamas mishandelt politieke tegenstanders in Gazastrook

Uit onderstaand verhaal blijkt dat Hamas nog steeds Fatah leden intimideert en mishandelt, en er nog dagelijks nieuwe gevallen in ziekenhuizen belanden.

"Every day we have one or two cases that arrive at the hospital," Saqqa told AFP. "They say that they are members of the security services or linked to Fatah. Some of them have signs of beatings, others sustained bullet wounds to their limbs."

Dit wordt bevestigd door het Palestinian Centre for Human Rights:

"PCHR calls for opening an immediate investigation into the death of Waleed Abu Dalfa during his detention in al-Mashtal intelligence outpost, northwest of Gaza City, after he and his bother had been tortured by the Izziddin al-Qassam Brigades (the military wing of Hamas) which currently control the outpost. PCHR also strongly condemns arrests and detentions by the Izziddin al-Qassam Brigades, which are often accompanied by practicing torture against a number of detainees, and calls for stopping such illegal practices, emphasizing that Hamas' military wing does not have any legal status that entitles them to arrest or detain people." 

Om de één of andere reden komen dit soort zaken zelden in het nieuws, en wordt hier een beeld gecreëerd van Hamas dat orde op zaken weet te stellen, wetteloosheid tegengaat en waarbinnen pragmatisme de overhand heeft.

Ratna
___________________________________________

Agence France Presse - 15/07/07 20h46 GMT+1
Hamas settling old scores a month after seizing Gaza
by Mehdi Lebouachera
http://www.france24.com/france24Public/en/administration/afp-news.html?id=070715194544.5pafoiof&cat=null

The bruises on Mohammed's body and his swollen blue feet are the price he says he paid for being an officer loyal to the Fatah party in a Gaza Strip now ruled by the Islamist Hamas movement.

One month after factional Palestinian fighting in the impoverished territory ended with Hamas seizing control there on June 15, the settling of accounts by the Islamists continues, say loyalists of president Mahmud Abbas's party.

It was Mohammed's turn on Monday, when a Hamas police squad raided his house.

"They came to look for weapons in my home, but I had none. They then tied me to a chair, covered my head with a sack and beat me with their guns and clubs, just because I am Fatah," the officer said from his hospital bed.

Despite explicit threats to his life Mohammed agreed to tell his story of arbitrary arrests and beatings by the Islamists, as long as his full name was not revealed.

Jumma al-Saqqa is the director of Gaza City's rundown Shifa hospital, where many patients were wounded during the fierce week-long clashes that killed more than 100 people before ending in the Hamas takeover.

But although the fighting ended a month ago, patients bearing the scars of factional clashes keep arriving.

"Every day we have one or two cases that arrive at the hospital," Saqqa told AFP. "They say that they are members of the security services or linked to Fatah. Some of them have signs of beatings, others sustained bullet wounds to their limbs."

Hamas's paramilitary Executive Force that has assumed police functions flatly denies any wrongdoing.

"We categorically deny using such methods. We arrest only those who refuse to hand in their weapons," spokesman Islam Shahwan said. "If there is any abuse by our men, we will investigate and punish those found guilty."

On Wednesday, the Executive Force paid a visit to the deputy director of the public Palestinian television, Mohammed al-Dahudi, a Fatah supporter.

They searched his home in the eastern neighbourhood of Tal al-Hawa, or "wind hill", which Hamas renamed Tal al-Islam -- "hill of Islam" -- after its takeover.

"Four men came to look for weapons at my place but they knew I didn't have any. They then confiscated my car and phone," Dahudi said.

The director of the Al-Mizan centre for human rights protection, Issam Yunes, confirmed that "illegal actions are occurring in Gaza. Some people say they were mistreated. There have been arrests, people were taken in for interrogation."

But Yunes also said "it is very difficult to get precise information because many people are afraid to talk and we can't visit them in prison. We have twice asked to visit Al-Machtal but Hamas turned us down," referring to the infamous detention centre that once headquartered the pro-Fatah intelligence services.

One person who did get to see Al-Machtal recently was Ezzedine Abu Safiya, the Fatah director general of the Palestinian parliament in Gaza.

"Armed men from the Ezzedine al-Qassam Brigades (Hamas's armed wing) took me to Al-Machtal for questioning," he told AFP. "They think that I had incited civil servants not to respect the weekly days off."

The weekly days of rest have been a bone of contention between Hamas and Fatah. The Islamists have decreed them to be Thursday and Friday, while Abbas's new emergency government said the weekend should be on Friday and Saturday.

In order not to risk the ire of either side, some civil servants take all three days off.

"The Qassams have no right to interfere in parliamentary affairs," Abu Safiya says. "They are destroying democracy and are violating human rights."

zondag 15 juli 2007

Enquete publieke opinie in Iran

Enkele punten uit de enquete:
 
* 10 tot 20 % van de Iraanse bevolking staat achter handelsbetrekkingen met c.q. hulp aannemen van Israël (vraag 9c en 12a).
 
* Een meerderheid van de bevolking staat achter financiële steun aan islamistische terreurgroepen als Hamas, Islamitische Jihad en Hezbollah (vraag 17a).
 
* Tegelijkertijd is een meerderheid bereid een twee-statenoplossing te accepteren in ruil voor normalisatie van relaties tussen Iran en de VS, iets waar Hamas, Hezbollah, en Islamitische Jihad tegen zijn (vraag 19a).

Q19a: Now, I am going to read you several proposals which some Iranian diplomats were willing to give to the United States in return for normal relations. For each, please tell me whether you would favor or oppose this proposal.

Endorse recognizing Israel and Palestine each as separate, independent states
Strongly favor  42.0%
Somewhat favor  12.6%
Somewhat oppose  8.4%
Strongly oppose  26.1%
Refused  3.6%
Don't know  7.3%
___________________________________________________

Polling Iranian Public Opinion: An Unprecedented Nationwide Survey of Iran
http://terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/TFT%20Iran%20Survey%20Report.pdf

The survey was conducted by telephone from June 5th to June 18th, 2007, with 1,000 interviews proportionally distributed according to the population covering all 30 provinces of Iran.

Terror Free Tomorrow's field partner and project manager on the Iran survey is D3 Systems, Inc.
www.D3systems.com

The interviews were conducted in Farsi by native speakers, among a random national sample of 1,000 Iranians aged 18 and up from June 5th to 18th, 2007. The questionnaire consisted of 20 substantive questions, 12 demographic questions, and 24 quality control questions. During the course of fieldwork, there were 2,124 contact attempts made. Of these, 465 resulted in non-contacts, yielding a non-contact rate of 21.9%. Another 8 contact attempts results in noneligible respondents because they were not Iranian nationals. Of the 1,651 successful contacts, there were 651 refusals giving the study a 60.6% response rate. The poll has a +/- 3.1% margin of error at the 95% confidence interval.

Q1: Do you think the economy in Iran today is going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?
The Iranian economy is headed in the right direction  27.1%
The Iranian economy is headed in the wrong direction 42.3%
Neither Right nor Wrong Direction  10.6%
Refused  1.5%
Don't know 18.5%

Q2: How do you feel about the overall economic situation in Iran today?
Would you say the overall economic situation is excellent, good, fair or poor?
Excellent  3.5%
Good  14.5%
Fair  47.0%
Poor  32.7% Refused  .4%
Don't know  2.0%

Q3: In terms of your own personal economic situation, do you think your financial situation today is better, the same, or worse than it was when President Ahmadinejad took office in August 2005?
Better  23.6%
The same  43.8%
Worse  31.4%
Refused  .1%
Don't know  1.1%

Q4: Overall, would you say President Ahmadinejad's policies have or have not succeeded in reducing unemployment and inflation?
Have succeeded  32.6%
Have not succeeded  52.2%
Refused  5.4%
Don't know  9.7%

Q5: Do you feel that President Ahmadinejad has kept his campaign promise to "put oil money on the tables of the people themselves"?
Yes 22.4%
No  56.3%
Refused  9.2%
Don't know  12.1%

Q6: Compared to when President Ahmadinejad took office in August 2005, do you think the amount of corruption overall in Iran has increased, stayed the same, or decreased?
Increased  28.3%
Stayed the same  28.0%
Decreased 35.9%
Refused  1.2%
Don't know  6.6%

Q7a: I am going to read you a list of possible investment options for the government of Iran when it comes to investing Iran's oil and gas revenues.
Please tell me for each option that I read whether you think it is very important, somewhat important, somewhat unimportant, or not at all important? (Rotate List)

Creating New Jobs
Very important 91.7%
Somewhat important 4.4%
Somewhat unimportant  .3%
Not at all important  1.2%
Refused  .3%
Don't Know  2.2%

Curbing Inflation
Very important  89.5%
Somewhat important  6.4%
Somewhat unimportant .3%
Not at all important  1.4%
Refused  .3%
Don't Know  2.1%

Improving the oil and gas industry itself
Very important  78.3%
Somewhat important  12.8%
Somewhat unimportant  2.0%
Not at all important  1.8%
Refused  .1%
Don't Know  4.9%

Developing nuclear energy, but not nuclear weapons
Very important  75.7%
Somewhat important  11.7%
Somewhat  unimportant  3.6%
Not at all important  3.5%
Refused  .9%
Don't Know  4.5%

Developing nuclear weapons
Very important  36.9%
Somewhat important  14.7%
Somewhat unimportant  8.1%
Not at all important 28.2%
Refused  1.6%
Don't Know  10.5%

Q8: Iran's oil and gas industry today does not have enough refineries to serve its own people's needs for gasoline and fuel. Some people think new investments should be made to improve Iran's declining oil and gas industry. Others think these investments should be made instead in developing nuclear energy. Which do you think should be the first priority?

Improving the oil and gas industry 41.1%
Developing nuclear energy  45.9%
Refused  4.5%
Don't know 85 8.5%

Q9a: Thinking about Iran's economy, normal trade relations now exist with only some countries. Do you favor or oppose having normal trade relations with each of the following countries? (Rotate List)

China
Strongly favor  63.6%
Somewhat favor  14.2%
Somewhat oppose  3.3%
Strongly oppose 9.6%
Refused .9%
Don't know  8.4%

Q9b: Thinking about Iran's economy, normal trade relations now exist with only some countries. Do you favor or oppose having normal trade relations with each of the following countries? (Rotate List)

Iraq
Strongly favor  37.8%
Somewhat favor  15.9%
Somewhat oppose  7.8%
Strongly oppose  29.5%
Refused  1.1%
Don't know 78 7.8%

Q9c: Thinking about Iran's economy, normal trade relations now exist with only some countries. Do you favor or oppose having normal trade relations with each of the following countries? (Rotate List)

Britain or the UK
Strongly favor  39.2%
Somewhat favor  13.0%
Somewhat oppose 7.3%
Strongly oppose  29.8%
Refused  1.0%
Don't know 9.6%

Russia
Strongly favor  47.9%
Somewhat favor  16.4%
Somewhat oppose5 6.5%
Strongly oppose  17.9%
Refused  1.1%
Don't know  10.2%

The United States
Strongly favor  33.4%
Somewhat favor  10.9%
Somewhat oppose  7.0%
Strongly oppose  38.9%
Refused 1.5%
Don't know  8.2%

France
Strongly favor 56.1%
Somewhat favor  17.1%
Somewhat oppose  3.8%
Strongly oppose 13.4%
Refused .9%
Don't know  8.7%

Israel
Strongly favor  10.5%
Somewhat favor  2.7%
Somewhat oppose  3.1%
Strongly oppose  74.8%
Refused  1.7%
Don't know  7.1%

Turkey
Strongly favor  56.9%
Somewhat favor  19.2%
Somewhat oppose  3.9%
Strongly oppose  10.9%
Refused  .9%
Don't know  8.2%

Q10a: Do you favor or oppose investment from Western countries in Iran to create more jobs?

Strongly favor  52.3%
Somewhat favor 22.5%
Somewhat oppose 5.3%
Strongly oppose  15.6%
Refused .8%
Don't know  3.5%

Q10b: Do you favor or oppose medical, education and humanitarian assistance from Western countries to Iranian people in need?
Strongly favor  50.5%
Somewhat favor  24.7%
Somewhat oppose  4.6%
Strongly oppose  15.7%
Refused  .6%
Don't know  3.9%

Q11: A hospital ship recently provided medical care to 61,000 patients, including major surgeries and medical training, while visiting Indonesia and Bangladesh. Would you like a hospital ship like this to visit Iran on a similar medical humanitarian mission?
Yes  73.2%
No  19.4%
Refused  .3%
Don't know  7.0%

Q12a: Should Iran accept or refuse a hospital ship visit from each of the following countries? (Rotate Order)

Russia
Accept  69.2%
Refuse  19.5%
Refused question 1.4%
Don't know  10.0%

USA
Accept  42.0%
Refuse  47.2%
Refused question  2.0%
Don't know 71 8.8%

Israel
Accept  21.2%
Refuse  68.1%
Refused question  2.1%
Don't know  8.6%

China
Accept  75.5%
Refuse  14.9%
Refused question  1.3%
Don't know 8.3%

European Union
Accept  71.6%
Refuse  17.3%
Refused question  1.2%
Don't know  9.9%

Saudi Arabia
Accept  73.2%
Refuse  16.5%
Refused question  1.0%
Don't know  9.3%

Turkey
Accept  75.0%
Refuse  14.5%
Refused question  1.4%
Don't know  9.2%

Q13a: Do you favor or oppose the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran developing nuclear energy?
Strongly favor  77.9%
Somewhat favor  13.6%
Somewhat oppose  1.8%
Strongly oppose  3.8%
Refused 1.0% Don't know  1.9%

Q13b: Apart from nuclear energy, do you favor or oppose the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran developing nuclear weapons?
Strongly favor  33.0%
Somewhat favor  19.0%
Somewhat oppose  4.8%
Strongly oppose  37.0%
Refused  1.3% Don't know  5.0%

Q14: If the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran had nuclear weapons, do you think that the people of Iran would live in a safer or more dangerous world?
Safer  51.5%
More Dangerous 31.4%
Neither safer nor more dangerous  6.7%
Refused  1.9%
Don't Know  8.5%

Q15a: I'm going to read a list of types of assistance which Iran has been offered by other countries. These have been offered if Iran provides full inspections and a guarantee not to develop or possess nuclear weapons. For each, please tell me if you would support or oppose Iran receiving this type of assistance in return for Iran guaranteeing not to develop nuclear weapons.

Trade and capital investment overall to create more jobs
Support  80.2%
Oppose  14.7%
Refused question 1.2%
Don't know  3.9%

Trade and capital investment in energy refineries to lower the price of gasoline
Support  79.2%
Oppose  16.2%
Refused question  1.4%
Don't know  3.1%

Medical, education and humanitarian assistance to Iranian people in need
Support  79.5%
Oppose  16.7%
Refused question  .9%
Don't know  2.8%

Technological assistance for developing peaceful nuclear energy
Support  79.8%
Oppose  14.2%
Refused question  1.2%
Don't know  4.8%

Q16a: I am going to read you a list of possible long-term goals for the government of Iran. Please tell me whether you think these goals are very important, somewhat important, somewhat unimportant, or not at all important for the government of Iran. (Rotate List)

Developing an arsenal of nuclear weapons
Very important 28.7%
Somewhat important 18.4%
Somewhat unimportant  7.8%
Not at all important 33.3%
Refused  1.9%
Don't Know  10.0%

Improving the Iranian economy
Very important  88.0%
Somewhat important  6.4%
Somewhat unimportant  1.6%
Not at all important  1.3%
Refused  1.0%
Don't Know  1.6%

Providing financial support for Arab and other foreign groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah
Very important 33.1%
Somewhat important  23.5%
Somewhat unimportant  10.3%
Not at all important  23.5%
Refused  1.6%

Seeking trade and political relations with Western countries
Very important  46.8%
Somewhat important  25.7%
Somewhat unimportant  9.0%
Not at all important  10.6%
Refused  1.9%
Don't Know  6.2%

Q17a: Do you support or oppose financial assistance to each of the following groups? (Rotate List)

Palestinian opposition groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad
Strongly support  43.5%
Somewhat support  21.2%
Somewhat oppose 6.9%
Strongly oppose  19.8%
Refused  2.7%
Don't  58 5.8%

Lebanese Hezbollah
Strongly support  41.0%
Somewhat support  22.6%
Somewhat oppose  7.9%
Strongly oppose  20.5%
Refused  2.5%
Don't know  5.6%

Iraqi Shiite militias
Strongly support  37.9%
Somewhat support  20.1%
Somewhat oppose  7.6%
Strongly oppose  25.7%
Refused  2.5%

Q18a: In the past, some Iranian diplomats have offered proposals to the United States that would lead to normal relations. I will read you some of the proposals, beginning with those Iran asked for from the United States.
For each, please tell me whether you favor or oppose this proposal? (Rotate List)

Full United States recognition of Iran and normalized trade relations
Strongly favor 55.5%
Somewhat favor  12.9%
Somewhat oppose  5.0%
Strongly oppose  17.6%
Refused  2.0%

Full access for Iran to peaceful nuclear technology
Strongly favor  77.4%
Somewhat favor  7.5%
Somewhat oppose  2.3%
Strongly oppose  5.5%
Refused  1.8%
Don't know 5.5%

Q19a: Now, I am going to read you several proposals which some Iranian diplomats were willing to give to the United States in return for normal relations. For each, please tell me whether you would favor or oppose this proposal.

Full transparency by Iran to assure there are no Iranian endeavors to develop or possess nuclear weapons
Strongly favor  37.4%
Somewhat favor  13.9%
Somewhat oppose  8.3%
Strongly oppose  29.0%
Refused 2.9%
Don't know 8.6%

Endorse recognizing Israel and Palestine each as separate, independent states
Strongly favor  42.0%
Somewhat favor  12.6%
Somewhat oppose  8.4%
Strongly oppose  26.1%
Refused  3.6%
Don't know  7.3%

Ending Iranian support for any armed group inside Iraq and only using Iranian influence to actively support a peaceful, democratic government in Iraq
Strongly favor 49.4%
Somewhat favor  14.4%
Somewhat oppose  4.2%
Strongly oppose  18.7%
Refused  3.4%
Don't know  9.9%

Q20a: I am going to read you a list of three options for governing Iran.
Please tell me whether you support or oppose each as a form of government for Iran. (Rotate List)

A political system where the 'Supreme Leader' rules according to religious principles, and cannot be chosen or replaced by a direct vote of the people.
Strongly support  16.7%
Somewhat support  10.2%
Somewhat oppose  8.2%
Strongly oppose  53.1%
Refused  5.5%
on't know  6.3%

A political system where the 'Supreme Leader,' along with all leaders, can be chosen and replaced by a free and direct vote of the people.
Strongly support 71.9%
Somewhat support  7.2%
Somewhat oppose  2.7%
Strongly oppose  10.8%
Refused 2.9%
Don't know  4.5%

A political system where there is a monarch who is not elected by the people, rules for life, and his family inherits the right to rule.
Strongly support  6.3%
Somewhat support  4.0%
Somewhat oppose  5.6%
Strongly oppose  74.5%
Refused  4.5%
Don't know  5.0%

D3: Do you work......?
Full-Time  23.3%
Part-Time  12.4%
Does Not Work  64.1%
Don't Know  .2%

D6b: Educational achievement
Illiterate  4.6%
No Formal Education But Read & Write  3.3%
Some/Finished Elementary  7.5%
Some/Finished Intermediate 8.5%
Some Secondary  13.2%
Finished Secondary  34.5%
Some/Finished College  16.5%
Finished University  12.0%

D7: What is your religious affiliation?
Shia Muslim  91.4%
Sunni Muslim  4.6%
Muslim  3.3%
Other .6%
Don't Know .1%

D9: Would you describe your household as upper class, middle class, working class, or poor?
Upper  1.0%
Middle 57.1%
Working  21.9%
Poor  19.4%
Refused  .2%
Don't Know  .4%

D10: What is your ethnic origin?
Persian  54.4%
Azeri  18.7%
Gilaki & Mazanderani  8.4%
Kurd 7.0%
Arab  2.0%
Lur 6.5%
Baloch  1.1%
Turkmen  .7%
Other  1.1%
Refused  .2%

For additional information about the content of the survey, please contact:
www.terrorfreetomorrow.org

For additional information about the methodology of the survey, please contact:
Matthew Warshaw, Senior Research Manager, D3 Systems, Inc.
www.D3Systems.com

--------------------------------------------
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis
Website:
www.imra.org.il

Stierf Arafat aan AIDS?

 
7/5/2007 Clip No. 1507
Ahmad Jibril, Secretary-General of the PFLP General Command:
I Was Told by Abu Mazen's Team that Arafat Died of AIDS

Following is an excerpt from an interview with Ahmad Jibril, Secretary-General of the PFLP General Command, which aired on Al-Manar TV on July 5, 2007:

Ahmad Jibril: When Abu Mazen came to Damascus with his team, I asked them: "What happened to the investigation into the death of Abu Ammar [Arafat]? The Israelis killed him. He was my colleague ever since 1965 and used to sleep at my home. He and I followed the same path." Is it conceivable that when Rafiq Al-Hariri was killed, all hell broke loose, even though he was just a merchant in Saudi Arabia, who later entered politics, whereas the death of Yasser Arafat, who for 40 years had been carrying his gun from one place to another, is not investigate? Is this conceivable? They were silent, and then one of them said to me: "To be honest, the French gave us the medical report, that stated that the cause of Abu Ammar's death was AIDS." I am not saying this, they did. Now they pretend that they miss Yasser Arafat, and complain that [Hamas] entered his house in [Gaza] and so on... I say to every honorable member of the Fatah movement that he should be happy that we got rid of the plague, which had been imposed upon them and upon the Palestinian people. The Fatah movement now has an opportunity to renew itself.

_____________________________
 
To view the clip:

Moslims moeten zich distantiëren van Islamistische terreur (Adel Darwish)

Adel Darwish is een gerenomeerde Britse journalist; hij werd geboren in Egypte uit Oost-Europese ouders, en is onder meer betrokken bij MideastWeb for co-existence.
Hij schrijft:

"What do those who accuse British journalists of linking Islam with terrorism suggest we do? Since the terror groups themselves use Islamic labels and Islamic slogans, we have little choice but to refer to those groups by the very names that they choose for themselves."

In feite zijn Britse journalisten en politici uiterst voorzichtig geweest hierin, en hebben het linken van beide soms tot het absurde toe vermeden.
Het volgende klopt feitelijk niet helemaal:

"Adolf Hitler's election by the majority of Germans in 1933 will never alter the fact that he was perhaps the biggest war criminal and mass murderer in the history of mankind. If the German people had not redeemed themselves by rejecting the Nazi ideology and making an historic apology, they would have still been held responsible for his crimes."

Hitler was niet door een meerderheid gekozen (de NSDAP had 33,1% van de stemmen), en nam eerst deel aan een coalitie met de conservatieve DNVP, waarin hij steeds meer macht naar zich toetrok en democratische wetten afschafte. Totalitaire bewegingen gebruiken de democratie vaak totdat zij machtig genoeg zijn hem af te schaffen.

Darwish' punt dat democratisch verkozen zijn niet betekent dat er zaken met een beweging te doen zijn is natuurlijk al te waar. En zoals mensen indertijd op Hitler stemden omdat hij de economie zou herstellen en het land - na de nederlaag van Versailles - zijn trots terug zou geven en niet omdat hij heel Europa in een oorlog wou storten en de Joden uitroeien, zo stemden mensen nu op Hamas omdat ze de corruptie van Fatah zat waren en Hamas een uitgebreid stelsel van sociale voorzieningen had opgebouwd. Maar in beide gevallen wist men ook van de donkere kanten van de betreffende partij, en terwijl in Duitsland nagenoeg niemand protesteerde tegen de ene antisemitische maatregel na de andere, en de steeds oorlogszuchtiger wordende retoriek, protesteert er nauwelijks een Palestijn tegen het genocidale Hamas handvest en de antisemitische retoriek. Pas nadat de betreffende partij is verslagen, blijkt een grote meerderheid het er toch niet zo mee eens te zijn geweest.

Ratna Pelle
__________________________________________________

 
Where is the Muslim March against Terrorism?
http://www.asharqalawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=2&id=9542
11/07/2007
 
Adel Darwish
is a veteran Fleet Street Foreign reporter and commentator on Foreign Affairs


Just as the second anniversary of the barbaric 7/7 terror attack on our capital city approached, terrorism bared its sharp teeth an unveiled it's ugly face once again. The terrorists nearly succeeded in claiming hundreds of innocent lives had it not been for a combination of good luck, the courage of a policeman risking his life to defuse a massive bomb, the quick reaction of another off-duty police officer and passengers at Glasgow airport and the terrorists' own incompetence.

Since the alleged Muslim plotters; Arabs and Asians, have not yet been tried in a court of law, it would be inappropriate to examine their individual cases in this column; although two of them were caught red-handed driving a blazed jeep (an Iraq-style car bomb) into Glasgow airport. I will, instead, confine my comment to looking into their sick Islamism, or Islamist ideology. We must all call them ' Islamists' – until someone comes up with better terminology to distinguish them from the large body of Muslims who state that they are law abiding citizens who reject terrorism. And since the violent extremists themselves have turned the Muslim faith into a political ideology, I cannot find any other term that would be more appropriate to refer to them. These Islamists only see the world through their ideological glasses and interpret world events through their narrow view, holding any other interpretation in contempt.

I, therefore, call upon all Muslims who believe their faith to be one of peace, to speak out, distancing their religion from the ideology that Islamists use to justify mass murder, kidnapping, and terror by citing Quranic verses that they argue call directly for terminating non-Muslims.

Many Muslims write to me objecting to the use of the term 'Islamists' to refer to terrorist-related atrocities such as 7/7. But to illustrate the problem that journalists face in selecting appropriate terminology, one can refer to many other examples of violent political movements, especially as some aspects of their conflict run along the religious divide. The Republican movement in the Irish conflict for example had always been deeply rooted in the Catholic faith and massed support among Catholics. On the contrary, the Unionists would tease the Irish nationalists with their Orange marches, which in turn were deeply rooted in the Protestant orange order of the 17th century. However, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) never called itself a "Catholic" movement, nor did it ever in any of its literature invoke Catholic references (furthermore, the IRA, with a few exceptions mainly related to poor communication, had always given warning to avoid human casualties, while Islamist terrorism is designed to maximise human casualties).

In his video tape broadcast by Aljazeera, the 7/7 gang leader, repeatedly claimed that he committed his crime in the name of Islam, invoking verses from Quran and even referred to us, the British citizens, as the enemy (even though he was a British citizen by birth) against whom he was revenging an alleged 'attack' on a mythical or metaphorical entity, the Muslim Ummah (nation).

The theoreticians who set the philosophy of Islamism as a revolutionary violent political movement such as Hassan al Banna and Sayyed Qutb, the ideologues of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is the granddaddy of all the modern movements, invoked selected verses from Quran when putting forward their philosophical argument to justify violence as means for their movement. They argued that it was a Muslim duty to 'kill the disbelievers wherever you find them'. Within a few years of launching the movement (the Muslim Brotherhood), this definition of targeted victims was extended to include fellow Muslims who followed a liberal way of life which contradicted the lifestyle prescribed by the Islamists.

Those who blew up cinemas, theatres, bars and nightclubs, or murdered judges, artists and intellectuals in Egypt in the 1930s and 1940s belong to a group that was named by its founder Hassan al Banna, the 'Muslim Brotherhood' that raised the slogan "The Messenger (Prophet Mohammed) is our leader and Jihad is our way."

It was evident that it gave the group the 'Muslim' label, which baptised itself with blood, fire and death. It also associated the name of the Prophet [pbuh], which is sacred to every Muslim to a slogan that limited the meaning of Jihad to a narrow literary meaning of 'a crusade or holy war' rather than its much deeper philosophical meaning of one's self discipline and spiritual commitment to elevate the lot of the individual and the community.

By the 1970s, other terrorist groups followed the example of the MB in selecting labels such as Muslim, or Islamic i.e. Islamic Jihad, al Gamaa al Islamiya (the Islamic Group), Ansar al Islam (Supporters of Islam) or adopting Islamic symbols or concepts in their names for instance, al Takfir wal Hijra (Atonement and Exodus), Mohammed's Army, Al Nagoon min al Nar (Redemption from Hell), Tawhid and Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad), Hisba (the Reckoning).

For example, the Dagmoush clan in Gaza that kidnapped and imprisoned the BBC reporter, Alan Johnston, for 114 days (and initially wanted a ransom to release him) called itself Jaish al Islam (The Army of Islam).

What do those who accuse British journalists of linking Islam with terrorism suggest we do? Since the terror groups themselves use Islamic labels and Islamic slogans, we have little choice but to refer to those groups by the very names that they choose for themselves.

Others, who are uncomfortable with publishing facts about terrorist and violent acts at the hands of Islamists groups like MB or Hamas, also accuse journalists and columnists of being unfair in criticising these groups because they are elected by the people.

This is granted. However, would the MB collecting approximately 20% of the votes in Egypt in the 2005 parliamentary elections rewrite history and change documented historic facts and exonerate the Muslim Brothers from acts of violence including murder especially when they claim with pride that 'jihad' is their chosen way of struggle?
Adolf Hitler's election by the majority of Germans in 1933 will never alter the fact that he was perhaps the biggest war criminal and mass murderer in the history of mankind. If the German people had not redeemed themselves by rejecting the Nazi ideology and making an historic apology, they would have still been held responsible for his crimes.

Almost every revolutionary political group or movement I can think of renounces violence as soon as it achieves its political objectives or joins the negotiation process for a settlement. Only the Islamist Jihadist groups have no declared aims to achieve, which would lead them to desist from terrorism. It seems that Jihadists are on a road-map for continuous terrorism, a process of indefinite permanent Islamic revolution.

It is beyond the human imagination how the failed Glasgow Airport terror attack was carried out by two doctors who had taken their Hippocratic Oath, to protect and save the sacred human life in any form.

Is it some sort of a short-circuit that fused the light in their minds and distorted the equilibrium of their souls to allow them to strike with the aim of killing as many people as possible on the first day of the Scottish school holidays when the airport was packed with families and children? Or is it the same ideology of hatred and dehumanising 'the other' that prompted Nazi officers to drive millions to the gas chambers? The difference in Glasgow is that the attackers targeted those who choose to lead a way of life that is not approved by the Islamists.

The car bomb discovered in the early hours of June 29, 2007 was aimed at the nightclub 'Tiger Tiger' in Piccadilly when it was packed with approximately 2000 women who were enjoying 'Ladies Night' without upsetting anyone or harming anyone. It is noteworthy that another terrorist gang (also Muslims) were jailed in April after a lengthy trial for conspiring to blow up targets including the 'Ministry of Sound' nightclub in London. The gang leader expressed his disgust at the nightclub following because 'immodestly dressed women were dancing like slags all night,' even though those 'slags' harmed no one. Poking his nose in other people's business by attempting to impose a dress code on them was not enough for that sick Islamist, rather, he wanted to change the way the majority of people choose to lead their lives.
Why didn't he leave the land of infidels and go to an 'Islamic Emirate' where the main duty of security service would be to protect his gentle eyes from the visual aggression of 'immodestly' dressed women?

The Islamists main aim has little to do with Britain's foreign policy and more to do with forcing us to change our way of life in a cultural war.
It is a battle between the culture of vibrant life which is a basic human instinct, and the culture of death, as summed up by Egyptian playwright, Ali Salem, in Asharq al Awsat last month.

Terrorists want to ram their sick culture down other people's throats and force them to change their way of life. Why not? They have already succeeded in forcing people to change their dress-code, their ways of entertainment and their way of life in regions where democracy has retreated.

Just compare the high standard of performing arts in Egyptian movies in the 1930s and 1940s with the poor standard of Egyptian television drama today. Self-censorship has always been the death of creative art. Fearing the outcry of Islamists or even the threat of terrorism that they pose, Egyptian television bosses were cowed into cutting out scenes and performances that have always been part of Egyptian culture.

We must never permit the culture of death-mongers to change our way of life or force us to change the way we eat, drink, dress, or enjoy ourselves.
Hundreds of thousands of white Britons marched in the 1970s to denounce an ultra right-wing nationalist organisation condemning its racist slogans against immigrants. Where are the British Muslims today? Why don't they march in their thousands to denounce terrorism?

Why don't Islamic scholars and clerics rule that coercing people into a different way of life is un-Islamic and that one of basic Islamic teaching is that "there is no compulsion in religion"?