Wie is er droneable? Over het preventief doden van gevaarlijke tegenstanders vanuit de lucht

 

Een uitstekend interview van een ons nog onbekende website. De Israeli's zijn niet triggerhappy om alle Palestijnen zomaar af te knallen, zoals sommigen ons willen doen geloven.

In onderstaand artikel komt havik Sharon er zelfs bedachtzamer en terughoudender vanaf dan (voormalige?) linkse held Obama.

Guiora, voormalig adviseur in Israel voor de omstreden 'targeted killings', waarschuwt verder vooral tegen het onderschatten van religieus extremisme, ook van Joodse kant.

 

Wouter

____________

 

Wie is er droneable?

http://mareonline.nl/archive/2013/10/10/wie-is-er-droneable

 

Een Hellfire-raket zoals drones die afschieten.

DOOR VINCENT BONGERS

Jarenlang adviseerde Amos Guiora het Israëlische leger bij het preventief doden van staatsgevaarlijke tegenstanders. Volgende week promoveert hij in Leiden. 'Er was niet genoeg reden om Bin Laden om te brengen.' 

 

Op 22 maart 2004 werd de aan zijn rolstoel gekluisterde Hamasleider Sheikh Ahmad Yassin (67) na het ochtendgebed teruggereden naar zijn huis in Gaza Stad. Onderweg werd hij dodelijk getroffen door raketten die een Israëlische gevechtshelikopter had afgevuurd. Toen de rook was opgetrokken en de verwrongen resten van Yassins rolstoel zichtbaar werden, bleek dat ook zijn twee bodyguards en meerdere onschuldige omstanders de aanval niet hadden overleefd. Wereldwijd leidde de aanval tot protest.

Toch was het legitiem, vindt de Israëlisch Amerikaanse professor rechtsgeleerdheid en terrorisme-expert Amos Guiora (1957). Hij diende negentien jaar lang in het leger van zijn geboorteland Israel en adviseerde over targeted killings. Hij is momenteel verbonden aan de universiteit van Utah, maar hoopt volgende week in Leiden te promoveren op een proefschrift over het tolereren van extremisme.

Guiora houdt zich nog steeds intensief bezig met de vraag of het geoorloofd is om mensen die een gevaar vormen voor de staatsveiligheid preventief te doden. 'De acties tegen sheik Yassin en zijn opvolger Abdel-al Rantissi (die in april 2004 op soortgelijke manier werd gedood, red.) waren terecht. Van hen was duidelijk dat zij aanslagen aan het voorbereiden waren. Daar zijn ook bewijzen voor geleverd. Deze aanvallen voldeden aan strenge criteria. Je probeert uiteraard de collateral damage te beperken; zo min mogelijk onschuldige slachtoffers te maken. Niemand vindt het leuk om mensen te doden. Het was zwaar om over dit soort zaken advies te geven. Daarom ben ik bijna kaal en zijn de haren die ik nog over heb grijs.'

Guiora geeft geen informatie over welke targeted killings hij precies advies heeft gegeven. 'Ik ga niet zeggen waar ik "ja" of "nee" op heb gezegd.'

Wel legt hij uit dat Israel een strikte procedure volgt voordat de trekker wordt overgehaald. 'Er zijn drie belangrijke vragen die je moet beantwoorden voordat je tot actie overgaat. Is het doelwit goed te identificeren; is duidelijk om wie het gaat en waar hij is? Vormt de persoon zo'n dreiging dat een actie is te rechtvaardigen of zijn er alternatieven? En de laatste kwestie. Hoe groot is de kans dat er onschuldige slachtoffers vallen en dat er veel schade is?'

Guiora heeft grote bezwaren tegen de drone-aanvallen van de Verenigde Staten. 'Obama's beleid is het voeren van geen beleid. En dat kan niet. Amerika gebruikt veel te brede definities voor wat een legitiem doelwit is. Er is geen bewijs van onmiddellijke dreiging nodig om iemand droneable te maken. En daar verzet ik mij tegen.'

Zo vindt hij de liquidatie van Bin Laden ook twijfelachtig. 'Dat hij 9/11 op zijn geweten heeft en ook achter andere gruwelijke aanslagen zit, is niet genoeg reden om hem om te brengen. Het is van belang dat er scherpe aanwijzingen zijn dat hij nieuwe zaken aan het plannen was en daarom moest worden uitgeschakeld. En dat bewijs was er niet.'

Guiora gaat in zijn proefschrift in op seculier- maar vooral ook religieus extremisme. 'Ik ben ook rechter in Gaza geweest. Daar had ik te maken met Palestijnen die zichzelf wilde opblazen maar daar niet aan toe zijn gekomen. Ik heb met ze gesproken en gevraagd wat hen dreef. Waarom doe je dit? Waarom breng je mij en mijn kinderen in gevaar? En dan zeggen ze zonder met hun ogen te knipperen dat het de wil van de imam en vooral de wil van God is.

'Het zijn niet alleen maar domme voetsoldaten, maar vaak goede opgeleide mensen. Ik heb zelf opdracht in 1993 gegeven om Abdel al-Rantisi vast te zetten. Ik heb met hem ook een gesprek gehad. Hij was nota bene opgeleid als kinderarts. Ik vroeg hem hoe zich dat rijmt met leiding geven aan een organisatie die opdrachten geeft aan mensen om zichzelf op te blazen en zo onschuldigen te doden. Hij zei dat je dat los van elkaar moet zien. Dat het twee werelden zijn. Ik vind dat bullshit. Je bent niet een vriendelijke kinderarts voor de helft van de week en de rest van je tijd leider van Hamas. Dat ben je 24/7.'

Guiora heeft een speciale band met Nederland. 'Ik heb hier gedoceerd en een goede band met rechtsfilosoof Paul Cliteur. Het is een eer dat ik in Leiden mijn proefschrift mag verdedigen.'

Ook de spanningen rond religieus extremisme trokken hier zijn aandacht. 'Ik dineerde in 2008 met PvdA-Kamerlid Ahmed Marcouch, toen nog stadsdeelvoorzitter in Amsterdam. Hij had net een aanvaring gehad met Sheikh Fawaz Jneid, imam van de Haagse as-Soennah moskee. Die had hem een munafiq; religieuze hypocriet genoemd, een afvallige. Marcouch zag dat als een fatwa. Zijn leven was mogelijk in gevaar.'

Guiora: 'Het belachelijke deed zich vervolgens voor dat Wilders in 2010 voor de rechter kwam en een imam die een fatwa uitspreekt niet werd aangepakt. Marcouch moest maatregelen treffen om zichzelf en zijn kinderen te beschermen. En er gebeurde verder niets. Gelukkig is het allemaal goed afgelopen.' Overigens is Fawaz Jneid in 2012 door het bestuur van de As-Soennah moskee ontslagen en is er aangifte tegen hem gedaan vanwege illegale shariapraktijken.

Men is te lang blind geweest voor de gevaren van religieus extremisme, vindt Guiora, zeker ook in zijn geboorteland. 'Ik heb met eigen ogen gezien wat er gebeurde na de moord op premier Rabin in 1995. De radicale rabbi's die dader Yigal Amir opstookten zijn nooit vervolgd. We mogen onze ogen niet langer sluiten voor de daden van deze ophitsers.'

Om radicalen aan te pakken, mag de vrijheid van meningsuiting worden ingeperkt, vindt hij. 'Ik vind zelfs dat dat moet om een maatschappij te beschermen. Als een imam, of een andere geestelijke, haat zaait en oproept tot geweld. Daar moet goed onderzoek naar gedaan worden. Dan moet de politie of een andere dienst met hem of haar gaan praten en zeggen dat het nu afgelopen is. Blijft deze persoon doorgaan dan is vervolging nodig, dan perk je de vrijheid van meningsuiting in. Als we dat niet doen, blijft het elke keer weer op dezelfde manier fout gaan. We kunnen intolerantie niet blijven tolereren.'

We nemen religieuze scherpslijpers nog steeds niet serieus, aldus Guiora. 'Je hoort vaak geluiden als: "Ach, ze menen het toch niet, laat maar lekker kletsen." Dat is denigrerend en gevaarlijk. Maar het is duidelijk dat het bepaalde groepen wel degelijk ernst is. Dat bewijst niet alleen de moord op Theo van Gogh maar ook de recente gruwelijke aanslagen in het winkelcentrum in Kenia en de landbouwuniversiteit in Nigeria tonen dat duidelijk aan.'

 

Een ondergrondse wandeling van Israel naar Gaza

Er is inmiddels nog een tunnel ontdekt, vol explosieven. De Nederlandse media zwijgen over de tunnels.

Calling the terrorists’ plans “ingenious,” Edelstein said that Hamas had used 500 tons of Israeli-supplied cement to build the tunnel, that there were others like it, and that their construction, crossing into Israeli territory, constituted “an extreme violation of the ceasefire,” which, he contended, Hamas had requested after Operation Pillar of Defense in November.

RP

--------------- 

 

An underground walk toward Gaza

 

The IDF offers a glimpse of an elaborate tunnel — a crime scene exposed before a devastating attack could be perpetrated

By Mitch Ginsburg October 13, 2013, 9:29 pm

http://www.timesofisrael.com/an-underground-walk-toward-gaza/

 

From a guerrilla warfare perspective, the smooth sandy plateau near the Gaza border, shorn of vegetation and buildings and devoid of topographic undulations, is a nightmare. There are few places to hide; nearly everything can be seen from above. Hence the tunnels. And the one the IDF unveiled on Sunday — 5,500 feet long and 60 feet deep — was indicative of both the scope of Hamas’s subterranean warfare operations and the undimmed devotion of its forces to armed resistance against Israel.

The commander of the IDF’s Gaza Division, Brig. Gen. Miki Edelstein, stood on Kibbutz Ein Hashlosha’s fields, where potatoes were soon to be planted, and pointed to the gaping mouth of the tunnel. “To build such a tunnel it takes more than months,” he said. “Basically it might be more than a year.”

Beside him, under the shade of a tent assembled for reporters, was photographic evidence: an aerial photo of the Gaza home from which the digging began; a table full of tools and other artifacts left behind; and a picture of loaves of white bread, which bore the production date of June 2013 (and the rather dubious expiration date of June 2014).

Edelstein revealed that the IDF had spotted the tunnel from the very beginning of its creation and that through a process requiring “the sort of determination I wish I could detail,” had charted its path and exposed it.

Brig. Gen. Michael Edelstein, Gaza Division commander, inside a tunnel dug from the Gaza Strip to Israel, October 13, 2013. (photo credit: Times of Israel/Mitch Ginsburg)

Calling the terrorists’ plans “ingenious,” Edelstein said that Hamas had used 500 tons of Israeli-supplied cement to build the tunnel, that there were others like it, and that their construction, crossing into Israeli territory, constituted “an extreme violation of the ceasefire,” which, he contended, Hamas had requested after Operation Pillar of Defense in November.

Shortly afterward, he led a group of reporters down a sandy slope and into the darkness of the tunnel. The structure, supported by 25,000 U-shaped concrete pieces, plunged deep on the Israeli side of the border, apparently to avoid detection. Black electrical wires ran along the southern wall, as did a communications cable. An army officer holding a post alongside the tunnel said that the majority of the work was done with a hand-held electric jackhammer.

The tunnel was over five feet high and wider than a man’s shoulders. The officer suggested that a sort of vehicle might be inserted into the tunnel to whisk a captive back to the tunnel’s starting point in Abassan al-Sughiya. In the evocative darkness, it was easy to feel the painstaking labor of building such a tunnel, clearing earth day after day, and the anticipated jubilant sprint of Hamas operatives with the ultimate prize in hand: an Israeli body.

After several hundred meters, reporters encountered two combat soldiers from an elite engineering unit, pointing their rifles and their flashlights west. This was the end of the road. Gaza lay beyond.

To the left was a second branch of the tunnel. The officer stationed outside explained that the diggers had left the tunnels covered and that on the day of an attack they would have dug stealthily through the final yards of earth, likely by hand.

The Y-shaped termini of the tunnel, directly beneath an IDF position and in the kibbutz fields, suggested a complex, two-stage attack — just the sort of action that Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz described last week when depicting the beginning of Israel’s next war.

 

Israelische soldaten te racistisch om Palestijnse vrouwen te verkrachten

 

In Nederland zijn BDS activisten eveneens actief in het verstoren van bijeenkomsten. Ze hebben recht op hun mening, en organiseren geregeld eigen activiteiten om die aan de wereld te verkondigen, maar willen anderen ondertussen dit recht om hun visie te verkondigen ontnemen. Zo hebben zij, zo hebben we uit Trouw vernomen, hardhandig een bijeenkomst verstoord waar kolonisten hun kant van de zaak toelichten voor een christelijke pro-Israel organisatie. Ze zijn er zelf behoorlijk trots op. Het walgelijke Stop de Bezetting meldt:

Inmiddels hadden de beide Israëliërs zich teruggetrokken tussen enkele getrouwen. Een liep eerst zelfs onthutst rond en werd door iemand met een arm om de schouder weggeleid.
Een tiental verslagen rondkijkende christenen lieten wij in de zaal achter.

En BDS Nederland schrijft op haar facebookpagina:

Zijn dedain naar zijn Palestijnse landgenoten en de aperte leugens waren zo tergend, dat de verontwaardiging in de forumdiscussie niet meer te kanaliseren was!

Iemand anders voegt daaraan toe dat: 

De wijze waarop Israelis te werk gaan is zo misdadig dat emoties hoog kunnen oplopen, bij ons die het ervaren hebben.(...) Een oneindige stroom van ziekelijke misdaden. Ik hoop dat u enig begrip heeft voor onze emoties.

Nee, dat heb ik niet, sorry. We leven in een land waar we het hartgrondig met elkaar oneens mogen zijn. U hebt genoeg manieren om uw emoties op een correcte manier te uiten, zonder anderen te intimideren en het spreken onmogelijk te maken, en u maakt daar ook gebruik van, getuige deze reactie op een openbare facebookpagina. Ik ben het zelf ook niet in alles met die kolonisten eens, en ik vind niet dat de Joden een door God gegeven recht op Judea en Samaria hebben. Maar ze mogen wel in Nederland komen uitleggen waarom zij vinden van wel.  

Het is daarbij goed voor de meningsvorming wanneer mensen niet alleen de anti-Israel propaganda van jullie kant vernemen maar ook eens een kolonist in levende lijve ontmoeten en zijn/haar ervaringen uit eigen hand horen. Dan blijft men achteraf wellicht met een ongemakkelijk gevoel en tegenstrijdige beweringen zitten, en dat zet er hopelijk toe aan wat minder zwart-wit te denken en wat meer verschillende bronnen te raadplegen alvorens een conclusie te trekken. Als zo'n avond daartoe bijdraagt, juich ik dat van harte toe. En ik hoop dat ze de volgende keer een uitsmijter inhuren.

 

RP

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Those Damn Racist Israelis Who Won't Rape Palestinians

http://www.israellycool.com/2013/10/15/those-damn-racist-israelis-who-wont-rape-palestinians/

Posted by: Aussie Dave in Aussie Dave October 15, 2013

 

 

 

 

Hen Mazzig, one of the protagonists in the Silverstein Bullygate affair, recently wrote of the anti-Israel bigotry and hostility he encountered when speaking on college campuses, high schools, and churches in the US.

His piece has since gone viral, and while the entire thing is worth reading, one part in particular stands out for me. 

To give you a taste of the viciousness of the BDS attacks, let me cite just a few of the many shocking experiences I have had. At a BDS event in Portland, a professor from a Seattle university told the assembled crowd that the Jews of Israel have no national rights and should be forced out of the country. When I asked, "Where do you want them to go?" she calmly answered, "I don't care. I don't care if they don't have any place else to go. They should not be there." When I responded that she was calling for ethnic cleansing, both she and her supporters denied it. And during a presentation in Seattle, I spoke about my longing for peace between Israel and the Palestinians. When I was done, a woman in her 60's stood up and yelled at me, "You are worse than the Nazis. You are just like the Nazi youth!" A number of times I was repeatedly accused of being a killer, though I have never hurt anyone in my life. On other occasions, anti-Israel activists called me a rapist. The claims go beyond being absurd – in one case, a professor asked me if I knew how many Palestinians have been raped by IDF forces. I answered that as far as I knew, none. She triumphantly responded that I was right, because, she said, "You IDF soldiers don't rape Palestinians because Israelis are so racist and disgusted by them that you won't touch them."

Yep. Damned if you do, damned if you don't.

Interestingly enough, this is not even the first time the accusation has been made. 

A research paper that won a Hebrew University teachers' committee prize finds that the lack of IDF rapes of Palestinian women is designed to serve a political purpose.

The abstract of the paper, authored by doctoral candidate Tal Nitzan, notes that the paper shows that "the lack of organized military rape is an alternate way of realizing [particular] political goals."

The next sentence delineates the particular goals that are realized in this manner: "In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it can be seen that the lack of military rape merely strengthens the ethnic boundaries and clarifies the inter-ethnic differences – just as organized military rape would have done."

The paper further theorizes that Arab women in Judea and Samaria are not raped by IDF soldiers because the women are de-humanized in the soldiers' eyes.

The paper was published by the Hebrew University's Shaine Center, based on the recommendation of a Hebrew University professors' committee headed by Dr. Zali Gurevitch.

"I do not have the entire text in front of me," Gurevitch said, when contacted by Arutz-7, "and I don't think we can jump to conclusions based on partial sentences, but I can say the following: This was a very serious paper that asked two important questions: Is the relative lack of IDF rapes a noteworthy phenomenon, and if so, why is it that there are so few IDF rapes when in similar situations around the world, rape is much more common?"

And let's not forget Deborah Orr's argument at the time of the Gilad Shalit-for-terrorists-exchange.

Folks, let's face it. Haters of Israel invariably don't base their views on factual arguments or logic. They simply can't. They base it on sheer ignorance or a loathing of Jews.

 

 

IDF ontdekt tunnel van Gazastrook naar Israel

 

Ik heb een proefabonnement op Trouw, en daar heb ik nog niks over deze materie gezien. Ook de VK schijnt er niks over te hebben, alleen een ANP bericht waarin staat dat de tunnel naar een ‘nederzetting’ in Israel leidt. Ze bedoelen kibboets Ein Hashlosha, vlakbij de Gazastrook, en ik neem aan dat er niet de boodschap achter zit dat dit eigenlijk ‘bezet Palestijns gebied’ is, maar vreemd is het wel.

Onvermeld bleef dat Hamas zo’n 500 ton aan cement gebruikte voor de tunnel, dat bedoeld was voor de bouw van huizen en ander niet-militair gebruik. Wel weer vermeld werd dat Israel daarop de levering van bouwmaterialen naar de Gazastrook heeft stopgezet. Ook werd vermeld dat dit verbod juist vorige maand werd opgeheven, wat vorige maand echter geen ‘eigen bericht’ waard was. Tot zover de objectieve berichtgeving van de kwaliteitskranten.

Many Palestinians move in broad daylight along plots of land next to the border. Most of them are innocent civilians, but others may be Hamas activists involved in tunnel construction or gathering intelligence on the Israeli side. The ability of Hamas to dig tunnels is impressive, and it is no secret that under Gaza City, the organization built a network of trenches and tunnels that its leaders used to hide from the Israeli bombs during Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012 and even during Cast Lead in 2009. Hamas, it seems, has not stopped preparations for the next conflict with Israel for so much as a second, and the question about that next round is not one of “if” but of “when.”

 

RP

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It keeps tunneling, but Hamas doesn’t want escalation… yet

http://www.timesofisrael.com/it-keeps-tunneling-but-hamas-doesnt-want-escalation-yet/

 

Egypt has made it clear that there is to be no confrontation with Israel, but Hamas might initiate one if Gazans revolt

 

By Avi Issacharoff October 14, 2013, 2:21 am

 

 

The presence and sophistication of the tunnel that the IDF exposed Sunday did not surprise Shin Bet and IDF officials in the Southern Command. IDF commanders in the area, at almost every opportunity, stress that Hamas is involved in a major effort to dig more and more tunnels between Gaza and Israel in order to use in them in case of renewed escalation.

Hamas isn’t even trying to hide its intentions. A statement from the Hamas military wing spokesman Sunday evening said that “the first tunnel will lead to a thousand more tunnels.”

A cursory examination of the border area also suggests that the digging of such tunnels is not an especially complicated task for an organization that has managed in the last six years to create a virtual tunnel city under Rafah on the Egyptian border. Adjacent to the Gaza-Israel border fence, there are plenty of houses, some of them only a few hundred meters from the Israeli side, and in every one of them Hamas could put a tunnel entrance.

Many Palestinians move in broad daylight along plots of land next to the border. Most of them are innocent civilians, but others may be Hamas activists involved in tunnel construction or gathering intelligence on the Israeli side. The ability of Hamas to dig tunnels is impressive, and it is no secret that under Gaza City, the organization built a network of trenches and tunnels that its leaders used to hide from the Israeli bombs during Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012 and even during Cast Lead in 2009. Hamas, it seems, has not stopped preparations for the next conflict with Israel for so much as a second, and the question about that next round is not one of “if” but of “when.”

Yet make no mistake: Hamas has no interest in initiating a confrontation with Israel. Not right now, that is. On Sunday evening, Hamas’s Gaza Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh hinted that the Strip’s Islamist rulers are not interested in escalation. In a speech to the graduates of a Gaza police officers’ course, Haniyeh said his forces are also concerned about Egypt’s security, and will guard the border with Sinai. The Hamas prime minister knows that the unequivocal Egyptian demand from his organization and from Haniyeh himself is to avoid any military conflict with Israel, otherwise the Egyptians themselves will act against Hamas.

Still, it is not clear how long Hamas will continue to maintain the quiet against Israel.

The conclusion of K., a resident of the northern Strip, may sound exaggerated. He argued recently that the economic situation of Gaza is so bad it is only a question of time until Gaza burns.

“It will not be directed against Israel, but against Hamas,” he claimed. “The residents are fed up. In six years they [Hamas] haven’t managed in bringing about any change. Quite the opposite. We still don’t have enough electricity and the economy is destroyed. We are still under siege — and not because of Israel, but because the Egyptians had a quarrel with Hamas. But before we reach a confrontation with Hamas, they [Hamas] will initiate an escalation with Israel and will fire Qassams, so the protests against them will stop.”

K. is a small-business owner who has never been big fan of Hamas. But he isn’t especially fond of the Palestinian Authority or Fatah either.

“Those ones were corrupt, now we have these guys. And we’re the ones who get hurt. We have a holiday in two days, Eid al-Adha, and people don’t have money. All the goods are expensive now, there are no building materials.”

K’s words are not unusual in the current reality in the Strip.

Israel’s understanding of the potentially explosive situation in the Strip — given the tunnel closings and price inflation — has likely led to subtle messages from Jerusalem to Cairo about the need to ease the blockade on the Strip slightly.

And so, miraculously, in parallel to the Israeli announcement about stopping the transfer of building materials from Israel to Gaza in response to the tunnel building Sunday, the Egyptians allowed 51 trucks of building materials to pass from Sinai to Gaza.

Let’s call it coincidental scheduling.

 

Interview met Khaled Abu Toameh, Israelisch-Arabische journalist

 

Voor de mensen die zijn stukken geregeld lezen bevat onderstaand interview niet veel nieuws, maar hij zet een paar zaken wel even duidelijk op een rij. Het is jammer dat zijn stukken nooit in Nederlandse media verschijnen, zoals wel geregeld gebeurt met Israel-kritische journalisten uit Israel of de VS. Hij benoemt wat zelden wordt benoemd: de onvrijheid om in de door de PA of Hamas gecontroleerde gebieden te schrijven over wat je ziet, de onmogelijkheid om als journalist, en zeker een in PA gebied gevestigde journalist, je werk goed te doen.

The P.A. leadership in the West Bank promotes BDS against Israel and also fights normalization with Israel. It bans meetings between Palestinians and Israelis and condemns the Israeli media as extremely hostile, which makes it impossible to work there and endangers our lives. 

 

Q. How does the Arab street respond to your reporting?
A. No one tells me that what I am reporting is inaccurate or untrue. I am often criticized, however, for reporting the facts. I am only reporting what many Arab journalists want to report. If I resided in Ramallah, I would not be reporting many things. There are P.A. journalists who post critical things on Facebook and risk prison. Those who ask the wrong questions at press conferences are sometimes detained or even tortured.

Toameh wordt vaak gezien als partijdig omdat hij voor het centrum-rechtse The Jerusalem Post en het conservatieve The Gatestone Institute schrijft. Het is waar dat hij zelden schrijft over misstanden aan Israelische kant, en zich focused op de Palestijnen, wellicht omdat hij daar zelf vandaan komt en boven tafel wil krijgen wat veel Palestijnse journalisten niet kunnen of willen rapporteren. Dat laat onverlet dat hij een ongemakkelijke waarheid vertelt die velen in het Westen liever niet willen zien, omdat het lastige vragen oproept over hoe zo’n Palestijnse staat zal functioneren als het huidige leiderschap zo met critici en dissidenten omgaat. 

 

RP

----------

 

September 2013

 

Interview: Khaled Abu Toameh
http://www.hadassahmagazine.org/site/apps/nlnet/content.aspx?c=twI6LmN7IzF&b=6725377&ct=13243859&notoc=1

Charley J. Levine

Photo by Albert Zablit.

Khaled Abu Toameh, 50, an award-winning Israeli journalist and documentary filmmaker, has reported on Arab affairs for three decades. He writes for The Jerusalem Post and the New York-based Gatestone Institute, a nonpartisan, not-for-profit international policy council and think tank, where he is a senior adviser. Since 1989, he also has been a producer and consultant for NBC News. He grew up in the Arab Israeli town of Baqa al-Gharbiyye near Haifa and studied at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He now lives in Jerusalem. 

 

Q. What are the challenges of working as a journalist in the West Bank and Gaza?
A. Before the Oslo peace process began, Arab journalists had almost no problem traveling throughout the West Bank and Gaza, speaking freely with Palestinians. But ever since the Palestinian Authority came to the West Bank and Gaza, the situation has become much more challenging and dangerous. The P.A. expects you to serve as an official spokesperson and avoid criticism of its leaders.

With Hamas in power in Gaza, it’s become even more dangerous for independent Arab journalists. Because of the BDS [boycott, divestment and sanctions] movement against Israel, journalists representing the Israeli media, like myself, face not only difficulties but threats and even physical violence when we go to Ramallah. The P.A. leadership in the West Bank promotes BDS against Israel and also fights normalization with Israel. It bans meetings between Palestinians and Israelis and condemns the Israeli media as extremely hostile, which makes it impossible to work there and endangers our lives. 

 

Q. How does the Arab street respond to your reporting?
A. No one tells me that what I am reporting is inaccurate or untrue. I am often criticized, however, for reporting the facts. I am only reporting what many Arab journalists want to report. If I resided in Ramallah, I would not be reporting many things. There are P.A. journalists who post critical things on Facebook and risk prison. Those who ask the wrong questions at press conferences are sometimes detained or even tortured.

I live inside Israel, so my reality is sharply different. I receive more threats from pro-Palestine students and academics in the U.S. than I do from local Palestinians. 

 

Q. What happened to the moderate Palestinian center?
A. Palestinians have been so radicalized that you will find very few Palestinians who will openly talk about making any significant compromise with Israel. No P.A. leader would dare to sign any agreement with Israel for fear of being condemned as a traitor. Israel has been delegitimized in the eyes of most Palestinians and this is the result of decades of indoctrination and incitement against Israel. This is true throughout the entire Arab world.

Ironically, this incitement intensified after the peace process began. The Palestine Liberation Organization leadership used the media, the mosques and every available podium to delegitimize and discredit Israel in the eyes of the Palestinians. By doing so, the P.L.O. has actually shot itself in the foot. P.A. leaders know that they have radicalized their people to the point where there are people who don’t want to hear about peace with Israel at all. I believe this is why [Mahmoud] Abbas will not sign any agreement with Israel. He simply doesn’t want to go down in history as a traitor. 

 

Q. Is there anything Israel should be doing differently?
A. Israel is facing two camps in the Palestinian community. One is the radical camp that doesn’t believe in Israel’s right to exist and seeks its destruction. With that camp, there’s nothing that can be done. The second, less radical, camp is represented by some P.L.O. leaders in the West Bank who are unable to deliver [change or peace]. This is a camp that lacks grass-roots support. It has further been discredited due to its close relations with the U.S., Europeans and even Israel. So Israel is facing one camp that doesn’t want to deliver and another that cannot practically do so. 

 

Q. United States Secretary of State John Kerry has tried to revive the peace process with multiple visits and public declarations. Can this break the logjam?
A. It’s a waste of time. You might be able to reach some sort of interim agreements with Abbas over certain areas that he’s actually in control of in the West Bank, but I doubt he’ll go even for that. Many in the international community see Abbas as a peace partner and this might be partially true, but so what? The question we need to ask is ‘Can this man deliver?’ What’s a peace agreement worth with Abbas when he can’t even visit his house in Ramallah that has been taken over by Hamas? The international community should go to the Palestinians and ask them to get their act together and start speaking in one voice and stop the indoctrination and glorification of suicide bombers. They must start preparing their people for possible compromise with Israel. 

 

Q. What are Israel’s Arab citizens saying about Israel?
A. Arab citizens of Israel can act as a bridge between Jews and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. The Israeli Arab dilemma is that their State of Israel is in conflict with their people, the Palestinians. While most Israeli Arabs would like to see a Palestinian state and a better life for the Palestinians, they would nevertheless prefer to stay inside Israel for two reasons: First, this has always been their home. Second, they have always been comfortable in Israel despite all the challenges facing them.

I am worried about the process of radicalization that is taking place among the Arab community inside Israel. I blame some of the domestic Arab community leaders for inciting their fellow citizens against Israel. I’m talking about some of the Arab Knesset members. And the Israeli establishment’s failure to address very serious problems within Arab society is no less problematic: unemployment, unequal allocation of public funds and investment in physical infrastructure.

Q. Does the composition of Israel’s government or the country’s political landscape matter to the Palestinians? 
A. Most Arab Israelis don’t see a difference between Labor and Likud. Sometimes, ironically, right-wing governments do more than the left wing. In this regard, I’ve never understood the P.A. leadership. When there’s a left-wing government in Israel, they reject it, and because of that Israeli left-wing governments fall. And when the right-wing government comes to power, they complain that they can’t make peace with them. 

 

Q. Why is there such a pronounced Palestinian denial of Jewish history—from the Holocaust to the Jewish connection to the Temple Mount and Western Wall?
A. It’s part of the campaign to delegitimize Israel: [The message is that] the Jews have no historical attachment to this land. We are told...even by moderates that there is no such thing as the Western Wall; it is the southern wall of the Al Aqsa mosque. We are told that there is no such thing as Rachel’s Tomb. We are told that there’s no such thing as Joseph’s Tomb; it’s just the tomb of a Muslim sheik. And all the archaeological discoveries are fake. That Jews come at night and plant items at excavation sites and in the morning call a press conference to present these items as something that demonstrates a connection.

There are different views about the Holocaust. There are those who might admit it happened but challenge the numbers; there are those who completely deny it. Finally, there are some who recognize it happened on the full scale. But the first categories are prevalent and they contend that Israel is using the Holocaust to extort money. The common sentiment says: Why should we talk about Jewish suffering? We have enough suffering of our own.

Q. What should Israel’s approach to peace be at this time?
A. Israel’s policy should be to talk to anyone who wants to talk and shoot back at anyone who shoots. I don’t see anything that Israel can do under the current circumstances. Some would say, ‘Why doesn’t Israel just get up and leave, unilaterally go to pre-1967 lines?’ I think that would be a recipe for another war. Any land you give to the P.L.O. will undoubtedly end up in the hands of Hamas and other extremists. We’ve been to this movie before and I’m not even sure the P.L.O. wants Israel to pull out of the West Bank, although they demand that in public. The P.L.O. knows that its survival in the West Bank depends on Israel’s security presence. 

 

 

De mythe van de inheemse Bedoeïnen?

 

Onderstaand artikel komt van een rechtse pro-Israel club, maar dat laat onverlet dan hun argumentatie overwogen kan worden...

 

De inheemse volken gaan mij ook aan het hart, maar bij de Bedoeïnen valt me steeds op dat degenen die in Israel wonen (met name de Negev woestijn) steeds in het nieuws komen als onschuldige slachtoffers van de Joods-Israelische landhonger, terwijl dezelfde Bedoeïnen in de aangrenzende Sinaï alleen in het nieuws komen (in NL media trouwens notoir onderbelicht) als mensenhandelaars en criminele bendes, die Afrikaanse vluchtelingen gijzelen, hen zwaar mishandelen en verkrachten, en zelfs vermoorden om hun organen te roven. (O ja, en tussendoor figureren ze nog als attractie en gidsen voor Westerse toeristen.)

 

Als nomadenvolk is het hele 'Arabische' woestijngebied hun thuis, van Marokko tot Iran, maar dat hele gebied als hun ('souvereine') land opeisen is natuurlijk nergens aan de orde.

Al eeuwen proberen verschillende Arabische (en voorheen de Ottomaanse) autoriteiten hen te temmen en aan centraal gezag te onderwerpen, min of meer zoals in Nederland met Roma en woonwagenvolk gebeurde (maar bij de Arabieren vaak met brutere middelen).

 

In onderstaand artikel wordt wel erg ver teruggegaan om te stellen dat de Joden in de Negev oorspronkelijker waren dan de Bedoeïnen (en er dus meer aanspraak op kunnen maken?). Zonder precieze details te weten (Wie weet die wel?), is mijn indruk dat sinds pakweg de Romeinse tijd of uiterlijk de Ottomaanse, er geen grote hoeveelheden Joden meer in de Negev hebben gewoond tot de stichting van Israel, terwijl de Bedoeïnen er waarschijnlijk al zo lang rondtrekken (alleen al gezien dat ze door de Negev moesten om tussen de Arabische woestijn en de Sahara te kunnen migreren). Volgens het artikel wonen de huidige Bedoeïnen er zo'n 200 jaar, maar rond 1600 werden er wel 43 andere Bedoeïnenstammen geteld (noot 2)!

 

Dat elders in Israel ononderbroken Joden hebben gewoond, is geen sterk argument om ook de Negev te claimen. De Volkenbond en de VN erkenden wel Joodse rechten c.q. Israelische souvereiniteit over de Negev, maar ook al trekken de huidige Bedoeïnenstammen er 'pas' 200 jaar rond, dan nog dient men in redelijke mate rekening te houden met hun belangen en rechten, inheems of niet...

 

Wouter

_____________________

 

News and Views from Jews Down Under

An online magazine for Australian Jews

 

Bedouin Myth #1 – Indigenous?

Posted on 13/10/2013 by Editor

http://jewsdownunder.wordpress.com/2013/10/13/bedouin-myth-1-indigenous/

Posted by Regavim: Regavim (The National Land Protection Trust) is an independent professional research institute & policy planning think tank, incorporated as a private non-profit company in Israel. The mission of the institute is to ensure responsible, legal & accountable use of Israel's national lands and the return of the rule of law to all.

Around twenty-five years ago, a global discussion began surrounding the term "indigenous peoples" as it relates to ethnic minorities around the world.  International law however began to address the issue of indigenous peoples as far back as the 17^th century, and by and large the matter was left to the discretion of the particular state. With the passing of the years, the law began to recognize an independent status of indigenous ethnic groups (such as the Indians and the Aborigines) in a way that was bound together with previous legal agreements regarding preservation of culture, holy sites, and more.

The International Labor Organization (ILO) associated with the United Nations tried to advance two international treaties pertinent to the rights of populations that define themselves as indigenous populations, yet were unsuccessful in formulating a statement due to each country's differing views on sovereignty and indigenous populations.

In the past few years, key figures in the Bedouin sector in Israel began to apply this term to themselves as characteristic of their independent status, together with a demand for recognition of their historic ownership of lands across the Negev.

Despite the lack of an international agreement as to the definition of "indigenous", the general recognition of indigenous peoples tends to use various parameters, focusing on the following:

• Original Inhabitants – the indigenous peoples are descendents of the first peoples to inhabit a particular territory.
• Extended Period of Time – the indigenous peoples live in a territory "from time immemorial" over a period of thousands of years.
• Pre-Colonial Sovereignty – the indigenous groups had territorial sovereignty before the arrival of a developed nation that took possession of the region.
• Group Connection to the Land – they have a spiritual connection to the land on which they live.
• External Validation – other external groups affirm that these people are in fact indigenous.

Professor Ruth Kark of the Geography Department of the Hebrew University, considered an expert on conceptions of land ownership in traditional and pre-modern cultures, in an article that appeared in the "Middle East Quarterly,"[1] enumerated the generally accepted parameters of the term "indigenous," and explains why the Bedouins cannot be included in this category. Here is the synopsis of her conclusions.

• Indigenous Peoples – Many groups preceded the Bedouins in Palestine in general and in the Negev in particular, including Jewish inhabitants who maintained an uninterrupted presence in the land since the days of the Bible. Therefore the Bedouins cannot claim that they were the original inhabitants of the land.

• The Dimension of Time – the variable called, "from time immemorial" requires a long-standing presence on the territory. The Bedouin tribes currently living in the Negev have been there for around two hundred years.[2] As such, they cannot claim that their presence predates the arrival of a foreign power, such as the Ottoman Empire, which preceded the current Bedouins tribes present by hundreds of years. In opposition to this, the Jewish presence in Palestine completely fulfills the requirements of "time immemorial."

• Sovereignty – in the case of the Bedouins of the Negev, they never had sovereignty over the region. When they arrived, the Negev was already under Ottoman control, followed by British and Israeli control.

• A Unique Spiritual Connection to the Territory – nomadic life precludes any specific fixed connection to the land.  There is no long-standing proof in the Bedouin tradition establishing a spiritual connection between them and the Negev, a logical situation owing to their relatively brief presence there and to their nomadic lifestyle. Indeed they claim the Arabian Peninsula to be their historic homeland. Today, the Bedouins are not claiming collective rights to the land, but are rather demanding fulfillment of the rights of individuals to sell the lands and transfer them to a third party. Such private demands are contrary to the spiritual dimension, and point to the fact that the main aspiration of the Bedouins is financial gain with no collective character that would be relevant to their campaign to be recognized as indigenous.

• The Group Defines Itself, and is Regarded by Others, as Indigenous Inhabitants of the Territory – The claim of the Bedouins as indigenous is quite recent, and was first mentioned only a number of years ago.[3] Previous studies did not find that the Bedouins regarded themselves in this way, and no researchers made the claim that they were indigenous. The fact that no other tribe in the Middle East ever made the claim of being indigenous raises questions as to the motives and authenticity of such a claim. Since the Bedouins of the Negev in a number of cases are a part of the same tribe that dwells in neighboring countries, it is thus illogical to say that only the Bedouins who live on the Israeli side of the border are considered indigenous.

Conclusion: The narrative according to the Bedouin claim that they are "indigenous" does not fulfill the world's accepted criteria for being considered indigenous. Such claims were first made only some ten years ago.

---

[1] Are the Negev Bedouin an Indigenous People? Fabricating Palestinian History. Havazelet Yahel,  Dr. Seth Fratzman & Prof. Ruth Kark. Middle East Quarterly. Summer 2012, pp. 3-14

[2] Ottoman tax records from the years 1596-97 specify the names of forty three Bedouin tribes in what was to become the Palestinian Mandate, including three in the Negev, yet the names of the tribes living today in the Negev do not appear in this list.

[3] The first articles to relate to this claim appeared about ten years ago in the platforms of organizations identified with the radical left in Israel such as "Adalah," "the Negev Co-existence Forum," and the "Human Rights Watch."

 

Gazanen klem door Egyptische belegering

 

Hier is nauwelijks aandacht voor in de media, in schril contrast tot de vele reportages toen Israel de grens sloot en de export naar Gaza van een aantal producten beperkte. VN organisaties als de UNRWA, OCHA en anderen spraken van een ‘humanitaire ramp’ en er werd gesproken van een openlucht gevangenis en zelfs concentratiekamp Gaza of het ghetto van Gaza. Waar is alle verontwaardiging gebleven nu Egypte hetzelfde – en feitelijk nog erger – doet? Waarom mag Egypte ongetraft strijden tegen Hamas over de hoofden van de bevolking in Gaza, en is er nauwelijks een journalist, mensenrechtenstrijder of VNer die het opvalt?

Abdallah even has some good words for Israel. "For years we were complaining about the Israeli siege of Gaza, but now it is the only one which lets in food and fuel through the Kerem Shalom crossing", he said. "Egypt has almost completely closed the Rafah crossing, which used to be the life line for the residents here. It's a one-way door. You can only enter Gaza. Exiting it is very difficult, it's almost an impossible mission".
 

------------- 

 

Gazans tell of life under siege. Egyptian siege. 

 

From Ma'ariv, translated by Yoel:

 

The crisis between Hamas and the new regime in Egypt is worsening: in Egypt there is no intention in the mean time to scale down on the military operation in Sinai, which started after the toppling of the Muslim Brotherhood regime. The Egyptians accuse Hamas of collaborating with jihadi elements operating in the peninsula, and the foreign minister, Nabil Fahmy, declared that if the need arises the Egyptian army will use military force against the Gaza Strip. Military sources even said that a target list for Gaza was drawn up to allow an aerial attack.

After years of an Israeli siege, in the last weeks the residents of Gaza are dealing with an Egyptian siege due to the wide-scale military operation against terror infrastructures in Sinai and against the smuggling between Gaza to the peninsula.

"The reality we were used to has changed completely. Life was always hard, but now it is almost unbearable", one resident said.

The Egyptian activity is mostly focused on the smuggling between the strip and the Sinai peninsula, which is part of the struggle against the Hamas movement. According to reports, 95% of the tunnels are not functioning today. "The smuggling has almost completely stopped and the prices of the products that go through the tunnels have skyrocketed", says Hamdan Abdallah, a resident of the Gazan part of Rafah, in a conversation with NRG. He told me a liter of fuel costs more than seven shekels today, as apposed to three shekels before the military operation. [That's the price Israelis pay. - EoZ]

Abdallah even has some good words for Israel. "For years we were complaining about the Israeli siege of Gaza, but now it is the only one which lets in food and fuel through the Kerem Shalom crossing", he said. "Egypt has almost completely closed the Rafah crossing, which used to be the life line for the residents here. It's a one-way door. You can only enter Gaza. Exiting it is very difficult, it's almost an impossible mission".

A Rafah resident who preferred to stay anonymous said he couldn't understand why the residents of the strip of all people had to pay the price for the actions of radical groups. "The Egyptian security forces are dealing with armed groups in Sinai, and they also blame Hamas for collaborating with them. This may be true, but the question is why do we the residents have to pay the price. But that's the way it is, we've gotten used to it - when there are troubles in the world it's the Palestinians who are responsible for them, and it's they who are punished", he said sadly.

Too bad Ma'ariv didn't get a chance to ask the Gazans what they thought of their government building tunnels to kidnap Israelis instead of houses and apartments.

Hamas in Gaza steeds verder onder druk

 

Het Egyptische leger heeft moeite de controle in het land te houden, met name in de Sinaï waar islamisten en Bedoeïnenbendes grotendeels de dienst zijn gaan uitmaken. De smokkeltunnels naar Gaza werden jarenlang gebruikt om wapens Gaza in te smokkelen, maar tegenwoordig ook om wapens (en strijders) Gaza uit te smokkelen ten behoeve van de strijd tegen de huidige Egyptische regering.

Daarom heeft Egypte de meeste tunnels (80 tot 90%) onklaar gemaakt, vaak met grof geweld (zonder dat dit de aandacht van onze media trekt). Allerlei levensmiddelen zijn daardoor weer schaars geworden en de prijzen rijzen dus de pan uit. Hamas, dat flinke belastingen hief bij de tunnels, profiteert daar echter nauwelijks van en ziet zijn inkomstenbron opdrogen, evenals andere inkomsten zoals de steun van de Moslimbroederschap en van Iran.

 

Missing Peace bericht dat Egypte zelfs aanvallen voorbereid op doelen in de Gazastrook zelf, en dat Hamas op haar beurt haar geweld tegen Israel aan het opvoeren zou zijn; als afleidingsmaneuvre maar ook om de vredesbesprekingen van Abbas met Israel te torpederen.

Avi Issacharaoff hieronder ziet dit echter niet zo, en schrijft: "For now, Hamas has no interest in launching a terrorist attack from Gaza or initiating military confrontations."

 

De tijd zal het leren.

 

Wouter

____________

 

 

In Gaza, Hamas feels the squeeze

http://www.timesofisrael.com/in-gaza-hamas-feels-the-squeeze/

 

Although Israel has boosted supplies, Egypt's crackdown on smuggling tunnels has raised prices in the Strip, angered residents, and cost the Islamist government a fortune. It's still training terrorists, though

 

By Avi Issacharoff - Times of Israel / October 12, 2013, 3:54 am

 

A student training session organized by Hamas national security forces in Rafah, southern Gaza Strip, on January 23, 2013. (photo credit: Abed Rahim Khatib/Flash90)

Related Topics

• Gaza Strip
• Hamas
• Kerem Shalom crossing

ISRAEL-GAZA BORDER — At first glance, everything seems peaceful and serene. I'm standing at the northern tip of the Gaza Strip, the point where the barrier between Israel and Gaza ends as it descends gradually into the sea. And nothing separates the sands of Israel's Zikim beach from the northernmost beach in Gaza.

Two Palestinian fishermen row their raft into the sea, hoping to catch some fish to sell and bring home a few shekels. Today, the rest of Gaza beach is empty. On weekends, it is packed with people seeking recreation and relaxation.

The northernmost homes of the al-Shati refugee camp, a few kilometers south, are visible in the distance. This is the home of Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh. Further south are the Gaza beach hotels, generally empty except for the foreign journalists who stay from time to time.

This single position where I'm taking in the view is one of the biggest headaches for the Israeli security forces. Those fishermen could, theoretically, row out to sea towards the imaginary border inside the water and easily swim to the Israeli side in a matter of seconds.

This hasn't happened. For now, Hamas has no interest in launching a terrorist attack from Gaza or initiating military confrontations.

But Egypt's exhaustive crackdown on Hamas, and on its smuggling tunnels running into the Sinai, is giving rise to fears that the Islamist group may attempt to escalate tensions with Israel, in a bid to force Egypt to open the Sinai border for commerce and trade.

That's why in recent weeks it has been the Israelis, of all people, who have attempted to dissuade Cairo from enforcing a hermetic blockade on the Gaza Strip. Squeezing Gaza too tight will likely cause upheaval in the region, which will result in a new round of violence between Israel and Hamas.

For most Gazans, though, the closing of the tunnels has translated into a new reality in which, while most products are still available, they are much more expensive than before Egypt made its move.

A city underground

During the years of Israel's tight blockade on Gaza, from 2007 to 2010, hundreds of tunnels were dug out, very close together, along the narrow strip of land that forms the border between Egypt and Gaza.

The spokesperson for the Egyptian Border Police reported last week that the Egyptians have closed 1,055 tunnels since January 2011, 794 of them in the nine months since January 2013.

The tunnels were one of the Hamas government's primary projects. The industry employed up to 40,000 people, and provided nearly 40% of the government's budget. The tunnels were of varying lengths and widths, but the majority shared a purpose – to smuggle in all types of merchandise, from missiles and military equipment to snacks and cigarettes. Subverting the Israeli blockade, the industry proved highly profitable, too, for private entrepreneurs.

Hamas monitored the tunnels closely and heavily taxed the tunnel owners. Each entrepreneur would pay taxes to the Rafah Municipality for a license to begin digging. Once the tunnel was dug, taxes were charged on all products brought through it, but the goods were still cheaper than anything flowing legitimately through the Kerem Shalom crossing with Israel.

A seven shekel ($2) pack of cigarettes from Egypt, for example, would sell for 10 shekels (almost $3) in the Gaza shops; the tunnel owner made two shekels and Hamas one shekel per smuggled pack.

The system worked for everyone: The tunnel owners earned their commission, residents of Gaza enjoyed exceptionally cheap products, and Hamas benefited from the tens of millions of dollars in taxes that it accumulated each month.

The first stage of the Egyptian war against the tunnels began when the Muslim Brotherhood was still in control. After 16 Egyptian police officers were killed near the Rafah border in August 2012, Cairo realized that terrorists affiliated with Al-Qaeda were using the tunnels to receive military equipment from Gaza and were smuggling people through the tunnels to facilitate fighting.

This was the trigger for Egyptian military action. Approximately half of the tunnels were closed down. But the most dramatic shift began in late June 2013, several days before the widespread protests against Morsi led to his ouster. The army took advantage of the Brotherhood's weakness and launched a massive operation along the Rafah border, shutting down 90% of the tunnels there.

The financial implications for Gaza and the Hamas treasury were immediate and the situation has not improved since. "For six years, we grew accustomed to buying everything, and cheap," a Gaza resident told me. "Gasoline was only three shekels per liter. Cigarettes cost ten and milk was sold for four shekels. Now, it's not that we're lacking anything. Trucks constantly enter Gaza via Kerem Shalom. But the prices have more than doubled."

The Coordinating Office for Government Activities in the Territories, understanding the potential for escalated violence in Gaza as a result of the lack of merchandise, has lately allowed over 430 trucks to bring products into Gaza via Kerem Shalom on a daily basis.

But according to the Gaza resident, the problem is cost, not availability. "People earn the same salaries as before, if they work at all. But the prices have skyrocketed. People cannot afford to buy gasoline for eight shekels per liter or cigarettes for 25 shekels. The Gaza markets are suffering a recession, and this is holiday season," he said, referring to Eid al-Adha, the Feast of the Sacrifice, which begins next Tuesday.

Hamas is also hurting. "Just picture the situation: Nearly all the men in Gaza smoke. But the taxes collected on smuggled cigarettes from Egypt are gone," a Gaza vendor said. "Half a million liters of fuel were transported through the tunnels daily and each liter contributed 1.5 shekels to the Hamas treasury. They paid thousands of dollars in taxes for each car that was brought in through the tunnels. The same was true for construction materials, snacks, everything."

The lack of income has impacted Hamas government salaries. Hamas withheld last month's wages in order to save the money for Eid al-Adha. The government apparently plans on granting a 1,000 shekel bonus to each of its 50,000 employees for the holiday.

What does Hamas do now?

"Hamas now has nothing to offer the Palestinian community in Gaza," said a Palestinian analyst, who asked to remain anonymous. "Let's look a few years ahead. According to the UN, by 2020 there will not be a single drop of water in the Gaza Strip that is fit for human consumption. What can Hamas do about that? Very little.

"But even today, the financial situation in the Gaza Strip is deteriorating rapidly. The government's income has declined — because of the tunnels, but also because of a decrease in outside contributions. The money that the Muslim Brotherhood once raised for Hamas from its members in Egypt has dried up. Unemployment rates among the younger generation in Gaza have never been higher and the majority of university graduates cannot find work. What kind of future can Hamas offer these thousands of young adults who cannot afford to buy a house or even to get married?"

Hamas, this analyst said, is facing "one of the most severe economic and political crises in its history — because of the events throughout the Middle East. Its mother-movement in Egypt has once again been outlawed and now operates underground. Its ally in Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, has his own local Intifada to deal with due to the rising costs of fuel. The movement has been pushed to the sidelines of the civil war in Syria and the Muslim Brotherhood is no longer a central player even in Jordan, where protests against the royal family have tapered out."

Hamas's only supporters, he said, "are Qatar and Turkey, while all other Arab countries including Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain oppose them. There isn't even anyone left to mediate between Hamas and Fatah, if Gaza decides to take the [internal Palestinian] reconciliation route."

This analyst believes that while there is a possibility of escalated violence against Israel, its unlikely. "It's not on their agenda, despite the financial crisis. One faction, led by Haniyeh, claims that the current circumstances in the region leave Hamas with no choice but to reconcile with Fatah. A second group argues that Hamas must show no signs of weakness at this time and must hang tough until circumstances change for the better. A third group advocates reconciliation, but only in six months' time, once the negotiations between the PA and Israel come to an end. At that point, they believe that Abu Mazen [PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas] will have no choice but to accept that the talks with Israel failed, which will weaken him politically. They want to reconcile from a position of strength."

For now, Hamas leaders are waiting to see if Egypt will change its policies towards Gaza. These leaders cannot even leave the Strip; Cairo has forbidden them from crossing through the Rafah border terminal.

At the same time, Hamas is constantly building up its military forces in case its leaders do choose the escalation route. It has set up a training camp for members of its military wing, not far from Gaza's northwestern border, on the ruins of the Dugit settlement. The camp is named Askelan — a reference to Ashkelon, further up the coast in Israel.

A tall watchtower constructed at the camp is clearly visible from Israeli territory. From this elevated vantage point, Hamas activists observe activity on the Israeli side of the border. Since the last major flare-up in November 2012, they've been watching relative quiet. There are no guarantees that it will last.

---

Avi Issacharoff, The Times of Israel's Middle East analyst, fills the same role for Walla, the leading portal in Israel. He is also a guest commentator on many different radio shows and current affairs programs on television. Until 2012, he was a reporter and commentator on Arab affairs for the Haaretz newspaper. He also lectures on modern Palestinian history at Tel Aviv University, and is currently writing a script for an action-drama series for the Israeli satellite Television "YES." Born in Jerusalem, he graduated cum laude from Ben Gurion University with a B.A. in Middle Eastern studies and then earned his M.A. from Tel Aviv University on the same subject, also cum laude. A fluent Arabic speaker, Avi was the Middle East Affairs correspondent for Israeli Public Radio covering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the war in Iraq and the Arab countries between the years 2003-2006. Avi directed and edited short documentary films on Israeli television programs dealing with the Middle East. In 2002 he won the "best reporter" award for the "Israel Radio" for his coverage of the second intifada. In 2004, together with Amos Harel, he wrote "The Seventh War - How we won and why we lost the war with the Palestinians." A year later the book won an award from the Institute for Strategic Studies for containing the best research on security affairs in Israel. In 2008, Issacharoff and Harel published their second book, entitled "34 Days - The Story of the Second Lebanon War," which won the same prize.