Hieronder een sobere analyse van onder andere de situatie met betrekking tot de Gazastrook.
In tegenstelling tot wat veel wordt geroepen is Israël momenteel niet van plan een grootscheepse operatie uit te voeren, en men hoopt dat een deal over de vrijlating van Shalit samen met een onofficiële 'kalmte' (waardoor er dus minder Qassams op Israël zullen vallen), het publiek kunnen tevredenstellen. Vandaar ook de recente discussie over het versoepelen van de criteria voor de vrijlating van Palestijnse gevangenen. Hamas zal Shalit immers alleen vrijlaten in ruil voor een aantal al lang vast zittende gevangenen die direct betrokken waren bij dodelijke aanslagen, alsmede zwaargewichten uit hun organisatie.
Dit lijkt een typische korte termijn oplossing: tijdelijk minder Qassams en de blijdschap van het publiek dat Shalit eindelijk vrij is, vormen natuurlijk geen oplossing voor het feit dat Hamas continu bezig is zijn raketten en andere aanvalscapaciteiten te verbeteren en voor de grootschalige wapensmokkel.
Ratna
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We are being told that very little is happening to secure the release of abducted Israel Defense Forces soldier Gilad Shalit, but the media is ripe with reports about the details of a deal that may be taking shape. We are promised that there is nothing to talk about with Hamas, but there is no end to the discussion about an emerging tahadiya (cease-fire) between Israel and the Palestinian terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip. Is this not much ado about nothing?
The questions one must ask are: Who is disseminating the information to the media, who stands to benefit from its publication and what interests underlie many of the reports? There are, of course, actual developments on the ground: Hamas' political wing is in fact showing interest in a cease-fire. Egypt has renewed its mediation between the two sides for a Shalit release; Hamas may soon provide a new list of prisoners whose release it demands, and may display greater flexibility. But the progress made in all these channels was inflated, in collaboration with the media, which was too eager at times, and those who leaked the information (most of them from Israel's political echelon), who benefit from a rise in the general level of optimism.
Why is this happening just now? Apparently it is connected with the burning political- security question looming as 2007 comes to a close: To occupy Gaza or not to occupy Gaza? There is no great enthusiasm for such a move. It is hard to find broad support for a large-scale operation in the levels above the GOC Southern Command, Major General Yoav Galant, and the commander of the Gaza Division, Brigadier General Moshe Tamir. It seems as though the wave of reports is aimed at preparing the public for the possibility that the government will forgo a big operation at this time and continue to absorb sporadic Qassam rocket fire at Sderot, provided Hamas does not overdo it.
A temporary truce will render moot the urgency of the arguments being voiced by proponents of a ground operation. No one is going to war over a Hamas munitions buildup. One can already hear the counter-arguments from the political echelon: a cease-fire will also make it possible for Israel to improve the protective facilities in Sderot (first for homes, then for a missile-interception system). After all, is Israel going to war again on the northern border against Hezbollah, which has improved its rocket deployment north of the Litani River?
If Prime Minister Ehud Olmert can succeed in obtaining Shalit's return as part of a cease-fire with Hamas, he will have a winning hand. Olmert commands an overwhelming majority in the cabinet that will allow him to set more flexible criteria for releasing Palestinian security prisoners. The right-wing will scream, but with Shalit's fate as part of the equation (Hamas is sufficiently sophisticated to release another video of Shalit at the appropriate time), the deal will go through. Even a deal in which 430 prisoners, most of them Palestinians, were released in return for a drug dealer in Hezbollah captivity was authorized four years ago. From the public's point of view, Shalit's emotional return home, together with a declaration that the responsibility and moderation projected by the government saved the lives of thousands of other soldiers, will sweeten the pill of showing restraint toward Hamas.
So, if Hamas can get the splinter groups to agree on a tahadiya, it will find in Israel a silent, if indirect partner. Until this question is resolved, the IDF will continue doing more of the same: raids in the "security strip," up to three kilometers past the fence that surrounds the Gaza Strip; assassinations (mainly of senior Islamic Jihad figures); and a continuation of the economic pressure.
Soon the money collected at the meeting of donor countries in Paris by Salam Fayyad, the prime minister in Ramallah, will start pouring into the Gaza Strip. If Fayyad manages to ensure that the money reaches only Fatah supporters, Hamas' distress will increase. In the meantime, the Israeli government and the army are taking pride in tactical achievements in the day-to-day struggle against the terrorists.
Barak and Olmert believe Israel does not have to adopt a special policy because a lone Qassam rocket lands in a certain place, however lethal the results. This is an important distinction, but whether it will stand the political test of time is another matter. Also militating against a large-scale ground operation at this time is the absence of an "exit plan." Israel has not been able to get others - from the United States to the Fatah government - to agree to a comprehensive assault against Hamas. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is in no hurry to volunteer to seize control in Gaza after Hamas is defeated. In this context Barak has lately been quoting Napoleon: You can do a lot with bayonets, but you can't sit on them.
2. Egypt - tension
It had been a full seven years since Ehud Barak last visited Sharm el-Sheikh. He probably doesn't have very fond memories of the last time. It was in October 2000, two weeks after the eruption of the Al-Aqsa intifada. U.S. President Bill Clinton sponsored an international conference in an attempt to bring about a cease-fire. The understandings collapsed shortly after Barak and Yasser Arafat returned to Jerusalem and Ramallah, respectively.
This week the issues on the agenda were a bit less dramatic. Barak did not come to strike a deal for the return of Gilad Shalit. Shalit was abducted on Olmert's watch, and it is the prime minister who has to set things right, both morally and politically. If there had been a genuine ribbon to cut, Olmert would have gone to Sharm el-Sheikh, not Barak.
Wednesday's meeting with President Hosni Mubarak was held in inauspicious circumstances. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, who is usually very judicious, came out with a gaffe, or was dragged into making it by MK Yuval Steinitz (Likud), the head of the anti-Egypt lobby. Livni, who was critical of Egypt's poor performance in blocking weapons smuggling into the Gaza Strip, did not deviate by so much as a millimeter from the consensus on this issue, both within the government and the defense es ablishment, but doing so publicly offended Cairo, which moved immediately from the status of accused to that of victim and took skillful advantage of the incident. Barak, who suddenly found himself in the role of having to put out the fire, went about the task cautiously. To the press and the Egyptians he promised that, "In the future, when disputes arise, we will deal with them together," and emphasized Israel's commitment to the peace with Egypt, which he views as a strategic asset.
But Barak, too, finds it difficult to resolve the contradiction between the sharp Israeli criticism of the Egyptian failure on the border, and declarations of eternal friendship. True, the government is not behind the initiative of Steinitz, who together with a delegation of MKs wants to persuade the U.S. Congress to slash aid to Egypt as punishment for the smuggling. The director of Military Intelligence, Major General Amos Yadlin, who was asked about this recently by an American delegation, said he objected to harsh measures against Egypt. At the same time, Israel, too, is looking for ways to get Washington to press Cairo to improve its performance.
The defense minister made a big effort to smooth things over, with partial success. Barak's replies were more diplomatic than ever. The Egyptian media remained hostile, and the Egyptian journalists, most of whom went out of their way to avoid their Israeli colleagues, competed among themselves in asking long questions, which condemned the occupation, the settlements and "Israeli terrorism." The Egyptians were not persuaded by the high-ranking Israeli guest, the more so because he did not come across as particularly focused. It's easy to see when Barak is unfocused: He reverts to English from the kibbutz ("Shalom, lehitraot and bye").
3. Winograd - Imminent
As soon as the dust of the Egyptian to-do settles, we will be able to move to the next to-do: the final report by the Winograd Committee, which investigated the Second Lebanon War. The report is expected to be released in the second half of January. Even though the war is becoming a distant memory, the debate over its management and its results remains as passionate as ever. Two conversations this week, less than 24 hours apart, with two high-ranking members of the security establishment (one took an active part in the war, the other did not) turned up two completely different viewpoints: between relative success, which has not yet gained the appreciation it deserves, and abject failure.
The final report will not resolve these differences, just as the disputes over the 1973 Yom Kippur War continue to arise every October. The trouble is that the Winograd Committee, with its rather erratic judicial behavior and with the vigorous aid of Olmert's office, has consistently undermined its own status. As such, it may have lost part of the validity the final report will receive.
Still, it is likely to be a stinging judgment, from which few will emerge unscathed. The members of the committee have good reason to be angry, not least at the way they were maneuvered into releasing a final report, which will not contain "personal conclusions" about those involved. One of the emerging directions is apparently trenchant professional criticism of the IDF for not warning Olmert and the defense minister, Amir Peretz, both of them inexperienced, that 60 hours would not be enough to chalk up achievements in the last move, when the army tried unsuccessfully to reach the Litani (the only ranking officer who warned against the mistake was the chief of operations at the time, Major General Gadi Eisenkot).
In the meantime, the prime minister's team of spokesman is already working at full tilt. The goal is to wrap Olmert "like an etrog," the delicate Sukkot citrus fruit, in a manner that will neutralize the calls for his resignation. The means are diverse: in-depth briefings with newspaper columnists; meetings of the Olmerts with cabinet ministers and their spouse; a "rare" Channel 2 interview with Aliza Olmert, the prime minister's wife; and of course the visit by U.S. President George W. Bush on the eve of the report's publication. It may also be necessary to organize a precise leak to the foreign press that will finally reveal what the Israel Air Force did in Syria on September 6. Already now, in the wake of the Annapolis conference, large parts of the political left appear to be persuaded. Forget about the events of the Saluki Valley in southern Lebanon. Olmert is the new etrog.
Politically, the ministers and MKs are united in their praise of the prime minister's performance. This week he pushed through the budget without visible effort and on Wednesday he declared that he has no intention of resigning in the wake of the Winograd Committee report. It is still hard to see whether this proficiency will ultimately be translated into votes as well. If so, it will be a genuine political miracle, equal to the return of Ariel Sharon as prime minister 19 years after the first Lebanon War. Anything is possible, but one group, at least, will probably find it hard to vote for Olmert after the events of the last 60 hours in Lebanon are fully revealed: the parents of soldiers who are still serving in both the regular and the career army.
