In de moderne en vooral guerrilla oorlogsvoering gaat het niet meer om het veroveren van land, maar het schade toebrengen aan of uitschakelen van de tegenstander, en daarin is Israel tijdens de Gaza Oorlog maar zeer matig geslaagd. Men heeft overigens wel een grote hoeveelheid explosieven en andere wapens vernietigd en ook enkele Hamas leiders gedood.
RP
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This answers, in part, one of the riddles of Operation Cast Lead - why so few Hamas terrorists were captured. It underlines some very serious failures. The object of a military operation is not to capture ground, but to neutralize and eliminate enemy forces, either by capturing them or killing them or causing mass desertions. Hamas was able to emerge from the operation with virtually all its forces intact and therefore Operation Cast Lead cannot be considered a tactical or strategic victory of the IDF.
Ami Isseroff
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Separate Israel Defense Forces units took vastly different numbers of Palestinian prisoners during Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, internal IDF inquiries reveal.
Yet in the end, the army captured fewer than 200 Palestinians, most of whom were freed immediately after their preliminary interrogations in the field. Fewer than 30 Gazans, mostly Hamas members, were transferred to prisons in Israel for further investigation by the Shin Bet security service.
The Paratroops Brigade, which fought in the northwest part of the Gaza Strip, took 128 Palestinians prisoner during the hostilities. The Golani infantry brigade, which operated in the northeast sector of Gaza City as well as its Sajaiyeh quarter and the Jabalya refugee camp, arrested only 15 prisoners throughout the entire operation - or by some counts, even fewer: Since some of the prisoners were released almost immediately after being arrested, there is uncertainty about the final number.
Before the start of the operation, the IDF made preparations to accommodate thousands of Palestinian prisoners, including establishing camps for the captives on the Gaza border and even a new prison facility on a base in the south.
The low number of prisoners seems to reflect the way Hamas fought. Most Hamas members preferred to retreat when the IDF moved into Gaza City and hide in neighborhoods where the IDF was not operating. Most of those who nevertheless decided to seek a fight with the IDF were killed or wounded.
However, another explanation is related to the IDF's combat methods, which involved very heavy firepower.
A senior officer in the IDF's Southern Command said that "the differences in the numbers of prisoners stem from the differences between the sectors. The paratroopers waged a series of offensive actions in which they advanced along a front of several kilometers, surrounded Hamas forces and surprised them. Thus they also took more prisoners."
In contrast, he said, Golani conducted one initial offensive and was then engaged mainly in defending the territory it had seized against Hamas' attempts to regain it. "In that situation, you attack and kill whoever is advancing toward you. Therefore, they had fewer opportunities to take prisoners."
However, he added, Golani did discover 50 arms-smuggling tunnels and dozens of booby-trapped houses.
But an officer who served in Gaza, though not in the Paratroops Brigade, offered a different explanation. "To some extent, it depends on the commander's attitude," he said. "The paratroopers' approach was more disciplined and orderly than that of some of the other brigades."
This was also reflected, he said, in the fact that the paratroopers destroyed fewer houses and suffered fewer casualties - the latter being due to the fact that they were more careful about taking cover and wearing helmets. Other brigades, he explained, gave junior officers more leeway, whereas in the Paratroops, senior officers supervised their juniors more closely.
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