Rosner's Blog: Praten met Hamas heeft geen zin

"Je sluit geen vrede met je vrienden, maar met je vijanden", zo luidt een bekend cliché. Maar in de geschiedenis waren die vijanden meestal eerst verslagen of op zijn minst ernstig verzwakt, voordat het mogelijk was vrede te sluiten. Een beweging of partij geeft zijn doelen niet zomaar op. De pogingen van Carter, en velen in het zogenaamde 'realistische kamp', om Israël met Hamas te laten praten zonder aan Hamas voorwaarden te stellen zoals het accepteren van Israëls bestaanrecht, speelt Hamas in de kaart. Ook het staakt-het-vuren dat nu in de maak is, zal Hamas legitimeren en versterken, zowel moreel als militair.

 

Ratna

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Posted: May 02, 2008

 

Rosner's Blog

 

There's no moral virtue in talking to one's enemies

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/rosnerBlog.jhtml?itemNo=980204&contrassID=25&subContrassID=0&sbSubContrassID=1&listSrc=Y&art=1

 

 

My frequent readers already know what I think about the latest visit of Jimmy Carter to the Middle East. Last week I wrote this:

The choice of those who still continue to insist on the need to listen to Carter is based on lies - it is possible to ignore him, protest his manipulative tricks, and still continue to work for true peace between Israel and the Arabs. There is no contradiction.

A couple of days ago, though, I wrote another piece on Carter for Slate, essentially analyzing his latest OpEd published in the New York Times. You can read it in full on Slate, or a couple of paragraphs here:

How Carter is helping Hamas

In his op-ed, two reasons emerged for the necessity of such talks, but Carter, misleadingly, turned them into one.

The first is that "Hamas [is] steadily gaining popularity." That's the let's-just-deal-with-reality argument: Hamas is strong, Hamas makes the rules, and we have to talk to the party in power. The second is "there can be no peace with Palestinians divided." That's the what-we're-trying-to-do-here-is-help-make-peace argument. Presumably, Carter is not in the business of sabotaging the peace talks being conducted by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas or undermining his efforts to rebuild a moderate, democratic Palestinian Authority. It just looks that way.

It is no accident that in Carter's version, these two arguments are mushed together and left unrecognizable. Carter is a calculating diplomat, and he knows his way around land mines. He needs the arguments to be confusingly entangled, because neither can stand on its own feet. Helping the cause of peace by engaging a party that expresses no interest in a two-state solution makes no sense. Talking to a villain because he is strong while giving up on the possibility of moderates being able to overcome their difficulties is a despairingly defeatist goal.

"This policy" Carter argues, "makes difficult the possibility that such leaders might moderate their policies." The hope of eventual moderation is another easy argument made by proponents of engagement, who fail to recognize that in some cases, moderation is not a reasonable expectation. Here, Carter is guilty not only of miscalculation but of hubris. He apparently believes that by the force of his personality and powers of persuasion, he can make Hamas change a deeply rooted ideology. Unfortunately, he can't.

There's no moral virtue in talking to one's enemies. Engagement is a tool, but so are disengagement and isolation. Both are effective, if used wisely; both can be damaging if used in haste. Talking to one's enemies is a tool - as is complaining about one's reluctance to talk to one's enemies. This is the tool now being used by Hamas and Syria - assisted by Carter - as they try to escape and counter the isolation being applied to them. Making the case for engagement helps them achieve their strategic goal.