Verzoenende woorden van een pragmatisch geworden Hamas?? Vergelijk dit met Olmerts oproep tot onderhandelingen met de Arabische staten en de Palestijnen. Zoals altijd is onduidelijk wat met de 'bezetting' wordt bedoeld, en is het twijfelachtig om het voorzichtig uit te drukken of er nog ruimte voor Joodse rechten (zoals het recht op zelfbeschikking) is, nadat de Palestijnen al hun rechten hebben verkregen.
---------------------
Hamdan : We will persist in resistance till the end of occupation ,restoring
the Palestinian rights and the return of the Palestinian refugees
15 April 2007
Hamas Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades website
Osama Hamdan, Hamas deputy in Lebanon, confirmed yesterday that the movement
will persist in resistance and will never give up this road till the
withdrawal of the occupation , restoring the usurped rights and the return of
the Palestinian refugees.
He said" Hamas will keep the promises, will be honest to the rights and the
blood of martyrs , and will continue in the road of Jihad till the end of the
occupation , the regain the Palestinian rights and the return of the
Palestinian refugees to their cities and villages"
Hamdan said that in a Hamas festival arranged on Saturday 14/4 in the "
Returned camp" for the Palestinian refugees in the city of "Hams" in Syria.
The festival was held in the occasion of the " Land Day" and the Martyrs Week.
Thousands of people from the camp attended the festival including Factions'
deputies , institutions , patriots and others.
The leader in Hamas movement referred to the martyrs " who map out the borders
of Palestine by their blood" . Also, Hamdan referred to Sheikh Ahmad Yassin "
who was an argument to all the healthy" and to doctor Rantisi " who was called
" Palestine's falcon" during his message that there will no return ,
liberation and dignity but with Jihad".
Hamdan clarified that martyrdom is a " victory not a defeat" reminding that
the Zionist forces assassinated Dr.Ranitisi in 2004 and retreat from Gaza
Strip in 2005 " hearing the words of the Ranitisi that we will get victory
Sharon , we will get victory Bush". Also , in 2006 the Palestinian people let
the resistance to get the victory when voting to the resistance movement. In
2007 , the Zionist conspiracies were defeated in Mecca agreement which ended
the internal conflict describing this agreement of the achievement to
prevention of bloodshed , opening the way to arrange the Palestinian house and
to rebuild the Palestinian Liberation Organization.
The leader in Hamas movement cleared that Hamas is very keen to rebuild the
PLO in order to unify all the efforts of the Palestinian people in a national
project in a resistance framework.
dinsdag 17 april 2007
Hamas: we zullen doorgaan met verzet
Syria: Without peace, resistance will liberate Golan Heights
Dit is in feite een simpel dreigement. Als Israël niet de Syrische voorwaarden voor vrede aanvaart, zal Syrië de Golan met geweld terugveroveren. Voor onderhandelen is in de Syrische visie geen ruimte. Zoals ik eerder heb geschreven, is een dergelijke houding alleen gebruikelijk nadat de vijand vernietigend is verslagen. Trekt Syrië hier misschien een iets te grote broek aan?
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Syria: Without peace, resistance will liberate Golan Heights
Syrian information minister says Damascus wants peace, but will resort to
violence if Israel rejects peace proposal; 'any nation living under
occupation has the prerogative to resist,' he says
Roee Nahmias YNET Published: 04.16.07, 21:33 / Israel News
"If Israel rejects the Arab League peace proposal, resistance will be the
only way to liberate the Golan Heights," warns Syrian Information Minister
Muhsen Bilal, at a press conference in Damascus Monday.
The minister explained that Syria had an interest in renewing talks with
Israel with support from America and Russia. "Syria wants to reach a fair,
comprehensive peace," he added. However, he also stated that "any nation
living under occupation has the prerogative to resist. In Lebanon, Palestine
and Iraq, we must liberate all occupied Arab land."
Bilal blamed Israel for causing instability in the Middle East.
He also referred to Ibrahim Soliman's visit to Israel. Soliman, a
Syrian-American, is recognized as someone who reached an understanding with
former Foreign Ministry Director-General Alon Liel regarding peace between
Israel and Syria.
"We have nothing to do with his visit," Bilal made clear. "Nobody elected
Soliman to represent Syria. He does not speak for any Syrian institute. It
is not our approach, to conduct underground negotiations."
Damascus announced Monday that it planned to host an international
conference to discuss "media coverage of the Palestinian problem and Iran's
right to have nuclear technology for peaceful purposes."
Bilal told reporters that the conference would focus on "several studies on
the Arab media coverage - professional ethics versus commitment to national
matters - as well as the concept of resistance in the Arab media."
The conference will take place on April 30; it will be headed by Syrian
President Bashar Assad; and 350 journalists, academics and politicians are
planned to attend.
donderdag 12 april 2007
Saudi Columnist: "The Right of Return Is an Illusion"
Special Dispatch-Reform Project/Arab-Israeli Conflict
April 12, 2007
No. 1540
Saudi Columnist: "The Right of Return Is an Illusion"
To view this Special Dispatch in HTML, visit:
http://www.memri.org/bin/opener_latest.cgi?ID=SD154007 .
In two recent articles in the Kuwaiti daily Al-Siyassa, Saudi columnist Yousef Nasser Al-Sweidan argued that the Palestinian refugees' right of return is an idea that cannot be implemented, and that the only solution is for the refugees to be naturalized in the countries where they currently reside.
The following are excerpts from the articles:
The Right of Return – An Idea that Cannot Be Implemented
In the first article, published March 5, 2007 and titled "On the Impossible [Idea] of the Right of Return," Al-Sweidan wrote: "...The slogan 'right of return'... which is brandished by Palestinian organizations, is perceived as one of the greatest difficulties and as the main obstacle to renewing and advancing the peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians based on the Road Map and a two-state solution.
"It is patently obvious that uprooting the descendents of the refugees from their current homes in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and other countries, and returning them to Israel, to the West Bank, and to Gaza is a utopian ideal and [a recipe for] anarchy. More than that – it is an idea that cannot be implemented, not only because it will upset the demographic [balance] in a dangerous and destructive manner, and will have [far-reaching] political, economic and social ramifications in such a small and constrained geographical area, but [mainly] because the return [of the refugees] stands in blatant contradiction to Israel's right as a sovereign [state], while the Palestinian Authority lacks the infrastructure to absorb such a large number of immigrants as long as the peace process... is not at its peak..."
The Refugee Problem is the Result of Mistakes By the Host Countries
"Clearly, the refugee problem is mainly the result of cumulative mistakes made by the countries where [the refugees] live... such as Syria and Lebanon, which have isolated the refugees in poor and shabby camps lacking the most basic conditions for a dignified human existence. Instead of helping them to become fully integrated in their new society, they let them become victims of isolation and suffering... Later, the worst of all happened when Arab intelligence agencies used the Palestinian organizations as a tool for settling scores in internal Arab conflicts that probably have nothing to do with the Palestinians...
"The Israelis, on the other hand, were civilized and humane in their treatment of the thousands of Jewish refugees who had lost their property, homes and businesses in the Arab countries, and who were forced to emigrate to Israel after the 1948 war. The Israeli government received them, helped them, and provided them with all the conditions [they needed] to become integrated in their new society...
"The lies of the Syrian Ba'th regime, and its trading in slogans like 'right of return,' 'steadfastness,' 'resistance,' 'national struggle,' and all the other ridiculous [slogans], are evident from the fact that, to this day, dozens of Palestinian families [remain] stranded in the desert on the Syrian-Iraqi border, because the Syrian regime refuses to let them enter its horrifying Ba'th republic and return to the Yarmouk [refugee] camp.
"The Arab countries where the Palestinians live in refugee camps must pass the laws necessary to integrate the inhabitants of these camps into society. [In addition, they must] provide them with education and health services, and allow them freedom of occupation and movement and the right to own real estate, instead of [continuing] their policy of excluding [the refugees] and leaving the responsibility [of caring for them] to others, while marketing the impossible illusion of return [to Palestine]..."(1)
The Refugees Don't Need Another 60 Years of Misery
In the second article, published March 16, 2007 and titled "Naturalization is the Solution," Al-Sweidan wrote: "There is no doubt that the Palestinian refugees in Syria and Lebanon – who have for many long years been fed by their Arab hosts on impossible dreams and on shiny promises that were soon broken – do not need another 60 years of misery, wretchedness and suffering... in order to figure out for the thousandth time that all the talk about the 'bridge of return' is [nothing but] nonsense and deceit – a fairytale that exists only in the old, worn-out demagogy of the Arab propaganda...
"In reality, there is no 'bridge [of return]'... except for the bridge that we now must pass... called the peace process and normalization of relations between the Arabs and Israel. Undoubtedly, the Arabs cannot continue to avoid the implementation [of the peace process], which brooks no further delay. [Any delay] will have a heavy price for the Arab societies in the present and in the future, considering the sharp strategic changes [occurring] in the Middle East. [These changes] demand an immediate and final solution to the Arab-Israeli conflicts, and [require] the two sides to direct their joint energies and efforts towards confronting the Iranian nuclear threat which imperils us all."
The Inevitable Solution is to Naturalize the Refugees in the Host Countries
"As the Middle East peace process gains momentum, and as the regional and international forces remain committed to the need to resolve this [conflict]... there is a growing necessity for a realistic, unavoidable and bold decision that will provide a just solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees by naturalizing them in the host countries, such as Syria, Lebanon, and other countries.
"Even though this is a humanitarian [project], it requires intensive efforts on the legislative, economic, logistic, and administrative levels, in order to integrate the Palestinians organically into the social, economic and political fabric of the Arab societies...
"By every conceivable and accepted criterion, naturalizing the refugees [in the Arab countries] is the inevitable solution to [this] chronic humanitarian problem. The fact that [this solution] constitutes an important part of the overall peace process and of the historic reconciliation between the Arabs and the Israelis will help to reinforce [the naturalization process] and to perpetuate it."(2)
Endnotes:
(1) Al-Siyassa (Kuwait), March 5, 2007.
(2) Al-Siyassa (Kuwait), March 16, 2007.
*********************
The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) is an independent, non-profit
organization that translates and analyzes the media of the Middle East. Copies
of articles and documents cited, as well as background information, are
available on request.
MEMRI holds copyrights on all translations. Materials may only be used with
proper attribution.
The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI)
P.O. Box 27837, Washington, DC 20038-7837
Phone: (202) 955-9070
Fax: (202) 955-9077
E-Mail: memri@memri.org
Search previous MEMRI publications at http://www.memri.org/
Marwan Barghouti's wife: I would tell terror victim's mother to leave my country
Marwan Barghouti's wife: I would tell terror victim's mother to leave my country
Date: 11 April, 2007
Reporter: If you would have the chance to talk with a Jewish mother who lost her son in an attack planned by your husband, what would you tell her?
Fadwa Barghouti (wife of Marwan Barghouti): I would tell her to leave my country (broad smile).
Interview broadcast on Israel Television Mabat News - 11 April 2007
[Translation of the Hebrew subtitles broadcast in the interview by IMRA]
Dr. Aaron Lerner, Director IMRA (Independent Media Review & Analysis)
(Mail POB 982 Kfar Sava)
Tel 972-9-7604719/Fax 972-3-7255730
INTERNET ADDRESS: imra@netvision.net.il
Website: http://www.imra.org.il
Palestijnse eenheidsregering (cartoon Berend Vonk)
![[Palestijnen+-+Berend+Vonk.gif]](https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhmujIOAoG21zP3UA6OuGq0gjp1WSdCbcSG_WOroTdCcLnVA2Zsysa_ksaG9I6aw-JpEPK5N7S2QTlObkTsSm5UKu_9t5Qvi-trK27VMIIKtiLvQVhD4KBC-AyAI6ZbUWQGAMUUZhBsPJ88/s1600/Palestijnen+-+Berend+Vonk.gif)
Arabisch vredesplan geen handreiking maar dictaat
Onderstaande reactie van mij op Barel werd helaas niet geplaatst.
Ratna
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Arabisch vredesplan geen handreiking maar dictaat
12.04.2007
In Podium van zaterdag 7 april wordt Israël er - wederom - van beschuldigd het Arabische vredesinitiatief te hebben afgewezen en oorlog boven vrede te verkiezen. De Arabische staten boden Israël vorige week een nieuwe kans zich te ontdoen van zijn gijzelnemers, aldus Zvi Barel van Haaretz, maar het blijft liever gegijzeld dan dat het met de Arabieren over vrede praat. Een vergezochte analogie, en bovendien onjuist.Premier Olmert heeft het Arabische vredesinitiatief 'een startpunt, maar geen eindpunt' genoemd, en voorgesteld om met de gematigde Arabische staten op basis van dit voorstel te praten over vrede. In onderhandelingen brengen beide partijen hun positie naar voren en proberen vervolgens tot overeenstemming te komen. Bij een serieus conflict tussen twee gelijkwaardige partijen komt het nooit voor dat één partij een voorstel van de andere kant onvoorwaardelijk accepteert, en vervolgens slechts details en technische zaken uitgewerkt hoeven te worden. Toch hebben de Arabische staten en de Palestijnen Olmerts voorstel tot onderhandelingen afgewezen en geëist dat Israël eerst het Arabische vredesplan onvoorwaardelijk accepteert. Zowel Amr Moussa, de leider van de Arabische Liga, als de Saoedische Minister van buitenlandse zaken Saud al-Faisal hebben het onomwonden als een eindbod gepresenteerd, en ervoor gewaarschuwd dat afwijzing door Israël zal leiden tot een escalatie van geweld. Moussa heeft bovendien in een officiële persconferentie verklaard dat er pas sprake kan zijn van 'normale betrekkingen' met Israël nadat het zich uit alle in 1967 veroverde gebieden heeft teruggetrokken, er een Palestijnse staat is, en een 'rechtvaardige oplossing' voor het vluchtelingenprobleem op basis van VN resolutie 194 is gevonden. Dat is niet iets wat je in twee dagen even regelt, en gedurende al die tijd waarin Israël nederzettingen ontruimt, land overdraagt aan de Palestijnen en vluchtelingen opneemt, gaat de Arabische boycot van Israël dus door, evenals de actieve steun van sommige staten aan terrorisme tegen Israël en de verspreiding van de walgelijkste antisemitische leugens. Dit is geen vredesaanbod, maar een dictaat, een eis tot overgave.
Resolutie 194 wordt in de Arabische wereld en door de Palestijnen algemeen geïnterpreteerd als een onvoorwaardelijk 'recht op terugkeer' van alle vluchtelingen en hun nakomelingen naar Israël. Zowel leiders van Fatah als Hamas hebben er tijdens de recent gehouden Arabische top op aangedrongen vooral geen compromis te sluiten wat betreft dit 'recht op terugkeer'. 76 Palestijnse organisaties hebben een officiële brief geschreven met dezelfde oproep. Voor Israël is juist het 'recht op terugkeer' het voornaamste struikelblok in het Arabische vredesplan. Het wijst er terecht op dat dit een twee-statenoplossing tegenspreekt, althans in de zin van twee staten voor twee volken, van erkenning van het recht op zelfbeschikking van zowel Joden als Palestijnen. Immers, de 'terugkeer' van miljoenen vluchtelingen zou spoedig leiden tot een Arabische meerderheid in Israël.
Het Arabische vredesplan spreekt van normale of natuurlijke betrekkingen met Israël, een vage formulering waarbij opzettelijk de gangbare diplomatieke term 'normalisatie van betrekkingen' is vermeden. Ook wordt niet gerept over erkenning van Israël als Joodse staat. De acceptatie van Fatah van een twee-statenoplossing is wat dit betreft eveneens altijd ambigu geweest: men is bereid Israël te erkennen, maar beschouwt tegelijkertijd de Wet op de Terugkeer, die bepaalt dat iedere Jood naar Israël kan immigreren, als racistisch. Terwijl iedere soevereine staat zijn eigen immigratiepolitiek kan bepalen, zou Israël dit recht niet toekomen. De Palestijnse eenheidsregering ging zelfs dit te ver en in de regeringsverklaring wordt in het geheel niet van een twee-statenoplossing en erkenning van Israël gesproken. In de Arabische landen worden de Joden als religie, niet als volk beschouwd, wordt de millennialange band van de Joden met het land Israël/Palestina en Jeruzalem ontkend en wordt geregeld de Holocaust ontkend omdat dit als de belangrijkste rechtvaardiging van de staat Israël wordt gezien. Er is dan ook weinig vertrouwen aan Israëlische kant dat men werkelijk bereid is Israël te erkennen in ruil voor een einde aan de bezetting en een Palestijnse staat, en de vasthoudendheid wat betreft het recht op terugkeer van de vluchtelingen is hier slechts een illustratie van.
Voorafgaand aan serieuze vredesonderhandelingen zouden beide partijen onomwonden het zelfbeschikkingsrecht van de ander in een deel van historisch Palestina moeten erkennen. Vervolgens zouden beide kanten hun goede wil moeten tonen, de Israëli's door het ontruimen van buitenposten, vergroten van de bewegingsvrijheid van Palestijnen en het vrijlaten van gevangenen, de Palestijnen door het tegengaan van wapensmokkel, van het afvuren van qassamraketten en opruiing in de media (allemaal zaken die beide partijen ook volgens de Routekaart voor Vrede moeten doen). Beide kanten zouden bovendien moeten investeren in 'vredeseducatie', in het zien van de andere kant als mensen, niet bezetters of terroristen, met legitieme claims en grieven, en de eigen bevolking moeten voorbereiden op vergaande concessies.
Het Arabische vredesinitiatief is een goed public relations offensief, maar bevat weinig substantie.
Ratna Pelle
America, Israel and the Arab world: A War of Narratives
And so we enter a more intractable phase in the conflict, which will not be a war over land or oil or even democratic institutions, but a war over narratives. The Arabs will nurture this Zionist-centric mythology, which is as self-flattering as it is self-destructive. They will demand that the U.S. and Israel adopt their narrative and admit historical guilt. Failing politically, militarily and economically, they will fight a battle for moral superiority, the kind of battle that does not allow for compromises or truces.
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The New York Times
A War of Narratives
http://select.nytimes.com/2007/04/08/opinion/&OQ=_rQ3D1&OP=7c27c076Q2FQ27.DpQ27YQ5BQ7EHHYQ27jmmlQ27mxQ27mhQ27HQ2FS2SH2Q27
On the Dead Sea, Jordan
I just attended a conference that was both illuminating and depressing. It was co-sponsored by the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan and the American Enterprise Institute, and the idea was to get Americans and moderate Arab reformers together to talk about Iraq, Iran, and any remaining prospects for democracy in the Middle East.
As it happened, though, the Arab speakers mainly wanted to talk about the Israel lobby. One described a book edited in the mid-1990s by the Jewish policy analyst David Wurmser as the secret blueprint for American foreign policy over the past decade. A pollster showed that large majorities in Arab countries believe that the Israel lobby has more influence over American policy than the Bush administration. Speaker after speaker triumphantly cited the work of Stephen Walt, John Mearsheimer and Jimmy Carter as proof that even Americans were coming to admit that the Israel lobby controls their government.
The problems between America and the Arab world have nothing to do with religious fundamentalism or ideological extremism, several Arab speakers argued. They have to do with American policies toward Israel, and the forces controlling those policies.
As for problems in the Middle East itself, these speakers added, they have a common source, Israel. One elderly statesman noted that the four most pressing issues in the Middle East are the Arab-Israeli dispute, instability in Lebanon, chaos in Iraq and the confrontation with Iran. They are all interconnected, he said, and Israel is at the root of each of them.
We Americans tried to press our Arab friends to talk more about the Sunni-Shiite split, the Iraqi civil war and the rise of Iran, but they seemed uninterested. They mimicked a speech King Abdullah of Jordan recently delivered before Congress, in which he scarcely mentioned the Iraqi chaos on his border. It was all Israel, all the time.
The Americans, needless to say, had a different narrative. We tended to argue that problems like Muslim fundamentalism, extremism and autocracy could not be blamed on Israel or Paul Wolfowitz but had deeper historical roots. We tended to see the Israeli-Palestinian issue not as the root of all fundamentalism, but as a problem made intractable by fundamentalism.
In other words, they had their narrative and we had ours, and the two passed each other without touching. But the striking thing about this meeting was the emotional tone. There seemed to be a time, after 9/11, when it was generally accepted that terror and extremism were symptoms of a deeper Arab malaise. There seemed to be a general recognition that the Arab world had fallen behind, and that it needed economic, political and religious modernization.
But there was nothing defensive or introspective about the Arab speakers here. In response to Bernard Lewis's question, "What Went Wrong?" their answer seemed to be: Nothing's wrong with us. What's wrong with you?
The events of the past three years have shifted their diagnosis of where the cancer is — from dysfunction in the Arab world to malevolence in Jerusalem and in Aipac. Furthermore, the Walt and Mearsheimer paper on the Israel lobby has had a profound effect on Arab elites. It has encouraged them not to be introspective, not to think about their own problems, but to blame everything on the villainous Israeli network.
And so we enter a more intractable phase in the conflict, which will not be a war over land or oil or even democratic institutions, but a war over narratives. The Arabs will nurture this Zionist-centric mythology, which is as self-flattering as it is self-destructive. They will demand that the U.S. and Israel adopt their narrative and admit historical guilt. Failing politically, militarily and economically, they will fight a battle for moral superiority, the kind of battle that does not allow for compromises or truces.
Americans, meanwhile, will simply want to get out. After 9/11, George Bush called on the U.S. to get deeply involved in the Middle East. But now, most Americans have given up on their ability to transform the Middle East and on Arab willingness to change. Faced with an arc of conspiracy-mongerin
What we have is not a clash of civilizations, but a gap between civilizations, increasingly without common narratives, common goals or means of communication.
__,_._,___
woensdag 11 april 2007
Fatah leden niet blij met mogelijke vrijlating Marwan Barghouti
Fatah prefers to see Barghouti released as part of a goodwill gesture by Israel to President Mahmoud Abbas.
Zo'n 'goodwill gesture', een paar weken nadat de Israëlische soldaat is vrijgelaten, is natuurlijk nauwelijks geloofwaardig. Wellicht was het beter geweest als Israël had aangeboden Barghouti vrij te laten in ruil voor concessies van Fatah. Het zou sowieso beter zijn als men geen grote hoeveelheden gevangenen vrij laat voor Shalit, want dit is een beloning voor het ontvoeren van Israëli's.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fatah members fear Barghouti's release
Fatah says release of former Tanzim leader as part of prisoner exchange deal with Israel may increase public support for Hamas, spark upheaval within faction; Barghouti's associates: Fatah members are wary of his 'threatening status'
Ali Waked - YNET Published: 04.08.07, 23:01 / Israel News
While Hamas leaders have already promised Marwan Barghouti's family that the former Tanzim leader in the West Bank would be included in a prisoner exchange deal with Israel, some Fatah members would rather see him remain in jail.
Barghouti is at the top of the list of senior prisoners the Palestinian Authority is demanding Israel free in exchange for IDF soldier Gilad Shalit, but some Fatah members fear his release would boost support for rival faction Hamas.
Senior Fatah officials are trying to convince Barghouti's family to back efforts to release him as part of a more comprehensive deal with Israel for which Hamas does not get all the credit.
The Islamic group claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of Shalit in a cross-border operation near Gaza in June of last year.
Fatah prefers to see Barghouti released as part of a goodwill gesture by Israel to President Mahmoud Abbas.
'Release would spark changes within the party'
Barghouti's associates have accused Fatah members opposed to his release of being concerned with Barghouti's 'threatening status within Fatah.'
Barghouti, whose relations with Hamas' leaders are excellent, was instrumental in the drafting of a document drafted by Palestinian prisoners, which urged the formation of a Palestinian unity government and to end internal strife.
Along with Hamas, he also helped devise a ceasefire between rival Palestinian factions, which was declared in March 2005 in Cairo.
Several Fatah leaders fear that Barghouti's release would spark the beginning of changes within the party, some of which they may not approve of.
In the past Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said he was opposed to releasing Barghouti in exchange for Shalit, but no final decision has been made.
Barghouti was captured in Ramallah in April 2002 during Operation Defense Shield. He was arrested not far from the office of former Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat after a long manhunt by IDF and Shin Bet forces.
Vrijlating van 'zware jongens' geeist in ruil voor Israelische soldaat
Palestinians demand release of terrorists convicted of murdering hundreds of civilians in exchange for kidnapped Israeli soldier. List includes masterminds behind Ze'evi assassination, Karin A weapons ship, scores of suicide bombings
Marwan Barghouti, seen as a potential successor to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, is serving five consecutive life terms for his involvement in the murders of four Israelis and a Greek monk, and the demand for his release could complicate the swap as Barghouti's release would require a pardon by Israel's president since he was tried in a civilian, not a military court.
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Shin Bet: Hamas bereidt nieuwe aanslagen voor
"The picture that emerges in interrogations of the members of the cell
clearly signals that the Hamas organization in Qalqilyah has shifted from
the stage of 'force building' to the operational stage and the carrying out
of attacks, including suicide attacks inside Israel. According to
information, they continue to work on planning and execution of significant
attacks, including ones in the immediate future," the Shin Bet announcement
read.
En dit is de betekenis van het staakt-het-vuren dat er is tussen Israël en de Gazastrook:
Egypt recently arrested a Hamas suicide bomber who was trying to cross from
the Gaza Strip into Israel through Sinai.
Hamas militants were also involved in a number of sniper attacks targeting
Israelis driving close to the fence separating Israel from the Gaza Strip.
In one of the attacks, an Israel Electric Corporation employee was
moderately wounded.
De Palestijn die de aanslag wou plegen kon Israël binnenkomen omdat hij met een Israëlisch-Arabische vrouw is getrouwd. Dit spreekt de vele aantijgingen tegen dat Israëlische Arabieren hun Palestijnse echtgenoten niet over kunnen laten komen, en laat bovendien zien dat aan de ruimte die Israël wat dit betreft biedt wel degelijk gevaren kleven.
The suicide bomber, a member of the Qalqilyah cell, managed to enter Israel
because he holds an Israeli identity card. Although a resident of Qalqilyah,
he is married to an Israeli Arab from Taibeh - and received residency status
as part of the program of reuniting families.
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Shin Bet: Hamas planned T.A. Passover bombing
By Amos Harel, Haaretz Correspondent / Last update - 03:01 10/04/2007
The Shin Bet announced Tuesday morning that in late March it broke up a Hamas cell in Qalqilyah that had planned to detonate a car bomb in Tel Aviv during Pesach, apparently at the time of the seder, on the holiday's first night.
According to the details released by the security service, the driver, a suicide bomber, had managed to cross into Israel in a vehicle laden with about 100 kilograms of explosives. However, once he reached Tel Aviv, and for reasons that are still unclear, he changed his mind and returned to Qalqilyah.
Nineteen members in the cell have been arrested by the security forces. No names of the suspects were released for publication.
"The picture that emerges in interrogations of the members of the cell clearly signals that the Hamas organization in Qalqilyah has shifted from the stage of 'force building' to the operational stage and the carrying out of attacks, including suicide attacks inside Israel. According to information, they continue to work on planning and execution of significant attacks, including ones in the immediate future," the Shin Bet announcement read.
This latest incident has further boosted the evidence that Hamas has resumed its terrorist activities following a long hiatus that began with the cease-fire in the Gaza Strip last November.
Egypt recently arrested a Hamas suicide bomber who was trying to cross from the Gaza Strip into Israel through Sinai.
Hamas militants were also involved in a number of sniper attacks targeting Israelis driving close to the fence separating Israel from the Gaza Strip.
In one of the attacks, an Israel Electric Corporation employee was moderately wounded.
It is believed that behind the attacks is Ahmed Jabari, the head of the military wing of Hamas in the northern Gaza Strip, who opposed the establishment of the unity government between his party and Fatah. Jabari is particularly dissatisfied with the fact that he and his men are not being awarded the positions of power they believe they deserve.
The degree to which Jabari and the Qalqilyah-based cell are linked is unclear. During the past two years, most of the Hamas cells operating in Samaria had followed orders originating in the Gaza Strip.
The suicide bomber, a member of the Qalqilyah cell, managed to enter Israel because he holds an Israeli identity card. Although a resident of Qalqilyah, he is married to an Israeli Arab from Taibeh - and received residency status as part of the program of reuniting families. The vehicle he was driving had Israeli license plates, and had collected intelligence on possible targets for an attack.
The terrorist changed his mind, returned to Qalqilyah, and left the vehicle in the backyard of a home. Arrests of suspects began shortly after his return, and then the vehicle exploded. There were no casualties as a result of the explosion.
The Shin Bet has described the explosion as a "work accident," euphemism for a technical malfunction.
The Qalqilyah cell is the largest Hamas grouping to have been exposed in the West Bank in recent years. The last time a Qalqilyah-based Hamas cell carried out an attack in Israel, 21 teenagers were killed in a blast at the Dolphinarium in Tel Aviv, in June 2001.
UN vormt mogelijk commissie om wapensmokkel naar Hezbollah te onderzoeken
be formed if all 15 members of the Security Council vote in favor of it.
The Security Council presidency is rotated alphabetically each month.
This means the formation of the committee is dependent on the consent of
member countries such as Qatar, South Africa, Indonesia and Russia,
among others.
07/03/2007 Haaretz
UN may form c'tee to review weapons smuggling to Lebanon
By Shlomo Shamir
NEW YORK - The United Nations Security Council will consider forming a
special committee to review accusations that Syria and Iran are
smuggling arms to Hezbollah through southern Lebanon.
The possibility of forming committee was included in a statement by the
Security Council president, U.K. Ambassador to the UN Sir Emyr Parry
Jones. The statement was circulated among member states in preparation
of a discussion on the matter tomorrow.
The statement proposes forming a team of experts commissioned by
Britain, France and the U.S., to examine whether weapons are indeed
being smuggled to Lebanon, as Israel has repeatedly claimed. The
initiative was launched Friday, and was considered a significant step
toward resolving the issue.
However, the statement stipulates that the proposed committee will only
be formed if all 15 members of the Security Council vote in favor of it.
The Security Council presidency is rotated alphabetically each month.
This means the formation of the committee is dependent on the consent of
member countries such as Qatar, South Africa, Indonesia and Russia,
among others.
"The initiative is a demonstration of the ongoing effort to counter the
efforts of Hezbollah and to promote stability within Lebanon," a senior
diplomat told Haaretz.
The initiative is a result of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's
briefing last week to member states, following his tour in the Middle East.
Sources in New York said the secretary-general informed the Security
Council that he had obtained evidence from Israel and from "another
country" that indicate Syria and Iran were indeed smuggling arms into
Lebanon.
__,_._,___
zondag 8 april 2007
EU Funding Promotes ICAHD's Ideological Agenda
March 26, 2007
Summary: The Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD) claims to be "a non-violent, direct-action group … to oppose and resist Israeli demolition of Palestinian houses in the Occupied Territories." A recipient of EU funding, ICAHD partners with radical NGOs such as Sabeel, Christian Aid, and LAW to campaign against the two-state solution, promote the "Durban Strategy" of boycotts and demonizing Israel, using terms such as "apartheid", and grossly distorting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Introduction
The Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD) claims to be "a non-violent, direct-action group … to oppose and resist Israeli demolition of Palestinian houses in the Occupied Territories." ICAHD states that its activities center on "resistance and protest actions…; efforts to bring the reality of the Occupation to Israeli society; and mobilizing the international community for a just peace."
Founded in 1997, ICAHD is led by Jeff Halper, formerly affiliated with Ben Gurion University. While some of ICAHD's activities are coordinated by others, such as Amos Gvirtz and Angela Godfrey-Goldstein, Halper is the public face of ICAHD, both in Israel and internationally. As the NGO's highest profile representative, Halper's activities are indistinguishable from ICAHD's, and his visibility is facilitated by the NGO.
As documented in previous NGO Monitor reports, ICAHD continues to use its EU funding to promote a highly one-sided view of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It consistently ignores the context of ongoing Palestinian terror attacks, promotes the "Durban strategy" of demonizing the Jewish state, campaigns against the two-state solution, and partners with radical NGOs. ICAHD's international backing lends the NGO a legitimacy and credibility that is highly disproportionate to its status in Israel.
Funding
International Advocacy
ICAHD regularly participates in United Nations sponsored events, and Halper takes an active role in pro-Palestinian activities, serving as a member of the steering committee of the UN Conference on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (CEIRPP).
Representing ICAHD, Halper delivered a speech at the United Nations Latin America and Caribbean Meeting on the Question of Palestine in Caracas on 13 December 2005. In his comments, Halper ignored Israeli security concerns, noting that "Israel's moves were all unilateral to create an illusion of a Palestinian state, but which would leave Israel in control." Halper also stated that "Ninety-five percent of the cases of house demolitions had nothing to do with security," providing no source or evidence for his claims.
In May 2005, ICAHD took part in a session of CEIRPP, which discussed implementation of the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion on the construction of Israel's separation barrier. The session emphasized adverse affects on the Palestinian population, while neglecting to mention the reduction in terrorist attacks since its construction. Other NGO participants in the session included Al-Haq, Ha-Moked, and World Vision International.
As in the past, ICAHD publicly expresses support for the imposition of a broad range of punitive measures by the international community upon Israel. A 2005 statement published on the ICAHD-UK website entitled "A Statement on Sanctions," outlined support for "a multi-tiered campaign of strategic, selective sanctions against Israel" and "selective divestment and boycott as tools of moral and economic pressure." On 30 January 2007, ICAHD joined with Interpal, Jews for Justice for Palestinians, War on Want, Medical Aid for Palestinians, and Pax Christi in a new "anti-occupation" coalition that called for sanctions against Israel.
In February 2007, ICAHD invited Judge Juan Guzman, the judge who indicted Chile's Augusto Pinochet, to visit Israel and provide "his legal opinion … to build an international legal case against Israelis involved in the demolition of Palestinian homes." (Guzman stated "that he had not formally agreed to work for ICAHD, nor was it clear to him that there was a basis for … a case").
Additionally, a 31 January 2007 posting on ICAHD's website announced a "two-day mobilization on June 10/11, 2007 in Washington, DC, including a massive rally, teach-in, and grassroots lobbying day," which will be organized in tandem with the U.S. Campaign to End the Occupation and United for Peace and Justice .
Publications
In its publications and interviews, ICAHD consistently promotes the "Durban strategy" of demonizing Israel, continuing to use terms such as "apartheid" to describe policies of the Israeli government. A 2006 working paper begins by stating that "…within the next year – four at the most – an expanded Israel will officially and unilaterally impose an apartheid regime over the remaining tiny, isolated and impoverished islands of a Palestinian Bantustan."
In a 2 February 2007 article on Al-Jazeerah's website, Halper is quoted referring to the separation barrier as the "Apartheid Wall" and describes its purpose as being "to continue ethnically cleansing Palestinians and keep those remaining virtual prisoners in restricted cantonized OPT areas." Additionally, Halper states in an April 29, 2004 article entitled "Towards a Middle East Union" that "two states, Palestine and Israel, [will] eventually join in a bi-national federation that in time will include Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and ultimately Egypt and other countries of the Middle East – a Middle East Union."
In a 25 November 2006 article, Halper wrote that "the problem in the Middle East is not the Palestinian people, not Hamas, not the Arabs, not Hezbollah or the Iranians or the entire Muslim world. It's us, the Israelis." Halper used this article to promote his radical views that erase any Palestinian reasonability for conflict, deny serious existential threats to Israel, ignore key contexts of terrorism and Arab rejectionism, and promote a clearly pro-Palestinian narrative that describes Yasser Arafat as "by far the most congenial and cooperative partner Israel ever had."
Activities in Israel
ICAHD's major activities in Israel involve conducting tours for international groups, individuals, and organizations in order to disseminate the NGO's views, and rebuilding houses. In contrast to the terms of its funding from the EU, which was for "Providing a Coherent Paradigm of Peace to the Israeli Public", many of ICAHD's activities focus on introducing visiting foreign nationals to the Israel-Palestinian conflict, presenting a paradigm that excludes or greatly distorts the State of Israel.
Participants in ICAHD's annual summer camp in 2007 will be "rebuilding a house and demonstrating non-violent resistance to the Occupation." Additionally, participants in the summer camp "will have the opportunity to learn about the facts on the ground through a full program which includes presentations from key organizations working for a just peace in Palestine and Israel, films about aspects of the conflict, and tours to other parts of the Occupied Territories, Jerusalem and Israel." These tours present "settlement activity, the emergence of a 'Greater' Jerusalem and the 'Matrix of Control'" to international audiences. In Spring 2007, ICAHD will promote its highly biased view of the conflict during a "Study Tour" that will include "meetings with organizations such as Breaking the Silence, Zochrot, Christian Peacemakers Teams, BADIL, Sabeel and many more." Participants will be afforded the chance "to hear different voices ranging from a member of the Knesset to an extremist settler and a British diplomat."
The International Solidarity Movement, which has been involved in tragic confrontations with the IDF and has been linked to terrorist figures, including two suicide bombers of British nationality, sends volunteers to participate in ICAHD house rebuilding campaigns.
Outside Contributors
ICAHD regularly publishes articles on its website by British-born journalist Jonathan Cook, who has written for Al-Jazeerah's online English edition and Electronic Intifada. In a 1 December 2006 article, Cook describes a suicide bombing as a choice between "death and resistance over powerlessness and victimhood." Another article by Cook from 7 December 2006, entitled "The Struggle for Palestine's Soul," argues that Israel "has not for one moment renounced violence against Palestinian resistance to occupation." He continues by writing that if Hamas wins its political and military battles with Fatah "then the Palestinians will have the chance to re-energize the intifada, and launch a proper, consensual fight to end the occupation."
Collaboration with Radical NGOs
ICAHD networks with a significant number of NGOs to publish reports, coordinate speeches, and organize events. In tandem with politicized NGOs such as Al-Haq, Al-Mezan, BADIL, and Ittijah, ICAHD authored a Joint NGO submission in May 2006 to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (UN CERD). ICAHD's contribution to CERD claims to provide "statistics" on the numbers of Palestinian homes demolished in the West Bank. No sources or evidence for these statistics are provided, making independent verification of ICAHD's allegations impossible.
Sabeel, which leads international church divestment campaigns and uses anti-Semitic imagery to attack Israel, continues to be one of ICAHD's main partners. In 2006, Halper appeared at Sabeel's Kansas City Conference with Phyllis Bennis, co-founder of the U.S. Campaign to End the Occupation as well as at a conference on divestment from Israel sponsored by the Canadian Friends of Sabeel. Halper also spoke at the 2006 Sabeel Washington DC Conference, demanding that civil society be "mobilized in an urgent and effective campaign, calling for the use of boycott, divestment and sanctions." In February 2007, Halper joined the founder of Sabeel, Rev. Dr. Naim Ateek at a "public hearing" sponsored by the Council on National Interest. The event was co-sponsored by the CNI and the Washington Interfaith Alliance for Middle East Peace, organizations who stress the need for a "just solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict" and a "just peace", but whose websites advertise activities such as the selling of "two-sided cards with maps showing Israel's takeover of Palestinian lands since 1946." Such activities undermine Israel's legitimacy, even within pre-1967 borders. Halper used this platform to repeat his mantra of Israel's "apartheid" state, its "matrix of control," and to argue against the two-state solution.
ICAHD is a partner of the UK-based Christian Aid (CA), which provides it (and Halper) with additional international exposure. CA publishes material that erases Palestinian responsibility, ignores terrorism and demonizes Israel and the NGO's activities have reflected classical anti-Semitic themes. Pressureworks.org, Christian Aid's youth arm, promotes ICAHD house parties and features an interview with Halper on its website.
ICAHD also works with LAW, an NGO that led the Israel demonization during the 2001 Durban Conference, in order to bring international delegations to Israel to tour the West Bank and "to engage in solidarity actions and help mobilize international public opinion."
Conclusion
With ample financial support provided by the European Union, ICAHD propagates a one-sided view of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Inspired by Halper's radical opinions, ICAHD continues to promote its agenda in the UN, supports boycotts and sanctions, and holds Israel solely responsible for the conflict. Furthermore, ICAHD's claim to be working for a "just peace" falls short in the face of its collaboration with NGOs that propagate anti-Semitic themes and its highly biased publications which promote an extreme pro-Palestinian narrative. ICAHD's politicized activities are at odds with EU funding guidelines and raise serious questions about the oversight of such grants.
zaterdag 7 april 2007
"Israel Is Our Home" - Avigdor Lieberman and Israeli politics
Israel's mission as a country has always been more complicated than "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Amos Oz has said that as far as the early Zionists were concerned, Israel was going to be the most secular country, and the holiest country, and the most socialist country, and the most democratic country, and the most ancient country, and the most modern country. With a founding vision like that, wasn't Israel bound to fall short of its own ideals?
If you don't fall short of your ideals, then you have pretty poor ideals! But I think Israel has done all right when you compare it to a lot of other countries that became independent in the post-World War II period. You could do worse at creating an independent society.
"Israel Is Our Home"
Gershom Gorenberg elucidates the startling politics of Avigdor Lieberman, a right-wing Israeli politician who has lately taken center stage
.....
Were Borochov alive today, he would likely be among the many outspoken critics of Knesset member Avigdor Lieberman. Like Borochov, Lieberman is a Russian-speaking Jew and a committed Zionist, but his vision of peace and stability is at antipodes from the one Borochov set forth in 1917. In 2004, Lieberman introduced a plan to transfer all Arab citizens of Israel to a future Palestinian state in the West Bank. His initial proposal met with booing and catcalls when he presented it before the Knesset in June 2004. More recently, he has modified his suggestion, allowing for Israeli Arabs to remain in the country, provided they take an oath of loyalty to Israel's state, flag, and national anthem.
As journalist Gershom Gorenberg demonstrates in his May Atlantic profile, Lieberman, once seen as a fringe figure, now sits at the table with members of the mainstream. A native of Moldova, Lieberman was born at the height of the Cold War to a father who had toiled for 10 years in a Siberian labor camp. Like so many Russian Jews who spent years battling Soviet anti-Semitism, he arrived in Israel with a distaste for leftist politics and a profound cynicism about the old socialist dream of panethnic unity. The party he founded in 1999 is called Yisrael Beitenu, or "Israel Is Our Home," and its base consists primarily of Russian-Jewish immigrants who desire above all else, in the words of the party platform, "to actualize the Zionist vision of a Jewish State for the Jewish people."
Although his politics might appear simplistic, Lieberman is, according to Gorenberg, forcing Israelis to redefine the terms "left" and "right." Unlike traditional right-wingers, whose primary agenda was to hold onto land, Lieberman is willing to part with most of the West Bank. But his attitude toward ethnicity marks him as anything but liberal. Gorenberg explains that Lieberman's newfound prominence—at a time when socialism is all but dead and the center-right is foundering—raises important questions about the country's future:
Lieberman's ascent, say supporters (and some rivals), shows he has moved toward the center. It could just as easily be read as evidence that the center of Israeli politics has collapsed. Olmert and the centrist Kadima movement were casualties of the war in Lebanon last summer. To bolster support in parliament, the prime minister had to offer Lieberman influence over decisions that could shape, and shake, the Middle East. Simply by granting him a ministerial position, Olmert gave legitimacy to hard-line views on internal issues. In December, addressing a convention of his Yisrael Beitenu, Lieberman declared that his goal was "to be the ruling party" within two elections. When aristocracies fade, a pariah may reign.
Gorenberg's writing has appeared in The New Republic, The New York Times, and The Washington Post along with The Jerusalem Report, where he is a senior editor. He is the author of the book The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements. I spoke to him by telephone from his home in Jerusalem on March 7th.
Israel is a young nation that was built entirely by immigrants. Why is there such a divide between sabras [native-born Israelis] and people who immigrated during the past couple of decades?
There's an old Israeli saying that Israelis love immigration, they just don't like immigrants. You could translate that as saying that the official ideology favors immigration of Jews, repatriation of Jews to their homeland as it were. But the social realities aren't any different in Israel than anywhere else. People come in with a different language and a different culture, want to belong, and find it hard to fit in. And that's part of what Lieberman's party appeals to. But there are certain aspects of the situation that are unique to Israel. In most cases, the right is anti-immigrant; in this case, the right is seeking its constituency among immigrants.
When immigrants began arriving en masse from the Soviet Union, they often found themselves living side by side with lower-middle-class Israeli Arabs. Did this shape their political outlook at all?
Well, there are certain glaring instances where that's true. For example, the town of Upper Nazareth is heavily Russian, and it's next to the largest Israeli Arab town, which is Nazareth. But what shaped their outlook more was downward mobility. In the Soviet Union, one of the ways Jews defined themselves was by their highly educated professions. The simple fact of mass immigration meant a large portion of those people weren't able to pursue the same professions here as they were in their home countries. So you have tension over a changed social position, you have tension over ending up in a part of the world that may have been a second choice. All of these things influenced the political outlook of many Russian immigrants.
Do Russian-born Israelis like Lieberman and Natan Sharansky feel they've earned the right to speak out forcefully against left-wing views because they spent so many years battling a socialist regime?
You know, one of the people I interviewed for this article pointed out that there's often a contradictory reading of the Russians' politics. People say, "The Russians reject socialism because the Soviet Union was socialist." But people also say, "The Russians are secular because the Soviet Union was secular."
In other words, some people believe that the Russians reacted against the culture they came from, and others believe they were colored by it.
Right. Now, that criticism is valid, and it is also true that people switching societies can do both of those things. It's just a much more complex transaction than simple rejection or simple acceptance. Somebody who stands between two backgrounds both belongs and doesn't belong and is critical of each of them.
I was intrigued by a reference you made to Avshalom Vilan, one of Lieberman's opponents in the Knesset. You wrote, "As a kibbutz member, Vilan is part of an Israeli gentry whose fortunes have faded like those of the antebellum plantation owners in Faulkner's novels." What exactly did you mean by this?
When Israel became independent, the Labor-Zionist movement was the dominant political movement, and the kibbutz was the vanguard of the Labor-Zionist movement. Kibbutz members were utterly overrepresented in every aspect of leadership. They were, in a sense, the ideal Israelis, as Israeli society saw itself at its beginning. Today, socialism in Israel is somewhere around where the log cabin is in America. It's something that you learn about in history class if you're paying attention. And the kibbutz is really very marginal.
I assume this was intentional, but there's a real irony in comparing plantation owners to socialists who owned nothing.
I understand the irony completely. But the elite of the society were also those who believed in owning nothing of their own. The fading of that idea is shown in the fact that they are privatizing their communes!
It's fairly common to newly independent countries that the movements that established them hold power at the beginning. But if they're actually successful at creating a democratic process, eventually those movements fall away, because what defined them were earlier issues. Either the movements redefine themselves, or they become irrelevant. All that's really left of socialism in Israel is the name "Labor Party," which hasn't been socialist in many a year.
Why would someone like Avshalom Vilan be particularly offended by Lieberman's population transfer proposal?
There are two things going on here. One is that Vilan is still, despite everything I've just said, left-wing in terms of being dovish, in terms of stressing equality in Israeli society, in terms of being oriented toward dialogue with Palestinians. And he saw the proposals that Lieberman was making as racist.
But in the particular comment I quoted ["What chutzpah! Who are you at all?"], I felt there was also a certain tone of "Who does this guy think he is?" So there was the irony of a very determined and committed position of pro-equality along with a kind of elitism.
I think it's difficult for Americans to fully grasp what the phrase "right-wing politician" means in Israel. How does someone like Lieberman compare to David Duke, for instance?
This is what's so interesting about the Lieberman phenomenon. For the first phase of Israeli history, through 1967, "left" and "right" meant what they meant in Europe. The left was socialist, and the right was free market. After 1967, gradually the dividing line became what you thought we should do about the occupied territories—or, for that matter, what we should call them. Were they the "liberated territories" or were they the "occupied territories"? Should we keep them because they were our homeland? Or should we give them up for the sake of peace and because it was wrong to rule over another people? How far right you were was determined by how eager you were to hold onto territory, and how far left you were was determined by how much territory you were willing to give up.
By those terms, Lieberman is not a right-winger, because he's talking about giving up land. In fact, he's even willing to give up land from sovereign Israel. On the other hand, as one of the people quoted in the article says, he's opened up a new front against Israeli Arabs. And he wants to underline in black the definition of the state as being the expression of one ethnic group. The other group will either have to declare loyalty to that or be excluded. I think one of the reasons people say Lieberman is in the center is that they don't realize he has, in effect, redefined the terms.
It's telling that you just used the term "ethnic group" to describe the notion of the Jewish State. I think a lot of Americans believe that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is essentially a religious one.
This is the most basic misunderstanding that comes from looking at Israel from the outside, particularly looking at Israel from the American experience. In America, the word "Jew" is primarily a religious term. And in Israel, while "Jew" is a religious term, it is primarily a term of nationality. That is the entire underlying idea of the state of Israel: Jews define themselves as a nationality and seek national self-determination. And therefore, the conflict is defined as the conflict between two ethnic or national groups.
Now, there has clearly been an overlay since the beginning of the conflict of the religious connections of both groups. I will be the first to stress that the ethnic and religious dimensions are hard to separate. But you're starting with the idea of thinking of these as nationalities, in the sense of European conflicts of nationalism. For instance, one of the ethnic groups in Bosnia was "Bosnian Muslim." In other words, there were three ethnic groups, and they were called Serbs, Croats, and Muslims.
Lieberman himself isn't particularly religious, is he?
He is not religious. He lives in a mixed religious-secular settlement.
So it doesn't necessarily follow that the more religious a Jew is, the more right-wing he'll be, and the more secular, the more left-wing?
There's an overlap. And certainly if you ran a statistical study, you'd find a relationship between the two things. But there's no absolute correlation between them. For instance, there's always been a very strong secular right wing.
And there's always been an ultra-Orthodox Jewish population that doesn't even recognize the State of Israel and goes so far as to side with the Palestinians.
Yeah, but that's outside of the right and left issues. That's a different universe. Let's not go there.
I think that if you tried to understand this conflict and said, "Okay, I've got it now. There are these two shades"—you're going to be in trouble. There's more than one fault line running through this.
You mentioned the idea of left and right in Europe. Is Lieberman's status as a right-wing politician more analogous to what a right-wing politician would be in Europe right now, where they're dealing with identity issues like headscarves in schools?
Without trying to make everything line up precisely, I think a Western European could have a much easier time simply identifying Lieberman as being on the right. The whole idea that we have to define who we are, and everyone who is not part of that has to adapt to our society—if you asked somebody in France or the Netherlands or Germany, they would say, "Well, of course. That's what our right looks like as well." But because for the last 40 years Israel has been defining its left and right in terms of territorial issues, when Lieberman was willing to give up land, people said, "He's moved to the center."
In your article, Faina Kirschenbaum, director of Lieberman's Yisrael Beitenu party, describes the party members as "pragmatic." Some of the more moderate Israelis I know have told me that Lieberman is a pragmatic man and that his logic makes a cold sort of sense. They usually conclude by adding, "But of course we cannot do this, because it's inhumane." Is this a common Israeli reaction to Lieberman?
I haven't run a survey on it, but I think that when people react against Lieberman's ideas, what they're saying is, "You can't do that. You can't take people who are citizens and exclude them." What he's proposing is very simple. It's terribly logical. And like many terribly logical things, it can't be done. Logical simplicity is very often the mark of extreme positions. Because an extreme position is often based on saying, "This is the only problem I need to solve. And everything else will just be pushed aside in order to solve that problem." But in the real world, you have to deal with a whole set of values that you're trying to maintain, not just one.
When I was in Israel during the summer of 1999, I spent a night in an Arab village in the Galilee. I really wanted the people to share their grievances, their feelings of being an oppressed minority, but they really seemed surprisingly content. Of course, things have probably changed in the past eight years. How much unrest do you think there is in Arab-Israeli villages these days?
I think there's a lot of tension. There's been a considerable amount of politicization among Arab citizens of Israel since 2000. At the beginning of the Second Intifada, in October 2000, there were disturbances inside Arab villages in Israel, and there was a very harsh police reaction, which led to a state inquiry afterwards. That issue remains very raw.
Let me put it this way. The issue of how to deal with an ethnic minority and how to integrate it into mainstream society is certainly not a uniquely Israeli issue. I mean, Europe has been embroiled in this for ages. Go back and look at how World War I started. Look at the conflict in the Balkans. Spain is still dealing with this. That's why I said that I actually think, in a lot of ways, these issues are less surprising from a European perspective than an American perspective.
How do American immigrants fit into the political landscape in Israel?
First of all, the number of American immigrants is quite small. There are certain areas where more Americans live, but you don't have the huge subculture you do with the Russians. Russians make up one sixth of the Israeli population, and the larger an immigrant group is, the more it can maintain a separate identity. I don't think Americans, as things stand now, are a political constituency of any weight in Israel.
The other obvious difference is that the Americans, unlike the Russians, didn't come here for reasons of personal comfort or economics or safety. So you have self-selection among immigrants. They are people who are coming here out of ideological commitment. Another thing about American immigrants is that because they're not part of the old power structure in Israel, they're much more likely to get involved in non-party groups. So whether you go to a Peace Now meeting or to a settlement, you will find Americans.
On the other hand, I would stress that there's an illusion in America that I've run into repeatedly that all the settlers are Americans. I can only guess this has to do with the fact that if someone shows up with a TV camera and a microphone, the one American in the settlement will be pushed out to speak. In reality, the percentages don't line up that way at all.
Lieberman believes that Ahmadinejad is every bit as dangerous as Hitler, and that his threats are parallel to the threats the Nazis made before World War II. Do most Israelis agree?
I think there's a lot of fear surrounding this, and I think that Iranian statements serve to arouse those fears. For very obvious reasons, Israelis, as a traumatized people, have an inclination to relate the current threat to what's happened in the past. Therefore, the Nazi metaphor is very easily applied. Lieberman is certainly not the only person who uses those terms. The reason he is able to use those terms is because they resonate in the wider society.
Without any dismissal of the Iranian threat, I think the most obvious reason it can't be compared to the Nazi threat is that in 1938, the Jews were not an independent nation with considerable military power. There is something almost ahistorical and, I would say, ironically non-Zionist in equating the situation of the Jewish people today with that of 1938.
In other words, I think that because of the pain of the past, it's very easy for Israelis to have a sense of helplessness in the face of a threat and want to respond to that threat sharply. But while we are not omnipotent, we are not helpless. We have achieved what Israel set out to do: we are a country. That means we face some threats, but we also have a degree of power—not unlimited power—to deal with those threats. Both the current rhetoric of Iran and the pain of history sometimes make it difficult for people to remember those things.
The Israeli political system is so different from America's three branches of government that it's hard to get a sense of how much power Lieberman actually has and where his career is heading. Is his current position really a stepping stone to even greater power?
Look, he sees it as a stepping stone. He increased his representation in the Knesset from something marginal to something significant at the same time the traditional major parties were continuing to lose votes and influence. I won't make any predictions as to how this will play out electorally, because in a parliamentary system we don't even know when the next elections will be held, much less what the political constellation will be at that moment. Therefore, it's very difficult to say whether he is correct in his evaluation. What I tried to convey in the article is that because of the breakdown of the classic ideologies, there is an opening for him. But there are a lot of other factors that could come into play.
Is Israel's parliamentary government really the best system for a small country with so many splinter groups? Do you think another system could be more unifying?
The Israeli system is based on the idea that the primary constituencies of the country are ideological groups and not necessarily geographic regions. This is very different from the American system, which was based on the states as the building blocks of the country. The Senate is the best example of this. The Israeli system is designed to guarantee representation for all the different ideological communities so they can negotiate their coexistence in a parliament. Even though that makes it look like the government is unstable, I think it actually promotes social stability.
Israel's mission as a country has always been more complicated than "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Amos Oz has said that as far as the early Zionists were concerned, Israel was going to be the most secular country, and the holiest country, and the most socialist country, and the most democratic country, and the most ancient country, and the most modern country. With a founding vision like that, wasn't Israel bound to fall short of its own ideals?
If you don't fall short of your ideals, then you have pretty poor ideals! But I think Israel has done all right when you compare it to a lot of other countries that became independent in the post-World War II period. You could do worse at creating an independent society.
