woensdag 11 juli 2012

Rapporten over Israelische nederzettingen dragen niet bij aan vrede (IMO)

 
 

http://www.israel-palestina.info/actueel/2012/07/10/rapporten-over-israelische-nederzettingen-dragen-niet-bij-aan-vrede/

IMO Blog

Afgelopen week kwam er alweer een rapport uit, dit keer van ontwikkelingsorganisatie Oxfam, over de nederzettingen en hun negatieve gevolgen voor de Palestijnen. Op dezelfde dag werd bekend dat de VN alweer een onderzoek gaat doen naar de nederzettingen en hun kwalijke invloed op de Palestijnen. Het is een onderwerp waarover mensenrechten- en vredesorganisaties niet uitgepraat raken. Men komt steeds weer tot dezelfde conclusies en uit dezelfde beschuldigingen aan het adres van Israel: door de nederzettingen, de wegen ernaartoe en de afscheidingsbarrière worden de Palestijnen op tal van manieren gehinderd in hun leven, wordt hun economie gehinderd, hun bewegingsvrijheid beperkt. Deze rapporten melden ook altijd dat Israel water van de Palestijnen steelt (onevenredig veel water gebruikt), huizen en andere gebouwen afbreekt zonder enige reden, olijfbomen vernielt en dat kolonisten straffeloos Palestijnen molesteren. Het rapport van Oxfam legt de nadruk op de economische ontwikkeling die wordt belemmerd in de Jordaanvallei, maar ook hier ruimte voor kolonistengeweld, gebrek aan water en andere misstanden. De kern van al deze rapporten is dat a) de arme Palestijnen geen partij zijn voor het rijke Israel en ook arm zijn omdat Israel rijk is, ofwel zij worden bewust arm gehouden door Israel, en b) dat Israel sowieso niks te zoeken heeft op de Westoever en daar op moet zouten, en de EU/VN/VS daartoe meer druk moeten uitoefenen op Israel.

De conclusies in dergelijke rapporten zijn altijd gebaseerd op met name (pro)Palestijnse bronnen, zowel de mensen ter plekke die hun verhaal doen als organisaties als OCHA, Betselem, Palestijnse ministeries en Palestijnse mensenrechtenorganisaties.

Een deel van deze claims is aantoonbaar onjuist. Zo gebruiken de Palestijnen meer water en Israel minder dan in de Oslo Akkoorden overeen gekomen en kun je sowieso niet van 'stelen' spreken, daar het om aquifers gaat die ook gedeeltelijk onder 'Israel proper' liggen. Bovendien hebben de Palestijnen honderden illegalen bronnen aangeboord en brengen daarmee de drinkwatervoorziening voor zowel Israel als de PA in gevaar (in 2006 gebruikte Israel 170 kubieke liter water en de Palestijnen 129, terwijl dit in 1967 resp. 508 en 93 was. De Palestijnen zijn er sinds de Oslo akkoorden alleen maar op vooruit gegaan, en zitten nu ruim boven het minimum dat de Wereldgezondheidsorganisatie heeft vastgesteld, namelijk 100 kubieke liter per dag. Zie voor meer informatie en cijfers deze pdf: The Israeli-Palestinian Water Conflict: An Israeli Perspective). De Palestijnse economie is de afgelopen jaren sterk gegroeid, en een groot aantal checkpoints en andere obstakels zijn verwijderd. Het kan zeker beter, maar deze rapporten overdrijven de zaken schromelijk en doen alsof iedere Palestijn voor iedere verplaatsing uren in de rij moet staan bij een checkpoint. Toen wij in 2008 in Ramallah waren, hebben we aan een Palestijnse vrouw gevraagd hoe lang zij er meestal over deed, en zij zei dat het normaal gesproken redelijk vlot ging. Ook iemand van een vredesorganisatie die we een jaar eerder in Bethlehem ontmoette, zei dat Palestijnen meestal niet langer dan een half uur hoefden te wachten.

Er wonen ca. 250.000 Joodse kolonisten op de Westelijke Jordaanoever. Ongeveer een kwart daarvan woont er uit principiële en/of religieuze motieven. De meesten kwamen vooral af op gunstige aanbiedingen voor ruime woningen met tuin, de rust en natuur en de frisse bries die het lager gelegen kustgebied mist. Ca. 70% is volgens onderzoek van vredesorganisatie Peace Now bereid te verhuizen indien men wordt gecompenseerd. In 2005 heeft Israel de kolonisten in de Gazastrook ontruimd en er circuleerden plannen om ook een groot deel van de Westoever eenzijdig te ontruimen, maar die zijn door de duizenden raketten van Hamas de ijskast in geschoten. Velen zagen de ontruiming van de Gazastrook als een fiasco dat slechts tot meer geweld en radikalisme aan Palestijnse zijde heeft geleid.

Kortom: de nederzettingen vragen om een politieke oplossing, waarbij een deel ontruimd zal moeten worden en een ander deel via grenscorrecties en landruil bij Israel kan worden getrokken. Gezien de animositeit en wederzijdse haat en wantrouwen, lijkt het uitgesloten dat er nederzettingen als Joodse gemeenschappen in Palestijns gebied kunnen blijven, zoals er in Israel Arabische steden zijn. De Palestijnse Autoriteit zal hun veiligheid niet kunnen garanderen (integendeel: PA politiemannen namen in 2002 deel aan het lynchen en op walgelijke wijze verminken van twee Israelische soldaten, en er zijn meer voorbeelden waaruit deze haat blijkt). Ook wonen in juist de kleinere nederzettingen die diep in Palestijns gebied liggen relatief vaker fanatieke en gewelddadige kolonisten.

Zolang er geen politieke oplossing is moeten beide groepen zo goed en kwaad als het kan samenleven, en dat lukt op sommige plaatsen beter dan men zou verwachten. In verschillende nederzettingen werken Joden en Palestijnen samen en zijn er goede onderlinge kontakten. Er zijn ook projecten en organisaties die zich richten op samenwerking en dialoog tussen Palestijnen en kolonisten. Verder moet het leger erop toezien dat de wet niet wordt overtreden, en dat kolonisten en Palestijnen die dat wel doen, worden gestraft. Dat klinkt voor de hand liggend, maar in de praktijk licht het leger niet zomaar een paar stenen gooiende Palestijnen van hun bed, met het risico op escalatie en alle internationale veroordelingen van dien. Bovendien liggen de nederzettingen allemaal in het zogenaamde C gebied dat onder volledige Israelische controle valt, en de Palestijnse plaatsen voornamelijk in A of B gebied, met gedeelde of Palestijnse controle. En de PA treedt niet snel op tegen de eigen bevolking, die in hun ogen terecht strijdt tegen de nederzettingen. Het leger zou natuurlijk harder moeten optreden tegen gewelddadige kolonisten, maar dat ligt weer moeilijk bij de rechtse coalitiepartners van Netanyahu.

Vergeleken met echte oorlogsgebieden is er echter weinig geweld in Israel en op de Westoever. Zo vielen er in 2011 welgeteld 20 Palestijnse en 16 Israelische slachtoffers. De alarmklok die de VN en mensenrechtenorganisaties vaak luiden, lijkt dan ook ietwat overdreven en mede ingegeven door politieke motieven. Men vindt heel erg dat de Joodse kolonisten er niet thuishoren en daarom weg moeten. Daartoe roept men alsmaar weer op om de druk op Israel te verhogen en somt de misstanden, vanuit eenzijdig perspectief en vaak uitvergroot, nog maar eens op. De veel voor de hand liggender oplossing, dat beide partijen moeten gaan praten en Abbas bereid moet zijn zonder voorwaarden vooraf aan de onderhandelingstafel plaats te nemen, wordt genegeerd. Door deze eenzijdige nadruk op de nederzettingen als enige obstakel voor vrede verliest men bovendien andere obstakels uit het oog: de verheerlijking van geweld en (zelfmoord)terrorisme door de PA, en het in stand houden van het vluchtelingenprobleem met een idiote definitie van wie een Palestijnse vluchteling is, en de weigering van de PA en de Arabische landen om verantwoordelijkheid voor deze mensen te nemen en mee te werken aan permanente huisvesting.

Zolang de Palestijnen vasthouden aan het zogenaamde recht op terugkeer van meer dan vier miljoen nakomelingen van de vluchtelingen, is vrede niet in zicht. De VN en ontwikkelingsorganisaties bezien het Israelisch-Palestijns conflict enkel door een Noord-Zuid bril, en zien een rijk westers land en een onderdrukt inheems volk. Pas wanneer men die bril afzet en onbevooroordeeld kijkt naar het conflict, kan men een bijdrage leveren aan de oplossing. Tot dan toe zijn deze rapporten onderdeel van het probleem en verdienen niet de aandacht die zij in de media steeds krijgen.

Ratna

 

Zwitserse supermarkt wil label voor 'foute' joodse producten

 
Op zich ben ik tegen het Israelische nederzettingenbeleid, en zou dus ook geen producten uit die nederzettingen hoeven, maar de activisten die zich hierover opwinden en om boycots roepen vertrouw ik voor geen meter. De halve tijd willen ze toch alles uit Israel zelf ook boycotten en de Joodse staat helemaal opdoeken. Bij gebrek aan keus en gebrek aan informatie koop ikzelf knarsentandend heel wat producten met een onfrisse achtergrond, vaak uit China, uit China of uit bijvoorbeeld China. Wanneer wordt daar eens een boycotcampagne voor opgezet?
 
Zeker bij iets gevoeligs en omstredens als boycots zou ik flink uitkijken om niet met twee maten te meten, want voor je het in de gaten hebt zijn die maten islamisten en neo-nazi's.
 
Wouter
_____________
 

Zwitserse supermarkt wil label voor 'foute' joodse producten

http://www.bnr.nl/programma/dewereldin360/897022-1206/zwitserse-supermarkt-wil-label-voor-foute-joodse-producten

Door Redactie 360

28 JUNI 2012 16:13 | BNR.NL

Producten uit door Israël bezette Palestijnse gebieden moeten herkenbaar worden voor de Zwitserse consument. Zwitserland is ook de uitvinder van het 'jodenstempel' in het Derde Rijk.

Zwitserland is de bedenker van de "J" die vanaf 1938 in paspoorten van joodse Duitsers werd gestempeld. Aan de hand van dat kenmerk konden Zwitserse douaniers Duits-joodse vluchtelingen bij de grens tegenhouden. Nu wil de Zwitserse supermarktketen Migros producten uit door Israël bezette Palestijnse gebieden voorzien van een label. Deze producten gelden als niet politiek correct.

In Migros-Magazin, een soort Zwitserse Allerhande, kondigt de supermarktketen aan om vanaf 2013 precies te vertellen uit welke delen van Israël bepaalde producten komen. Bij herkomst staat dan niet Israël, maar bijvoorbeeld Westbank, israelisches Siedlungsgebiet. Migros zegt zich niet tegen de producten uit te spreken, maar de keuze aan de consument over te laten.

Verontwaardiging
Het plan voor een "joods label" heeft tot veel verontwaardiging geleid. De Israëlische ambassade in Zwitserland zegt teleurgesteld te zijn dat Migros een anti-Israëlische campagne voert.

In Die Welt vertelt publicist Henryk M. Broder de geschiedenis van het 'jodenstempel' dat Duitse joden vanaf 1938 op verzoek van Zwitserland in hun paspoort kregen. Zwitserland, dat geen prijs stelde op joodse vluchtelingen, wilde kunnen zien welke Duitsers bij de grens teruggestuurd moesten worden. Broder vraagt zich af waarom producten uit Iran waar vrouwen gestenigd en homoseksuelen opgehangen worden geen apart kenmerk krijgen.

Transparantie
In een reactie zegt Migros dat het de supermarkt om transparantie gaat. Klanten zouden precies willen weten waar producten vandaan komen. Bovendien bestaat er volgens de supermarktketen een verschil in invoerbelasting op producten uit Israël en producten uit de bezette gebieden waardoor het belangrijk is het onderscheid goed duidelijk te maken.

 

dinsdag 10 juli 2012

Artikel 49 van de Vierde Geneefse Conventie

 
De Vierde Geneefse Conventie handelt over de bescherming van burgerbevolking in oorlogstijd.
Israel wordt er vaak van beschuldigd deze conventie te schenden door burgers van het eigen land toe te staan en zelfs te stimuleren zich te vestigen in het in 1967 veroverde gebied.
 
De status van dit gebied is omstreden. Zo is er geen algemeen erkende soeverein over het gebied, en zijn er geen algemeen erkende grenzen, alleen wapenstilstandslijnen die uit 1949 dateren, waarbij de partijen (in casu Israel en Transjordanie) toen expliciet benadrukten dat dit géén erkende grenzen zouden zijn. Wel heeft het gebied (de Westelijke Jordaanoever) een bevolking die al eeuwenlang in meerderheid Arabisch is (met uitzondering van Jeruzalem, dat voor 1948 in meerderheid Joods was), en is er een brede concensus dat dit gebied primair een Arabisch-Palestijnse staat moet gaan vormen, conform ook het VN-delingsplan van november 1947.
 
In die zin vind ik het verkeerd dat Israel grootschalige vestiging van haar burgers in dit gebied toestaat en stimuleert, evenals China dat in Tibet doet en Marokko in de West-Sahara, tegen de wil van de meerderheid van de bewoners in het gebied.
 
Desondanks is dit beleid niet in strijd met de Vierde Geneefse Conventie, die zich alleen keert tegen gedwongen verplaatsing van bevolking. Onderstaande discussies en toelichtingen lijken mij wat dat aangaat overtuigend genoeg. Het artikel was duidelijk bedoeld om gedwongen deportaties zoals tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog te voorkomen.
 
Wouter
____________
 

Fourth Geneva Conventions, Article 49 - the Travaux Préparatoires

http://elderofziyon.blogspot.nl/2012/07/fourth-geneva-conventions-article-49.html  

 

There has been much discussion about the intent of the sixth paragraph of the Fourth Geneva Conventions which many claim proves that Israel has violated by allowing citizens to move, voluntarily, to occupied territory.

The entire text of Article 49 states:

 

Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.

Nevertheless, the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand. Such evacuations may not involve the displacement of protected persons outside the bounds of the occupied territory except when for material reasons it is impossible to avoid such displacement. Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased.

The Occupying Power undertaking such transfers or evacuations shall ensure, to the greatest practicable extent, that proper accommodation is provided to receive the protected persons, that the removals are effected in satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health, safety and nutrition, and that members of the same family are not separated.

The Protecting Power shall be informed of any transfers and evacuations as soon as they have taken place.

The Occupying Power shall not detain protected persons in an area particularly exposed to the dangers of war unless the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand.

The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.


The only way to determine whether the last paragraph is referring to forced transfers or to voluntary transfers as well is to read the entire discussion about the article that occurred while the Conventions were being drafted - the Travaux Préparatoires.

These aren't easy to find, but here is every reference to the discussions about the article I could gather.

The draft of the Conventions, written at Stockholm, is a little different, and it was called Article 45 in the draft. While the final paragraph remains identical, the discussions around the entire article must be read.

The Stockholm draft of Article 45 stated:

 

ARTICLE 45. -Deportations or transfers against their will of protected persons out of occupied territory are prohibited, whether such deportations or transfers are individual or collective, and regardless of their motive.

The occupying Power shall not undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area, unless the security of the population or imperative military consi- derations demand. Such evacuations may not involve displacements outside the bounds of the occupied territory, except in cases of physical necessity.

The occupying Power shall not carry out such transfers and evacuations unless it has ensured proper accommodation to receive the protected persons. Such removals shall be effected in satisfactory conditions of hygiene, healthfulness, security and nutrition. Members of the same family shall not be separated.

The Protecting Power shall be informed of any proposed transfers and evacuations. It may supervise the preparations and the conditions in which such operations are carried out.

The occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civil population into the territory it occupies.


Here are the Travaux Préparatoires.

I think they make clear that the entire Article is concerned with forced transfer of populations against their wills, and the last paragraph is no exception, even though there was remarkably little discussion specifically about that last paragraph.

From the 16th meeting:

 

The CHAIRMAN said that four amendments had been submitted to Article 45, viz. by Canada, Greece, Finland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (see Annex No. 270).

The Canadian Delegation had withdrawn its amendment.

The Greek amendment was to delete the words "against their will" in the first paragraph.

The Finnish amendment only concerned a drafting point, which the Finnish Delegation felt needed no explanation.

Mr. MOROSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the purpose of the Soviet amendment was merely to define certain points in the Stockholm text, with which his Delegation fully agreed. The insertion of the words "by force" would ensure a formal prohibition of the deplorable practices carried out by certain European countries, where men had been loaded into trucks like cattle, and sent to distant countries to do forced labour.

The Soviet Delegation further proposed deletion of the words "against their will", because in occupied territory no one had the right to express an opinion. There was a risk of abuses arising out of the words "against their will".

It would also be advisable to lay down in the second paragraph that an evacuated population should be transferred back as soon as hostilities ceased in a given area. The Soviet Delegation's view was that it should not be possible to transfer civilians except within occupied territory. It would therefore be desirable to strengthen the prohibition in the first paragraph by adding the words "into the territory of the occupying Power or the territory of any other country" after the words "out of occupied territory".

His Delegation wished mass evacuations to be prevented in future. For those reasons it would perhaps be preferable to say "forcible removals" rather than "deportations by force" as first proposed by the Soviet Delegation.

Mr. SLAMET (Netherlands) agreed with the principles underlying Article 45. In Indonesia, during the last war, numbers of women and children had been transferred to unhealthy climates and forced to build roads, and had died as a result. He would like to see it made clear in the first paragraph that the territory referred to was the national territory inhabited by the protected persons.

Moreover, the third paragraph should also lay down that such persons might provide themselves with money for their journey, and carry with them their luggage and personal effects; the occupying Power would have to provide the necessary means of transport for the transfer or evacuation of such persons and their property.

Mr. MARESCA (Italy) said that in the last war the flower of Italian youth had been sent to Germany in cattle trucks. Such forced transfers must at all events be prohibited in the future. The term "deportation" in the last paragraph of the Article had better not be used, as "deportation" was something quite different.

Mr. CLATTENBURG (United States of America) had read the Soviet amendment with interest. He felt, however, that the words "except in cases of physical necessity" which that amendment wished to delete might be of value in the interest of protected persons. He quoted the case of part of the population of the little island of Wake who had been transferred to Japan. In spite of the bad treatment inflicted, nearly all had survived, whereas the inhabitants left on the island had died as a result either of the fighting or of the brutality of the Japanese field forces.

The CHAIRMAN, before declaring the discussion on Article 45 closed, noted that the Committee was unanimous in condemnation of the abominable practice of deportation. The sole purpose of every speaker had been to strengthen the interdictory provisions of the Article. He suggested that deportations should, in the same way as the taking of hostages, be solemnly prohibited in the Preamble.

He added that only three amendments had been submitted to Articles 46 to 55, two by the Canadian Delegation on Articles 47 and 54, and one by the Finnish Delegation on Article 49. The Canadian and Finnish Delegations had· no comments to offer on their amendments, which only concerned drafting points.


From the 40th meeting:

 

Colonel Du PASQUIER (Switzerland), Rapporteur, said that the text proposed by the Drafting Committee (see Annex No. 271) set forth a principle on which all the members of that Committee had had no difficulty in agreeing, namely, the need to prohibit, once and for all, the abominable transfers of population which had taken place during the last war. The procedure for giving effect to that prohibition had, however, been difficult to determine.

In the first paragraph, as the result of a proposal by the Soviet Delegation (see Summary Record at the Sixteenth Meeting), the words "against their will", which occurred in the Stockholm text, had been omitted. The Drafting Committee had considered that they were valueless in view of the pressure which could be brought to bear on internees. The words "to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not", took account of a Soviet amendment (see Summary Record ot the Sixteenth Meeting), and of a Netherlands amendment. The reservation contained in the second paragraph ("Nevertheless...") took account of a suggestion made by the Delegate of Finland (see Summary Record of the Sixteenth Meeting).

A United Kingdom amendment to the third paragraph, which involved the insertion of the words "to the greatest practicable extent" after the word "ensure", had been rejected by 3 votes to 3. The fourth paragraph took into account the impossibility of the Protecting Power being informed in advance of any transfers and' evacuations (in the light of the necessity for secrecy in regard to military operations). The new fifth paragraph included part of the subject matter dealt with in Article 24 of the Stockholm text (see Summary Record at the Twenty-Ninth Meeting).

The sixth paragraph was identical with the fifth paragraph of the Stockholm text.

Mr. PASHKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) wished the Article to prohibit not only forced transfers but also the transfer of workers in the service of belligerents. It would be sufficient for that purpose to add the words "any other transfer" in the first paragraph after the words "as well as". The Soviet Delegation was prepared provisionally to accept the words "les transferts forces, en masse ou individuels" (individual or mass forced transfers) in the French text, in place of the phrase "rapts ou transferts" which they had proposed; but in the English text they wished the words "forcible removals" to be included in the wording adopted. Again, they maintained their proposal to omit the words "except in cases of physical necessity" from the second paragraph. Finally, his Delegation objected to the provision, in the fifth paragraph, under which protected persons could be detained in dangerous areas. He proposed a return to the wording used in Article 24 of the Stockholm text.

Mr. CLATTENBURG (United States of America) believed that the addition (suggested by the Soviet Delegation) of the words "any other transfer" would have hampered the evacuation of the religious and political minorities which the Allies, on entering Germany; had discovered in labour and concentration camps. As regards the proposed suppression of the words "except in cases of physical necessity", there were cases where, owing to the limited size of the territory, it was physically impossible to evacuate the population otherwise than to places outside the occupied territory. That was the case, for example, in the islands of Wake and Guam, where the whole of the territory could be considered as dangerous. 

Mr. BAGGE (Denmark) said that the fifth paragraph had arisen out of a proposal by the Danish Delegation which wished to avoid a repetition of the disastrous consequences of the mass flight of civilians on roads exposed to bombardment. He hoped that the Committee would adopt the Article as it stood.

Mr. DAY (United Kingdom) proposed an alternative wording for the third paragraph. The proposed wording which had been agreed to by a minority of the Drafting Committee (Canada, United States of America, United Kingdom), read as follows:

"The Occupying Power undertaking such transfers or evacuations shall ensure, to the greatest possible extent, that proper accommodation is provided to receive the protected persons, that the removals are effected in satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health, security and nutrition, and that members of the same family are not separated."

The above wording provided, everything considered, a better safeguard for the population of towns menaced with destruction. If accommodation had to be provided in advance for the population of such towns, it was almost certain that the evacuation would never take place.

Mr. MOROSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) felt that the amendment proposed by his Delegation had not been fully understood by the Delegate of the United States of America. If it was desired to avoid mass transfers of the population, such as had taken place during the last war, the Soviet amendment should be supported.

Mr. WERSHOF (Canada), like the Delegate of the United States of America, opposed the Soviet amendment for the insertion of the words "any other transfer" in the first paragraph. Such an addition might interfere with the liberation of workers or deportees.

The CHAIRMAN declared the discussion closed and put the amendments to Article 45 to the vote.

The Soviet amendment for the insertion of the words "any other transfer" after the words "as well as" in the first paragraph, was rejected by 22 votes to 7.

The Soviet amendment proposing the omission of the words "except in cases of physical necessity" in the second paragraph, ,vas rejected by 16 votes to 9.

The wording proposed for the third' paragraph by the minority of the Drafting Committee (Canada, United States of America, United Kingdom), was rejected by 14 votes to 13.

The Soviet amendment proposing that the fifth paragraph should be replaced by the Stockholm text of Article 24, was rejected by IS votes to 1O. The subsidiary amendment submitted by the Soviet Union Delegation, proposing the omission of the words "unless the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand" at the end of the fifth paragraph, was rejected by 17 votes to 9.

The whole of Article 45, as proposed by the Drafting Committee, was adopted.

 

From the final report summarizing the proceedings:

 

Article 45
Although there was general unanimity in condemning such deportations as took place during the recent war, the phrase at the beginning of Article 45 caused some trouble in view of the difficulty in reconciling exactly the ideas expressed with the various terms in French, English and Russian. In the end the Committee have decided on a wording which prohibits individual or mass forcible removals as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to any other country, but which permits voluntary transfers. [I know this is not the same paragraph, but still...]

The second paragraph deals with the problem of evacuations made necessary in the interest of the security of the civilian population, or for imperative military considerations. In principle, these evacuations take place only within an occupied territory which distinguishes them from the transfers envisaged in the first paragraph. Never~ theless, when it is physically impossible to retain evacuees in such territory, for example, if the latter is an island of limited size, they may be evacuated to another territory. This special case constitutes an exception to the first paragraph. A new provision has been added to the effect that persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased. ..

The third paragraph is unchanged from the Stockholm text, although considerable doubt has been expressed as to whether the wording employed is in the best interest of the protected persons concerned.

The fourth paragraph has been altered because discussion showed that for reasons of military security it was impossible to inform the Protecting Power in advance of proposed transfers and evacuations; the Committee, therefore, confined itself to imposing on the Occupying Power the obligation to lodge the necessary information as soon as the transfer or evacuation had taken place.

The fifth paragraph derives from Article 24: the latter provided that no protected person could be sent to, or retained in areas which are particularly exposed. Discussion showed that the problem was more complex than it seemed at first sight; in fact, it could happen-and it frequently did happen during the war-that the population of a district, believing their homes threatened, might leave them so as to escape the danger. Such persons, however, are often more exposed to danger on the roads or in the battle zone than if they stay at home. It is also necessary to take into account, in addition to the principle of freedom of movement, the restrictions demanded by the security of the population or imperative military considerations such as the need to keep the roads open. A qualification to this effect has been included in the paragraph.

Finally, the sixth paragraph consists of the fifth paragraph of the Stockholm text.

 

All of the discussions of that article assumed that the entire article dealt only with forced population transfer. The final paragraph would be very out of place if it alone included voluntary transfer on the part of a population, after five paragraphs that are clearly about forced transfers, deportations and evacuations all actively done by the occupying power.

 

 

maandag 9 juli 2012

Entebbe reddingsoperatie: een interview met de hoofdpiloot

 
On June 27, 1976, a Paris-bound Air France flight from Tel Aviv, via Athens, was hijacked and diverted to Entebbe, Uganda. Two of the hijackers were members of the German Baader-Meinhof Gang, and two were from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. They demanded the release of 53 jailed terrorists in Israel.

On the third day of the crisis, the terrorists separated Israeli and Jewish passengers from the others. The captors freed the non-Jews and sent them to France the next day. Quietly, while the rest of the world talked but did nothing, the Israel Defense Forces planned a rescue mission.

De reddingsoperatie maakte indruk op vriend en vijand, en raakt ook aan het wezen van de staat Israel. Men hoefde niet langer machteloos toe te zien wanneer Joden worden bedreigd, maar kon wat doen. Men liet voor het oog van de wereld zien nu zijn eigen boontjes te kunnen doppen. De operatie was gedurfd en verliep bijzonder succesvol, behalve dan dat Yonatan Netanyahu werd gedood. 

RP

-----------------

 

Rescue at Entebbe: An Interview With the Chief Pilot

http://www.idfblog.com/2012/07/05/rescue-at-entebbe-an-interview-with-the-chief-pilot/

Published on: July 5, 2012 

 

Brig. Gen. (res.) Joshua Shani was the lead pilot in Operation Entebbe, flying the first C-130 Hercules cargo plane with the entire rescue force on board. This week, for the 36th anniversary of the rescue operation on July 4th, he agreed to answer a few questions.

 

Tell us a bit about your family background.

My parents lived in what is now Ukraine. Their small town was part of Poland at the time. They escaped the Nazis and ended up in Siberia, where I was born in 1945. We were refugees, wherever we were.

Soon after the war ended, my family lived in the Bergen-Belsen displaced persons camp in Germany, which was run by the British. We were there for almost a year. And then we made our way from Germany to Israel, via France and Egypt.

My parents were lifelong Zionists and fluent in Hebrew, which they spoke to me as a baby. They were thrilled to arrive in Israel and begin a new life, never again to be refugees.

Did you always know that you wanted to be a pilot?

No, actually. I wasn’t interested in airplanes as a teenager. I wanted to be an electrical engineer. On my draft day, I was sitting on the grass with other new recruits at the Bakum (the IDF induction base), and a major with wings on his uniform approached us. He said, “You are all fit for flight school. Who here doesn’t want to volunteer?”

I started to raise my hand, but when it was about halfway up I realized that nobody else around me was raising his hand. So I put my hand down. The rest is history.

What did you do when you first joined the Israel Air Force?

I was drafted in 1963. I received my pilot’s wings in 1965 from Ezer Weizmann, who was then the commander of the Israel Air Force.

The first plane I flew was the Nord Noratlas, a transport plane. I was also a Fuga instructor for two years.

The Air Force then sent me to the United States to learn how to fly the C-130 Hercules cargo plane. First I was in Little Rock, Arkansas, and later in Pope, North Carolina. It was my first time in the United States.

You were on active duty during some of Israel’s major wars. Where were you then? 

 

In 1967, during the Six-Day War, I supplied fuel and ammunition to IDF soldiers fighting in the Sinai Peninsula.

In 1973, during the Yom Kippur War, I was a squadron commander. I was involved in fueling and reconnaissance missions with the C-97 Stratofreighter. I also flew the C-130 Hercules across the Suez Canal, deep into Egyptian territory, in order to supply fuel and ammunition to the ground forces that were holding territory west of the canal. Those forces, by the way, were led by Ariel Sharon.

 

How did the crisis at Entebbe begin?

On June 27, 1976, a Paris-bound Air France flight from Tel Aviv, via Athens, was hijacked and diverted to Entebbe, Uganda. Two of the hijackers were members of the German Baader-Meinhof Gang, and two were from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. They demanded the release of 53 jailed terrorists in Israel.

On the third day of the crisis, the terrorists separated Israeli and Jewish passengers from the others. The captors freed the non-Jews and sent them to France the next day. Quietly, while the rest of the world talked but did nothing, the Israel Defense Forces planned a rescue mission.

How did you first find out that you would be asked to help rescue the hostages? 

 

I was at a wedding when the commander of the Israel Air Force, Maj. Gen. Benny Peled, approached me and began asking questions about the capabilities of the C-130. It was a strange situation — the commander of the IAF, a major general, asking a lieutenant colonel questions about an airplane. But the C-130 was a new plane, and the IAF top brass were always focused on fighter jets, not transport planes. Peled asked me if it was possible to fly to Entebbe, how long it would take and what it could carry. I left him with the impression that a rescue would be possible. 

 

How did the operation begin? 

 

We began our journey from Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, which at the time was under Israeli control. The takeoff from Sharm was one of the heaviest ever in the history of this airplane. I didn’t have a clue what would happen. The aircraft was crowded. I was carrying the Sayeret Matkal assault team, led by Yonatan Netanyahu. I was also carrying a Mercedes, which was supposed to confuse Ugandan soldiers at the airport, because Idi Amin, the country’s dictator, had the same car. And I also found room to pack Land Rovers and a paratrooper force.

I gave the plane maximum power, and it was just taxiing, not accelerating. At the very end of the runway, I was probably two knots over the stall speed, and I had to lift off. I took off to the north, but had to turn south where our destination was. I couldn’t make the turn until I gained more speed. Just making that turn, I was struggling to keep control, but you know, airplanes have feelings, and all turned out well.

The flight to Entebbe is about 2,500 miles (4,000 km). How’d you do it? 

 

We had to fly very close to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, over the Gulf of Suez. We weren’t afraid of violating anyone’s air space — it’s an international air route. The problem was that they might pick us up on radar. We flew really low — 100 feet above the water, a formation of four planes. The main element was surprise. All it takes is one truck to block a runway, and that’s all. The operation would be over. Therefore, secrecy was critical.

At some places that were particularly dangerous, we flew at an altitude of 35 feet. I recall the altimeter reading. Trust me, this is scary! In this situation, you cannot fly close formation. As flight leader, I didn’t know if I still had planes 2, 3 and 4 behind me because there was total radio silence. You can’t see behind you in a C-130. Luckily, they were smart, so from time to time they would show themselves to me and then go back to their place in the formation, so I still knew I had my formation with me.

 

What was going through your head as you approached the runway in Uganda?

My biggest fear was not being shot at from the ground, but making a mistake as a pilot. All I could think the entire time was “Don’t screw this up!” True, the risks to my life were real, but I was more worried about botching the landing and endangering the success of the entire operation. Think about it — how many people would have died at Entebbe if I had made a mistake?

In case something did go wrong, though, I was prepared for the worst. I was wearing a helmet, a bullet-proof vest, and I had an Uzi. I was also given a thick wad of cash in case I needed to use it to escape Uganda. Luckily, I never had to use it. I returned the cash after returning to Israel.

What happened after you landed?

I stopped in the middle of the runway, and a group of paratroopers jumped out from the side doors and marked the runway with electric lights, so that the other planes behind me could have an easier time landing. The paratroopers went on to take the control tower. The Mercedes and Land Rovers drove out from the back cargo door of my airplane, and the commandos stormed the old terminal building where the hostages were. While coordinating the assault, Yonatan Netanyahu, Sayeret Matkal’s commander, was fatally shot by a Ugandan soldier.

When the hostages were freed, what was your next move?

We had a little problem: We needed fuel to fly back home. We came on a one-way ticket! We had planned for a number of options for refueling, and I learned from the command-and-control aircraft flying above us that the option to refuel in Nairobi, Kenya, was open. After about 50 minutes on the ground in Entebbe, I gave the order: “Whoever is ready, take off.” I remember the satisfaction of seeing plane number 4, with the hostages on board, taking off from Entebbe — the sight of its silhouette in the night. It was then that I knew. That’s it. We did it. The mission succeeded.

How were you greeted in Israel?

The plane with the hostages landed at Ben-Gurion Airport, where they were reunited with their families. The other three planes remained for a debrief. Here comes Yitzhak Rabin, prime minister of Israel, walking up to me. I had been in my flight suit for 24 hours straight, in temperatures over 100 degrees in the airplane, sweating and smelly, and here walks the prime minister with big open arms. I’m thinking — please don’t hug me — he may die from this! He hugged me for what felt like a full minute, and said only “Thanks.”

 

What was it like returning to Israel as a hero?

After my father’s death, I found his letters from Bergen-Belsen that he sent to Kibbutz Mishmar Haemek. The letters describe his experiences during the Holocaust, what happened to his family, etc. I won’t discuss it here. One of his letters said, “My only comfort is Joshua. He gives me reason to continue.”

The reason I mention this letter is because, 30 years later, when I returned from Entebbe, my father hosted a party for me. Family and friends were all there to celebrate the success of my mission. My father was in a great mood. I know what he was thinking, a Holocaust survivor. His son at the time was a lieutenant colonel in the Israel Air Force and had just flown thousands of miles in order to save Jews. It probably added ten years to his life.

Are you still in touch with people from the mission?

Well, as you probably know, many of them are in high places today.

Ehud Barak, the minister of defense, was the same rank as me at the time. He was in the planning group for the operation, and I was the chief pilot. We consulted each other then, and I see him often nowadays.

Shaul Mofaz, recently named vice prime minister, was in charge of destroying MIG fighter jets on the ground in the Entebbe airport so that our rescue force could not be pursued as we left Uganda.

Matan Vilnai was in the cockpit with me. Ephraim Sneh was on the plane as a doctor.

Dan Shomron died a few years ago — he was one of the leaders of the entire operation.

And, of course, Yoni’s brother, Benjamin, is the prime minister. I first met him in the early 1980s when he was Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy of Israel in Washington, DC.

Where has your career taken you since Entebbe?

I stayed in the IAF for a while – more than 30 years, in fact. I accumulated 13,000 flight hours, including nearly 7,000 in C-130s. Over the years, I commanded three squadrons and a mixed base of four squadrons and eight ground units.

From 1985 to 1988, I was the Air Force attache in the Embassy of Israel in Washington, DC. I retired from active duty in 1989, as a Brigadier General. For ten years after that I was in the reserves.

Today, I am the vice president of Israel operations for Lockheed Martin. And to think, as a new recruit in the IDF, I wasn’t interested in being in the Air Force — and airplanes became my life. You never know how things will turn out.

 

Vrouwen tweederangs burgers in Beit Shemesh?

 

Phillip herself was a victim of a similiar attack. "Women ask me why I care about the sign as it's a haredi district. My reply is that this is a main road leading to a shopping center. I once rode my bicycle near there and got a stone to the head by a haredi man," she recounted. "On other occasions I was spat on and name called."

Dit zijn Iraanse toestanden, waartegen hard moet worden opgetreden. In een moderne, grotendeels seculiere democratie, kunnen mensen niet op een dergelijke manier eigen rechter spelen en vrouwen rechten ontzeggen, zoals de vrijheid in de openbare ruimte over openbare wegen te lopen. 

 

RP

---------  

 

Beit Shemesh 'helpless' fighting women's exclusion

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4251544,00.html

Municipality admits cannot handle 'complex issue' by itself after woman files police complaint over sign ordering women to avoid sidewalk frequented by synagogue goers

Noam (Dabul) Dvir

Published:

07.04.12, 23:56

The issue of women's exclusion is troubling the city of Beit Shemesh once again. A sign ordering women to avoid walking on a pavement at the Chazon Ish street has been removed at one woman's insistence.

Earlier on Wednesday, Beit Shemesh resident Nili Phillip filed a police complaint after noticing the sign. "The sign resembles one that was posted on the street in the past," Phillip said. 

 

She is claiming that the sign was posted against the law and is proof that the city is ruled by anarchy. "This may come to bloodshed," she warned. "There is a direct correlation to recent attacks on women," she added referring to an incident where a woman was pelted with a stone for dressing immodestly.

 

Phillip herself was a victim of a similiar attack. "Women ask me why I care about the sign as it's a haredi district. My reply is that this is a main road leading to a shopping center. I once rode my bicycle near there and got a stone to the head by a haredi man," she recounted. "On other occasions I was spat on and name called." 

 

Mickey Gitzin, director-general of the Free Israel movement believes there has been no change in the fight against women's exclusion in Israel. "It's unfortunate to see that Israel's top politicians use the issue as a means to get headlines while no change was seen on the ground," he said. "Nevertheless, we have no intention of giving up and we shall keep fighting."

Several hours after Phillip's complaint was filed, the Beit Shemesh Municipality said in response, "The city has removed the sign many times. Each such step sparked riots and disorderly conduct. The city cannot handle this complex issue by itself. We call on the police and other law enforcement authorities to take action and end this shameful phenomenon." 

 

The Municipality eventually removed the sign as well as another sign posted further down the road with the police's help. 

 

 

Related stories: