Het Hamas regime lijkt na een jaar controle over de Gazastrook nog niet te wankelen. Dat komt volgens Barry Rubin door de brede steun onder Palestijnen voor de extremistische opstelling van Hamas, en dat Fatah nog steeds geen aantrekkelijk alternatief weet neer te zetten. Na jaren van incompetent en corrupt Fatah bestuur zijn de schone straten nu in Gaza toch wel een verademing, terwijl de repressie onder Fatah niet zoveel minder erg was.
Het is waarschijnlijk alleen aan de Israëlische grensblokkades en internationale isolatie van Hamas te danken dat het regime haar nieuwe machtpositie in Gaza niet heeft kunnen gebruiken om het aantal aanslagen op Israëlische burgers op te voeren.
Wouter
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The Jerusalem Post Sunday, June 29, 2008
Jun 26, 2008 13:52 | Updated Jun 27, 2008 15:28
Jun 26, 2008 13:52 | Updated Jun 27, 2008 15:28
The Region: They're dictators and terrorists, but look what clean streets!
By BARRY RUBIN
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1214132697657&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
Hamas just celebrated its first anniversary of power in the Gaza Strip amid massive misinterpretations regarding the situation there.
Ironically, Hamas's victory and survival has little to do with Israel.
Instead, it rests on the rotten strategy of Yasir Arafat, who ruled the Palestinian movement for 35 years by establishing a weak, anarchic, corrupt and factionalized structure which he played like a violin. Only after Arafat's death did the Palestine Liberation Organization pay the price: Fatah collapsed in the Gaza Strip, first electorally, then militarily. Following which, having failed at governing, Fatah proved itself a failure in opposition as well.
As for Hamas, its power is founded on repression, radical ideology, international protection and an incompetent enemy. As one Palestinian storekeeper told an American reporter, "What can we do? Hamas is even stronger than a year ago. They can take me and put me away whenever they want."
FATAH IS its own worst enemy in combating Hamas.
President George Bush recently stated that a Fatah-ruled Palestinian state should be quickly developed since, "It will serve as an alternative vision to what is happening in Gaza."
This is rubbish. No matter how much money the West pumps in, the nationalists are not going to offer an attractive regime. Fatah's lower level of still-considerable repression as compared to Hamas is counterbalanced by the corruption and anarchy included in the package.
Moreover, Fatah is still up to its old tricks. When it does arrest those involved in terrorism, they are quickly released. Incitement to commit violence continues on the Palestinian Authority media, and the PA is far more eager to reconcile with Hamas than to make peace with Israel.
Yes, the PA's survival is a US, Western, and Israeli interest, but let's not get sentimental or naive about these weak, corrupt and largely radical allies of necessity.
AS FOR Hamas, it possesses three key weapons.
* The mainstream appeal of extremism and terrorism. "Hamas is strong and brutal but very good at governing," Eyad Sarraj told The New York Times, which described him as a British-trained psychiatrist and secular opponent of Hamas. After all, he continues, it's distributing gas coupons, getting people to pay electricity bills, and keeping the city clean.
Suddenly, people considered "progressive" see the up side of having a police state. Imagine this kind of thinking applied to other dictatorships around the world: they are brutal, but boy do they keep law and order! Sarraj also forgets that Hamas's war policy resulted in reducing the gas and electricity supply.
In any case, Sarraj is no moderate. In 1999, he wrote that Palestinians were better off without the peace process. Refusing to recognize Israel had been their "nuclear weapon" and armed struggle their great asset. Giving these up was a mistake, Sarraj insisted, and might lead to ending the conflict without eliminating Israel.
Sarraj, while a member of Gaza's tiny left, advocated a strategy parallel to that of Hamas today. Perhaps that's why he protested Arafat's repression but now seems content to accept Hamas's, however much he dislikes its Islamism. The continued extremism of mainstream Palestinian activist opinion makes Hamas's rule seem an acceptable trade-off because of its militancy.
* The success of ideological demagoguery. As one Hamas supporter told a reporter: "Israel is trying to pressure us to make us forget that the real problem is the occupation." Of course, there is no Israeli occupation in the Gaza Strip, which is one reason why Hamas was able to seize power. "We can take it," she continued, "The Koran teaches that in the end we will be victorious."
This expresses widespread sentiment: Israel is the only enemy; everything else is irrelevant, suffering isn't important, victory is inevitable. Shortly after Hamas seized power, Sarraj told a Canadian reporter how Hamas threw Fatah men off the tops of buildings, murdered them in hospital beds, and tortured them in a "horrific" manner. But that isn't important. Whether Hamas brutalizes Palestinians, creates conditions that destroy living standards, drags people into endless war, turns Gaza into a mini-Iran or causes numerous casualties, its militancy and refusal to compromise is what counts.
That may seem irrational to Western observers, but that's how Palestinian politics work.
* Pretended moderation as a scam. Since Westerners can't understand the culture of ideology and extremism, they're sure Hamas will moderate. This is "proven" for them when Hamas leaders say that if Israel only returns to the 1967 borders - giving the West Bank and east Jerusalem to the Hamas-ruled state - and lets millions of Palestinians live in Israel, they'll make a truce until they decide otherwise.
That silly evaluation reminds me of an American high-school textbook which said Israel should try this idea - if it didn't work, we would all know better.
FINALLY, THERE'S the strange conclusion that since Hamas isn't about to fall from power, this proves sanctions have failed. One could argue that this shows economic and military pressures should be increased. But at least it should be understood that the sanctions' purpose is to make Hamas less able to kill even more people, take over the West Bank, damage Israel, or turn Gaza into - to stand Bush's view on its head - an "attractive alternative."
Any policy that prevents those things seems pretty valid; any Westerner favoring a strategy that strengthens Hamas should be forced to live under its rule.
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1214132697657&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
Hamas just celebrated its first anniversary of power in the Gaza Strip amid massive misinterpretations regarding the situation there.
Ironically, Hamas's victory and survival has little to do with Israel.
Instead, it rests on the rotten strategy of Yasir Arafat, who ruled the Palestinian movement for 35 years by establishing a weak, anarchic, corrupt and factionalized structure which he played like a violin. Only after Arafat's death did the Palestine Liberation Organization pay the price: Fatah collapsed in the Gaza Strip, first electorally, then militarily. Following which, having failed at governing, Fatah proved itself a failure in opposition as well.
As for Hamas, its power is founded on repression, radical ideology, international protection and an incompetent enemy. As one Palestinian storekeeper told an American reporter, "What can we do? Hamas is even stronger than a year ago. They can take me and put me away whenever they want."
FATAH IS its own worst enemy in combating Hamas.
President George Bush recently stated that a Fatah-ruled Palestinian state should be quickly developed since, "It will serve as an alternative vision to what is happening in Gaza."
This is rubbish. No matter how much money the West pumps in, the nationalists are not going to offer an attractive regime. Fatah's lower level of still-considerable repression as compared to Hamas is counterbalanced by the corruption and anarchy included in the package.
Moreover, Fatah is still up to its old tricks. When it does arrest those involved in terrorism, they are quickly released. Incitement to commit violence continues on the Palestinian Authority media, and the PA is far more eager to reconcile with Hamas than to make peace with Israel.
Yes, the PA's survival is a US, Western, and Israeli interest, but let's not get sentimental or naive about these weak, corrupt and largely radical allies of necessity.
AS FOR Hamas, it possesses three key weapons.
* The mainstream appeal of extremism and terrorism. "Hamas is strong and brutal but very good at governing," Eyad Sarraj told The New York Times, which described him as a British-trained psychiatrist and secular opponent of Hamas. After all, he continues, it's distributing gas coupons, getting people to pay electricity bills, and keeping the city clean.
Suddenly, people considered "progressive" see the up side of having a police state. Imagine this kind of thinking applied to other dictatorships around the world: they are brutal, but boy do they keep law and order! Sarraj also forgets that Hamas's war policy resulted in reducing the gas and electricity supply.
In any case, Sarraj is no moderate. In 1999, he wrote that Palestinians were better off without the peace process. Refusing to recognize Israel had been their "nuclear weapon" and armed struggle their great asset. Giving these up was a mistake, Sarraj insisted, and might lead to ending the conflict without eliminating Israel.
Sarraj, while a member of Gaza's tiny left, advocated a strategy parallel to that of Hamas today. Perhaps that's why he protested Arafat's repression but now seems content to accept Hamas's, however much he dislikes its Islamism. The continued extremism of mainstream Palestinian activist opinion makes Hamas's rule seem an acceptable trade-off because of its militancy.
* The success of ideological demagoguery. As one Hamas supporter told a reporter: "Israel is trying to pressure us to make us forget that the real problem is the occupation." Of course, there is no Israeli occupation in the Gaza Strip, which is one reason why Hamas was able to seize power. "We can take it," she continued, "The Koran teaches that in the end we will be victorious."
This expresses widespread sentiment: Israel is the only enemy; everything else is irrelevant, suffering isn't important, victory is inevitable. Shortly after Hamas seized power, Sarraj told a Canadian reporter how Hamas threw Fatah men off the tops of buildings, murdered them in hospital beds, and tortured them in a "horrific" manner. But that isn't important. Whether Hamas brutalizes Palestinians, creates conditions that destroy living standards, drags people into endless war, turns Gaza into a mini-Iran or causes numerous casualties, its militancy and refusal to compromise is what counts.
That may seem irrational to Western observers, but that's how Palestinian politics work.
* Pretended moderation as a scam. Since Westerners can't understand the culture of ideology and extremism, they're sure Hamas will moderate. This is "proven" for them when Hamas leaders say that if Israel only returns to the 1967 borders - giving the West Bank and east Jerusalem to the Hamas-ruled state - and lets millions of Palestinians live in Israel, they'll make a truce until they decide otherwise.
That silly evaluation reminds me of an American high-school textbook which said Israel should try this idea - if it didn't work, we would all know better.
FINALLY, THERE'S the strange conclusion that since Hamas isn't about to fall from power, this proves sanctions have failed. One could argue that this shows economic and military pressures should be increased. But at least it should be understood that the sanctions' purpose is to make Hamas less able to kill even more people, take over the West Bank, damage Israel, or turn Gaza into - to stand Bush's view on its head - an "attractive alternative."
Any policy that prevents those things seems pretty valid; any Westerner favoring a strategy that strengthens Hamas should be forced to live under its rule.
--------
The writer is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center at IDC Herzliya and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal .
The writer is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center at IDC Herzliya and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal .
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