woensdag 27 november 2013

Geen vrijheid in Gazastrook volgens Human Rights Watch

 
Sinds Israel zich in 2005 uit de Gazastrook terugtrok en in 2007 Hamas met een bloedige coup de macht greep, is het met de mensenrechten helaas bepaald niet beter geworden.
 
Wouter
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http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/11/25/gaza-abuse-harassment-activists
‘Tamarod’ Supporters Forced to Cancel November 11 Protest

NOVEMBER 25, 2013

Hamas’s attempts to silence Tamarod fit a grim pattern of repressing free speech and peaceful assembly in Gaza. The Hamas Interior Ministry should allow Palestinians to hold peaceful demonstrations and stop persecuting critics.

Joe Stork, deputy Middle East director

(Jerusalem) – Hamas authorities in Gaza have been harassing Palestinians suspected of supporting the “Tamarod Gaza” activist group. The authorities should stop the harassment, allow the group to hold demonstrations, and investigate the alleged torture of Tamarod’s supporters. Tamarod (‘Rebel’) has criticized what it calls poor governance by Hamas and abuses by security services, and has called on Hamas to relinquish power and hold elections.

Human Rights Watch spoke with four men detained by Hamas police and Internal Security authorities on suspicion that they supported the group and three others who were summoned for questioning since the group published a video online in July. Three of the men said interrogators tortured them because they had made pro-Tamarod statements on Facebook or otherwise indicated support for the group. Others described threats and harassment.

“Hamas’s attempts to silence Tamarod fit a grim pattern of repressing free speech and peaceful assembly in Gaza,” said Joe Stork, deputy Middle East director at Human Rights Watch. “The Hamas Interior Ministry should allow Palestinians to hold peaceful demonstrations and stop persecuting critics.”

Tamarod called off a demonstration planned for November 11, 2013, because, according to members of the group, they feared Hamas security services would use excessive force to disperse it. A political activist in Gaza told Human Rights Watch that Tamarod had not requested a permit from the Hamas authorities to hold the demonstration because “people were too afraid” they would be arrested and ill-treated. In August, Hamas authorities briefly detained the activist after he requested a permit to hold a demonstration, ordered him to cancel the demonstration, and denied the permit without explanation, he said. The Hamas authorities have never presented any evidence suggesting that Tamarod advocates or is associated with violence.

A university student in his twenties told Human Rights Watch that Hamas Internal Security officials arrested him on September 4, interrogated and at times tortured him over the course of 11 days, and detained him until September 23. Human Rights Watch has not publicly identified him or any of the Tamarod supporters interviewed due to concern for their safety.

“After a lot of questions, it turned out my crime was that I had clicked ‘Like’ on a Tamarod page on Facebook,” the student said. Interrogators put a cloth bag on his head, beat him, forced him to stand up for five hours at a time, and repeatedly suspended him off the ground by tying his arms above him, he said:

They forced me to give up my phone and my Facebook and Hotmail passwords and asked me about my contacts and my [Facebook] page for three days. The daily routine was standing, interrogation, and praying. I was bagged the whole time. I can’t stop remembering what happened to me. Since my release, sleep doesn’t come until dawn. I keep thinking about what happened.

The student’s mother told Human Rights Watch that the authorities refused to acknowledge his whereabouts for the first week of his detention. “Finally they called us and told us he needed a change of underwear and money to buy food at Ansar [detention facility]. They didn’t tell us he needed a lawyer. It took ten days before the clothes were handed to him.”

Hamas security officials in Gaza City summoned the student again on September 30, again put a bag over his head, and questioned him for four more hours, he said.

Another Tamarod supporter, a journalist in his twenties, told Human Rights Watch that on the morning of September 3, Hamas Internal Security officials summoned him to their offices in Gaza City, where interrogators put a cloth bag over his head, questioned him about the Tamarod Facebook page, suspended him from the ceiling by his arms, forced him to stand in a painful position for about an hour, and beat him:

They accused me of being Fatah [Hamas’ rival political movement], but I said I’m just a [Fatah] supporter and nothing else, and I didn’t know anything specific about the organization. They moved on to asking me about Tamarod and said to talk about my role, that there was no need for me to get beaten.

The journalist said he refused to speak about the group and was released that night, but summoned to appear again at the same facility the following day. “I waited for two hours, then they put a bag over my head and beat me,” he said. “The interrogator was yelling at me that Tamarod was bad, that I should feel guilty. They made me give them my email and Facebook passwords and took my journalist pass.” Internal Security officials released the journalist that night, and later returned his journalist pass.

A third Tamarod supporter, an engineer in his forties, told Human Rights Watch that Hamas security forces summoned him on September 10 for questioning. His interrogators accused him of working for Mahmoud Abbas, the Fatah leader and Palestinian Authority president, and of “having received Tamarod materials, fliers and things from [group members driving] a Jeep,” the engineer said. “I am in favor of Fatah, but that’s all. They kept telling me to confess, confess, to tell them about what happened three days ago. But I had no idea what happened three days ago.” He said he was forced to sit in a child’s chair, then moved to another room and ordered to stand up:

It was very hot. I waited for hours, maybe the whole night, I don’t know. I stopped being able to hear. My legs were numb [from standing] so I bent over a bit. That’s when I was hit on the neck, from behind, and told I would be beaten again if I did not stand straight. I managed [to stand for] another 30 minutes, had to rest and was hit again. I became so tired I just lay down. I didn’t care if they shot me.

The engineer said his interrogation continued the following day. “After I denied knowing anything about a Jeep with Tamarod materials, someone came in and asked if I was in trouble,” he said. “Someone else said yes, and then they hit me so hard that I fell over backward in my chair, with my feet in the air. They started hitting my toes with a small hammer. It was very painful.”

The security officials released the engineer that night, but summoned him to deposit his laptop computer on September 16. He was questioned again and told not to “spread lies” about his ill-treatment during interrogation, but he was not abused further, he said. In the late morning of September 17, he said, “they called me on the phone to come in again so they could close the case.” After he waited 30 minutes, security officials blindfolded him and questioned him again about his alleged Fatah affiliations. They released him later that day.

A second journalist, in his forties, and a political activist in his late twenties told Human Rights Watch that they received anonymous death threats over the phone for their support of Tamarod. The journalist said that after he had written an article supporting Tamarod, he received a call on July 4 from a caller with a blocked number, who “identified himself as a member of Qassam [Hamas’s armed wing] and said they would kill me.” He said a Hamas official later assured him that “the threat was not officially sanctioned.”

The activist said that he joined the Tamarod Gaza group’s Facebook page when it released a video online on July 3, and “I got anonymous threats on the phone about cutting out my tongue and giving me ‘a last warning.’ ” The activist, who says he supports neither Hamas nor Fatah, called the police in Gaza to request protection, but on July 15 Hamas security officers arrested, questioned, and abused him, due in part to suspicions that he supported Tamarod and in part to his role in a demonstration in Gaza against Israel’s mistreatment of its Bedouin citizens that day.
Security officials released the activist that evening, but summoned him for further questioning the next day, July 16. On both occasions, he said, “they asked about Tamarod, my personal life, demonstrations, and claimed that I was connected to Ramallah,” the seat of the Palestinian Authority. “It was humiliating. They threatened me and wanted me to sign papers promising to stop my activities. They made me sit painfully in a small chair for children, for hours, before releasing me.”

Hamas police summoned him again to a Gaza City police station at 9 a.m. on August 1, the date of a planned demonstration:

I asked if they had a warrant, and they told me not to worry, it was just for me to pick up a permit for the demonstration. When I arrived they told me the permit was denied and I had to cancel the demonstration. They let me go but I was picked up again, by intelligence. And then the police called to ask why I hadn’t cancelled the demonstration yet. Luckily my phone broke while I was with the intelligence, so I actually couldn’t cancel it.

The activist said he continued to receive anonymous phone calls and threating text messages until mid-September, when one message threatened that “no more warnings are coming, but they will act.”

Human Rights Watch interviewed another activist, a man his fifties, who has written in support of Tamarod. Hamas Internal Security interrogated him on August 18 and threatened to charge him with libel on the basis of an article he wrote criticizing Hamas in 2012. It was not clear whether his interrogation and the threat of criminal prosecution were related to his support for Tamarod.

The demonstrations Tamarod called for November 11 would have occurred on the ninth anniversary of the death of Yasir Arafat, the former Palestinian president and leader of Fatah. Hamas ousted the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority from Gaza in 2007.

 

dinsdag 26 november 2013

Khamenei: Akkoord met Westen leidt tot het uiteindelijke doel (Missing Peace)

 

Het komt misschien niet echt als een verrassing dat Missing Peace het standpunt van Netanyahu verdedigt, maar de citaten van Iraanse politici die worden gegeven zijn zeer verontrustend.

De Iraanse president Rouhani verklaarde dat de vijanden van Iran, die de wereld een Iran fobie probeerden aan te praten hebben verloren. Dat was een duidelijke verwijzing naar de Israëlische regering.  Ook zei hij dat 'de verrijkingsactiviteiten zullen doorgaan zoals in het verleden' en dat het akkoord betekent dat de Iraanse nucleaire rechten nu zijn erkend.

De Iraanse minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Zarif zei al in Geneve, na de ondertekening van het akkoord, dat "het proces van verrijking van Uranium 20% (dat in korte tijd kan verder worden verrijkt tot 90% ,het materiaal dat nodig is voor een nucleair wapen) zal worden voortgezet gebaseerd op de plannen die Iran al had…….". Ook zei Zarif dat het plutonium project in Arak 'zal worden voortgezet langs dezelfde lijnen als in de huidige situatie'.

 

Enige dagen voor de ondertekening van het akkoord in Geneve bedreigde ayatollah Khamenei Israel in voor hem ongekende bewoordingen. Hij noemde de regering van Israel " Sag-e haar-e najess", wat een hondsdolle onreine hond betekent, een van de meest grove beledigingen in Farsi.

Hij zei dat Israel verzwakt is en gedoemd is te verdwijnen. In dezelfde toespraak tot de Basij strijdkrachten sprak Khamenei over de besprekingen in Geneve. Hij zei dat de onderhandelingen 'zachte vormen van gymnastiek zijn in de manoeuvre in de richting van het uiteindelijke doel'.

Of het echt 1938 is zoals sommigen beweren betwijfel ik, maar feit is wel dat Iran eerder VN inspecteurs heeft misleid en zich niet aan internationale afspraken hield. De uitspraken van Iraanse leiders stemmen dan ook niet hoopvol. Hopelijk zit de internationale gemeenschap er bovenop en maakt duidelijk dat Iran niet alleen heeft gewonnen, maar ook verplichtingen heeft en beloftes heeft gedaan waar het aan gehouden zal worden. 

 

RP

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Khamenei: Akkoord met Westen leidt tot het uiteindelijke doel

http://missingpeace.eu/nl/2013/11/khamenei-akkoord-met-westen-leidt-tot-het-uiteindelijke-doel/

Door Missing Peace 

 

Onderhandelaars na ondertekening van Geneve akkoord

De Amerikaanse nieuwssite " The Jewish Press" schreef zondag 24 november boven een artikel over de overeenkomst tussen Iran en zes wereldmachten in Geneve het volgende: "Het is september 1938, het aftellen naar 1939 is begonnen".

Dat was een verwijzing naar het akkoord tussen de Britse premier Chamberlain en Adolf Hitler aan de vooravond van de Tweede Wereldoorlog.  Dat akkoord dat volgens Chamberlain vrede had moeten brengen (peace in our time), werd door Winston Churchill die, toen nog in de oppositie zat, als volgt omschreven:

"Wij hebben een nederlaag geleden zonder oorlog en de consequenties van die nederlaag zullen verstrekkende historische gevolgen hebben. Denk niet dat dit het einde is, het is slechts het begin van de misrekening. Het is de eerste slok uit een bittere drinkbeker".

Churchill werd door niemand serieus genomen toen hij deze uitspraak deed. Hij was een eenling, een roepende in de woestijn die toen nog werd behandeld als een spelbreker.

De positie van premier Netanyahu van Israel lijkt na de ondertekening van het akkoord over het Iraanse nucleaire programma op die van Churchill indertijd.  Terwijl de Amerikaanse president Barack Obama haast euforisch was en zei dat het akkoord 'een nieuw pad betekent naar een meer veilige wereld', verklaarde Netanyahu dat 'de wereld een gevaarlijker plaats was geworden omdat het meest gevaarlijke regime in de wereld een behoorlijke stap richting het verkrijgen van het meest gevaarlijke wapen in de wereld had genomen' (Netanyahu tijdens de wekelijkse kabinetsvergadering afgelopen zondag).

Wie heeft er gelijk? De Amerikaanse president en diplomaten zoals Catherine Ashton die als EU commissaris direct verantwoordelijk was voor het afsluiten van het akkoord, of de Israëlische premier en met hem het grootste deel van het Israëlische publiek en de Arabische golfstaten die Israëls zorg over de deal met Iran delen.

Om die vraag te beantwoorden lijkt een analyse van het akkoord en de ontwikkelingen in Iran de afgelopen week de beste oplossing.

De letterlijke tekst van het akkoord laat zien dat de zes wereldmachten in feite afstand hebben genomen van alle VN resoluties waarin werd geëist dat Iran zou stoppen met het verrijken van uranium. Verder blijkt dat geen enkel onderdeel van het Iraanse nucleaire programma geschrapt moet worden. Er is slechts sprake van bevriezing van de diverse onderdelen en het gedeeltelijk omvormen van  verrijkt uranium 20 %.  Het gevolg van deze bevriezing is dat de tijd die Iran nodig heeft om uit te breken naar een atoombom verlengd wordt met enkele weken. Het verscherpte toezicht door de IAEA wil niet zeggen dat Iran nu niet meer in staat is om ongemerkt uit te breken. Het is immers herhaaldelijk gebleken dat Iran geheime programma's had waar de IAEA niet van op de hoogte was. (een voorbeeld is de opwerkingsfaciliteit in Fordo).

In ruil voor de (wat Netanyahu noemt cosmetische)Iraanse concessies wordt een deel van het sanctieregime tegen Iran versoepeld. Volgens de Verenigde Staten is het pakket sancties dat wordt opgeheven of versoepeld 7 miljard dollar waard. Volgens analisten zou dat de Iraanse economie, die op instorten staat, kunnen redden.

Het akkoord wordt in Iran vooral gezien als een overwinning op Israel en als een Westerse erkenning van de Iraanse nucleaire rechten.

De Iraanse president Rouhani verklaarde dat de vijanden van Iran, die de wereld een Iran fobie probeerden aan te praten hebben verloren. Dat was een duidelijke verwijzing naar de Israëlische regering. Ook zei hij dat 'de verrijkingsactiviteiten zullen doorgaan zoals in het verleden' en dat het akkoord betekent dat de Iraanse nucleaire rechten nu zijn erkend.

De Iraanse minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Zarif zei al in Geneve, na de ondertekening van het akkoord, dat " het proces van verrijking van Uranium 20% (dat in korte tijd kan verder worden verrijkt tot 90% ,het materiaal dat nodig is voor een nucleair wapen) zal worden voortgezet gebaseerd op de plannen die Iran al had……". Ook zei Zarif dat het plutonium project in Arak 'zal worden voortgezet langs dezelfde lijnen als in de huidige situatie'.

Het hoofd van het Iraanse bureau voor atoomenergie Akbar Salehi, verklaarde dat het akkoord geen schade had toegebracht aan de structuur en organisatie van het nucleaire programma. Hij sprak overigens andere taal dan Zarif over de verrijking van uranium 20%. Hij zei dat Iran onder het akkoord uranium verrijking tot 20% zal voorkomen.

Dit zijn de eerste tekenen dat Iran opnieuw zal proberen om verwarring te stichten over haar nucleaire activiteiten.

Het is dit bedrog over de werkelijke aard en de voortgang van het nucleaire programma dat Iran in staat stelde om het materiaal voor een eerste atoombom te produceren (de voorraad uranium 20% die Iran nu bezit wordt geschat op ca. 200 kilo) ondanks voortdurende buitenlandse druk. In 2006 leidde het Iraanse bedrog bijvoorbeeld tot VN resolutie 1696 waarin de ervaringen van de IAEA werden omschreven met het Iraanse bedrog.

Israel heeft echter nog andere redenen om sceptisch te zijn over het akkoord met Iran.

Enige dagen voor de ondertekening van het akkoord in Geneve bedreigde ayatollah Khamenei Israel in voor hem ongekende bewoordingen. Hij noemde de regering van Israel " Sag-e haar-e najess", wat een hondsdolle onreine hond betekent, een van de meest grove beledigingen in Farsi.

Hij zei dat Israel verzwakt is en gedoemd is te verdwijnen. In dezelfde toespraak tot de Basij strijdkrachten sprak Khamenei over de besprekingen in Geneve. Hij zei dat de onderhandelingen 'zachte vormen van gymnastiek zijn in de manoeuvre in de richting van het uiteindelijke doel'.

Khamenei's woorden werden genegeerd door de media buiten Israel en door de onderhandelaars in Geneve.  Ook de Iraanse rol in het conflict in Syrië bleef buiten de besprekingen.  De Amerikaanse minister van Buitenlandse Zaken bevestigde dit.

In Israel maar ook in landen zoals Saoedi Arabie wordt nu gevreesd dat de Iraanse invloed in de regio slechts zal toenemen. Dit gebeurt op het zelfde moment dat de positie van de Verenigde Staten in het Midden-Oosten steeds verder wordt verzwakt en de onrust in de Arabische landen voortduurt.

Het lijkt daarom op zijn minst voorbarig om te verklaren dat met het akkoord in Geneve de wereld een meer veilige plaats is geworden.

 

Israelische deelname aan wetenschapsproject problematisch (CIDI)

 

Israel, dat een waardevolle bijdrage zou kunnen leveren vooral op het gebied van innovatie, zou 600 miljoen euro investeren in het project, en zou in ruil daarvoor beurzen en onderzoeksfondsen ontvangen van 900 miljoen. Maar toen de EU in juni dit jaar de 'nederzettingenrichtlijnen' aannam – die in 2014 zouden moeten ingaan in de lidstaten die de richtlijnen omzetten in wetten -, kwam ook de eis dat Israel niets van dit geld zou besteden aan instellingen die óók werken in de gebieden. De EU rekent daartoe ook delen van de Israelische hoofdstad Jeruzalem en de door Israel geannexeerde Golan en wil ook 'indirecte subsidies' tegengaan: als een wetenschapper bijvoorbeeld werkt aan een universiteit binnen de Groene Lijn, maar daar zelf buiten woont, komt zijn project niet voor subsidie in aanmerking.

Ik kan mij voorstellen dat dit de Israelische regering veel te ver gaat. Het is daarbij echt onzinnig en onnodig beledigend om heel Jeruzalem over de groene lijn bezet te noemen. Hier liggen de belangrijkste Joodse plaatsen, hieruit zijn duizenden Joden met geweld verdreven, de hele oude Joodse wijk ligt er. Dat een wetenschapper die net over de groene woont subsidie voor zijn project kan vergeten zou ik zelf ook onverteerbaar vinden. Toch zoekt Israel naar een compromis en is de minister van wetenschap voor. Israel en de EU betichten elkaar er nu van niet compromisbereid te zijn en alleen op details te willen schuiven. Laten we hopen dat er veel details te vinden zijn die met elkaar de scherpe kantjes eraf halen. Maar eigenlijk moet de enorm selectieve verontwaardiging over Israel, die in geen verhouding staat tot de werkelijke misstanden (en de veel soepeler houding tegenover werkelijke misstanden elders) eens aan de kaak gesteld worden. Israel is verre van perfect, maar dat geldt wat mij betreft ook voor een aantal EU landen en al helemaal voor een aantal andere landen waarmee intensief wordt samengewerkt en gehandeld. Over de besteding van het vele EU geld door de Palestijnen aan nobele zaken als een riante maandelijks loon voor terroristen, heb ik het nog niet eens.

 

EU bronnen zeggen dat de EU wel flexibel is, maar Netanyahu geen overwinning gunt. Rare opmerking. Het gaat natuurlijk helemaal niet om een overwinning voor Netanyahu, maar een akkoord dat in redelijkheid wordt gesloten. Vreemd ook dat men er bij Iran blijkbaar geen enkele moeite mee heeft dat na het atoomakkoord Rouhani de overwinning vierde. De weerzin tegen Netanyahu lijkt het van de zakelijkheid, de fairness, en de belangen van de EU te winnen. 

UPDATE: er is gisteravond een akkoord bereikt, zie: http://www.cidi.nl/akkoord-over-israelische-deelname-wetenschapsproject/ 

RP

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Israelische deelname aan wetenschapsproject problematisch

http://www.cidi.nl/israelische-deelname-aan-wetenschapsproject-problematisch/

IN ISRAEL / DOOR ELISE FRIEDMANN / OP 26/11/2013 OM 16:03 / TAGS: EU, GOLAN, PALESTIJNEN

 

 In Israel vergaderde Netanyahu maandagnacht en dinsdag tweemaal met vijf ministers over de mogelijkheden nog deel te nemen aan het grote wetenschapsproject van de EU, Horizon 2020. Aan het eind van de week moet Israel tekenen – of niet, afhankelijk van de voorwaarden die de EU verbindt aan deelname. De EU wil de nieuwe EU-nederzettingenrichtlijnen als een bijlage aan de overeenkomst hechten.

De ministers zitten niet op één lijn. Zo is de in zijn ambt herstelde rechtse minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Lieberman falikant tegen ondertekening, die hij 'capitulatie' noemt, terwijl minister Peri van Wetenschap helemaal voor is. Uiteindelijk gaf Netanyahu opdracht tot diplomatieke inspanningen om een uitweg te vinden uit de patstelling. Als onderdeel daarvan zou minister Livni van Justitie trachten tot overeenstemming te komen met de EU-chef Buitenlandse zaken Ashton.

Israel was het enige land buiten de EU dat zou deelnemen aan het prestigieuze project, waarvoor het Europees Parlement afgelopen donderdag de regels goedkeurde. Universiteiten in de EU staan in de startblokken om subsidies aan te vragen voor hun projecten. De EU steekt tussen 2014 en 2020 in totaal 80 miljard euro in onderzoek en innovatie; dit moet het wetenschappelijke vlaggenschip worden van de EU.

Israel, dat een waardevolle bijdrage zou kunnen leveren vooral op het gebied van innovatie, zou 600 miljoen euro investeren in het project, en zou in ruil daarvoor beurzen en onderzoeksfondsen ontvangen van 900 miljoen. Maar toen de EU in juni dit jaar de 'nederzettingenrichtlijnen' aannam – die in 2014 zouden moeten ingaan in de lidstaten die de richtlijnen omzetten in wetten -, kwam ook de eis dat Israel niets van dit geld zou besteden aan instellingen die óók werken in de gebieden. De EU rekent daartoe ook delen van de Israelische hoofdstad Jeruzalem en de door Israel geannexeerde Golan en wil ook 'indirecte subsidies' tegengaan: als een wetenschapper bijvoorbeeld werkt aan een universiteit binnen de Groene Lijn, maar daar zelf buiten woont, komt zijn project niet voor subsidie in aanmerking.

In eerste instantie zei Israel dat het onder die voorwaarden niet zou deelnemen aan Horizon, maar eerder deze maand deed het enige compromisvoorstellen. Eén daarvan zou een clausule zijn dat Israel accepteert dat de EU niets over de Groene Lijn wil subsidiëren, maar dat dit geen consequenties heeft voor een vredesverdrag met de Palestijnen. De EU eist alvast dat Israel afstand doet van gebieden waarover nog onderhandeld moet worden, was het Israelisch argument.

Wat de standpunten precies zijn, was dinsdagmiddag niet duidelijk. Israelische bronnen stelden dat de EU 'alleen op details flexibel was' en de compromisvoorstellen van Israel afwees; bronnen in de EU vonden dat de EU 'wel flexibel was' en een 'pragmatische manier zocht om het verdrag uit te voeren', maar dat de EU Netanyahu geen "overwinning" gunde. Eind deze week moet duidelijk zijn wat de uitkomst wordt: Israel zou dan getekend moeten hebben.

 

maandag 25 november 2013

Khamenei en Obama winnen bij atoomakkoord, Netanyahu verliest

 
Het valt nog te bezien of het tussenakkoord ook tot een definitief akkoord over Irans atoomprogramma gaat leiden. De nieuwe Iraanse president lijkt een hervormer als paus Franciscus, maar zelfs als hij dat zou zijn, hij is niet degene die het laatste woord heeft in het land van de Ayatollahs.
Nonetheless, Iran's ongoing "right" to even low-level enrichment raises serious and justified concerns in Jerusalem, Riyadh, Amman, Bahrain, and beyond. The conviction here is that Tehran has managed to fool Obama, and will use the next six months to move closer still to nuclear weapons capability. It is not clear what has been decided regarding surprise inspections at other facilities, such as Parchin. And Iran has a track record of building secret facilities which inspectors know nothing about.
 
Niet alleen Israel, maar ook de Arabische regimes zijn bezorgd, zelfs verbolgen over het akkoord. Men weet steeds minder waar men aan toe is met de Amerikaanse bondgenoot, die eerst Mubarak, en later zijn opvolger Morsi liet vallen, om vervolgens de militairen in Egypte weer onder druk te zetten vanwege het harde optreden tegen Morsi-aanhangers. Evenzo werd lang geaarzeld om actie te ondernemen tegen Assad in Syrië, toen gedreigd met militaire acties, en vervolgens aangehaakt bij een compromis over de vernietiging van het chemische arsenaal.

Relations can only further deteriorate now. This twisted atmosphere could lead some in the moderate Arab world, mistrustful of US readiness to stand up for its allies, to move closer to Moscow, and perhaps even to enter into secretive agreements with Israel, headed by the current "biggest loser," Benjamin Netanyahu.

Wouter
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Khamenei and Obama are Geneva's winners, Netanyahu the big loser

If Iran uses the coming weeks to further advance its nuclear program, Israel's moment of truth could be much less than six months away

http://www.timesofisrael.com/khamenei-and-obama-are-genevas-winners-netanyahu-the-big-loser/

  November 24, 2013, 7:55 pm 15

 

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Barack Obama embrace at a ceremony held in honor of Obama as he lands at Ben Gurion Airport near Tel Aviv, on March 20, 2013 (photo credit: Miriam Alster/Flash90)

·       

The interim agreement announced in Geneva early Sunday morning between Iran and the world powers does not resolve the issue of Iran's rogue nuclear power program. It is only the starting point on the way to a decisive junction that the sides will reach in another six months. Only then will it become clear how good or bad the interim agreement is for the State of Israel, the United States, Iran and its Arab neighbors. Only then will it be possible to gauge its success (or lack thereof) in reducing Tehran's ability to attain a nuclear bomb.

Still, even at this early stage, it is possible to declare some interim winners and losers.

Tehran and its Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (represented by the charming President Hassan Rouhani) are big winners, at least for the next six months. Under the deal, the international community has essentially recognized the right of Iran to enrich uranium, which has long been demanded by the regime. Moreover, the world has basically agreed that for the next half a year, Iran can continue as a nuclear threshold state — though not a nuclear state, a critical difference.

Iran will retain its stores of low-enriched uranium, quantities which today could be further enriched to produce between six and eight nuclear bombs. The financial situation in Iran is likely to improve, given the immediate release of $8 billion in assets and, in the near future, increased state revenue from the easing of sanctions. The likelihood of an "Iranian Spring," a la July 2009, has been decreased and the public support for Khamenei and his messenger Rouhani will only increase. The Iranian president's speech on Sunday morning and Khamenei's statements illustrate how enthusiastically they view the achievement.

A second big winner is US President Barack Obama. Although bitterly critical voices were heard against the agreement in Israel, in the Arab countries close to the United States and even in Congress (including Harry Reid, the Senate majority leader), the White House stayed the course. The American public, entering the holiday season, is likely to welcome the deal — a "historic" alternative to what could have become a new outbreak of American warfare in the Middle East. Obama will tout the Geneva agreement as his latest foreign policy achievement, following the summer deal for the dismantling of Syria's chemical weapons capabilities. And the deal does, indeed, provide for the rolling back, to some extent, of Iran's ability to develop a nuclear bomb: uranium enrichment above 5% will stop, and Western supervision at the Fordo and Natanz facilities will be increased with inspectors allowed in at any time.

Nonetheless, Iran's ongoing "right" to even low-level enrichment raises serious and justified concerns in Jerusalem, Riyadh, Amman, Bahrain, and beyond. The conviction here is that Tehran has managed to fool Obama, and will use the next six months to move closer still to nuclear weapons capability. It is not clear what has been decided regarding surprise inspections at other facilities, such as Parchin. And Iran has a track record of building secret facilities which inspectors know nothing about.

The concern, anger and dismay among moderate Sunni states and in Jerusalem has only increased in light of what is perceived as an exercise in deception by Washington. According to a Sunday Associated Press report, the American government managed to keep secret for months a series of meetings it held with Iranian emissaries, which began even before Rouhani was elected five months ago.

Obama and Iran should not be contemptuous of the "losers." Today there is an unprecedented crisis of faith between the moderate Arab states and Washington. What was perhaps regarded as a beginner's mistake concerning the US attitude toward former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, and continued in a surreal fashion with Washington's incoherent stance on the current Cairo strongman, Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi, had already developed, following the deal on Syria, into a terrible sense of betrayal among Arab countries.

Relations can only further deteriorate now. This twisted atmosphere could lead some in the moderate Arab world, mistrustful of US readiness to stand up for its allies, to move closer to Moscow, and perhaps even to enter into secretive agreements with Israel, headed by the current "biggest loser," Benjamin Netanyahu.

The prime minister of Israel has emerged battered and bruised from his struggle with the White House. His efforts, overt and covert, to dissuade Obama from signing the agreement have failed. Some US newspapers have opined that he tried to pull the United States into a war. At home, along with a fair amount of support, he has also drawn some criticism for his belligerent statements on the issue.

It is hard to know how Netanyahu and the Arab states will act with their backs to the wall. Obviously they'll try to use every ounce of leverage to secure a permanent accord that would neutralize Iran's ability to build nuclear weapons in the long term. This will mean pressure on Obama, via the US Congress, to stand by his commitment to thwart the Iranian bomb. There is no shortage of members of Congress, Democrats among them, prepared to go head-to-head with Obama on this issue. That pressure is only expected to increase as the six months mark nears.

Finally, Iran has a history of attempting to hide elements of its nuclear program. If it becomes clear in the coming weeks that Iran is doing so again, and taking further significant steps toward the bomb, then Israel's moment of truth will come in much less than six months.

Wat er mis is met het nucleaire akkoord met Iran

 
Zeker niet iedereen is blij met het voorlopige akkoord dat Iran met het Westen heeft gesloten over zijn atoomprogramma (zie Ned. vertaling akkoord).
De meeste havikken zijn uiteraard fel tegen en de meeste duiven blij met deze doorbraak.
 
Maar hopen dat het geen Verdrag van München blijkt....
 

In exchange for superficial concessions, Iran achieved three critical breakthroughs. 

First, it bought time to continue all aspects of its nuclear-weapons program the agreement does not cover (centrifuge manufacturing and testing; weaponization research and fabrication; and its entire ballistic missile program). Indeed, given that the interim agreement contemplates periodic renewals, Iran may have gained all of the time it needs to achieve weaponization not of simply a handful of nuclear weapons, but of dozens or more.

Second, Iran has gained legitimacy. This central banker of international terrorism and flagrant nuclear proliferator is once again part of the international club. Much as the Syria chemical-weapons agreement buttressed Bashar al-Assad, the mullahs have escaped the political deep freezer. 

Third, Iran has broken the psychological momentum and effect of the international economic sanctions. While estimates differ on Iran's precise gain, it is considerable ($7 billion is the lowest estimate), and presages much more. Tehran correctly assessed that a mere six-months' easing of sanctions will make it extraordinarily hard for the West to reverse direction, even faced with systematic violations of Iran's nuclear pledges. Major oil-importing countries (China, India, South Korea, and others) were already chafing under U.S. sanctions, sensing President Obama had no stomach either to impose sanctions on them, or pay the domestic political price of granting further waivers.

 

________________

 

Simple explanation of what's wrong with the Iranian nuclear deal

http://elderofziyon.blogspot.nl/2013/11/simple-explanation-of-whats-wrong-with.html  

 

The full text of the nuclear deal has been published. The best description I could find of why it is a disaster comes from former US ambassador to the UN, John Bolton:

 

This interim agreement is badly skewed from America's perspective. Iran retains its full capacity to enrich uranium, thus abandoning a decade of Western insistence and Security Council resolutions that Iran stop all uranium-enrichment activities. Allowing Iran to continue enriching, and despite modest (indeed, utterly inadequate) measures to prevent it from increasing its enriched-uranium stockpiles and its overall nuclear infrastructure, lays the predicate for Iran fully enjoying its "right" to enrichment in any "final" agreement. Indeed, the interim agreement itself acknowledges that a "comprehensive solution" will "involve a mutually defined enrichment program." This is not, as the Obama administration leaked before the deal became public, a "compromise" on Iran's claimed "right" to enrichment. This is abject surrender by the United States.

 

Indeed, that's what the agreement says:

This comprehensive solution would involve a mutually defined enrichment program with practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the program. 

It is hard to interpret this as anything other than the "right to enrich," something that Kerry strenuously denied last night. In this specific example, Iran clearly won.

Bolton goes on:

 

In exchange for superficial concessions, Iran achieved three critical breakthroughs. 

First, it bought time to continue all aspects of its nuclear-weapons program the agreement does not cover (centrifuge manufacturing and testing; weaponization research and fabrication; and its entire ballistic missile program). Indeed, given that the interim agreement contemplates periodic renewals, Iran may have gained all of the time it needs to achieve weaponization not of simply a handful of nuclear weapons, but of dozens or more.

Second, Iran has gained legitimacy. This central banker of international terrorism and flagrant nuclear proliferator is once again part of the international club. Much as the Syria chemical-weapons agreement buttressed Bashar al-Assad, the mullahs have escaped the political deep freezer. 

Third, Iran has broken the psychological momentum and effect of the international economic sanctions. While estimates differ on Iran's precise gain, it is considerable ($7 billion is the lowest estimate), and presages much more. Tehran correctly assessed that a mere six-months' easing of sanctions will make it extraordinarily hard for the West to reverse direction, even faced with systematic violations of Iran's nuclear pledges. Major oil-importing countries (China, India, South Korea, and others) were already chafing under U.S. sanctions, sensing President Obama had no stomach either to impose sanctions on them, or pay the domestic political price of granting further waivers.


Even if you disagree with Bolton's politics, all three points seem incontrovertible. 

He continues:

[T]he deal leaves the basic strategic realities unchanged. Iran's nuclear program was, from its inception, a weapons program, and it remains one today. Even modest constraints, easily and rapidly reversible, do not change that fundamental political and operational reality. And while some already-known aspects of Iran's nuclear program are returned to enhanced scrutiny, the undeclared and likely unknown military work will continue to expand, thus recalling the drunk looking for his lost car keys under the street lamp because of the better lighting.

Moreover, the international climate of opinion against a strike will only harden during the next six months. Capitalizing on the deal, Iran's best strategy is to accelerate the apparent pace of rapprochement with the all-too-eager West. The further and faster Iran can move, still making only superficial, easily reversible concessions in exchange for dismantling the sanctions regime, the greater the international pressure against Israel using military force. Iran will not suddenly, Ahmadinejad-style, openly defy Washington or Jerusalem and trumpet cheating and violations. Instead, Tehran will go to extraordinary lengths to conceal its activities, working for example in new or unknown facilities and with North Korea, or shaving its compliance around the edges. The more time that passes, the harder it will be for Israel to deliver a blow that substantially retards the Iranian program.

 

Anatomie van atoomafspraken met Iran

 

De deal klinkt op het eerste gezicht niet gek: Iran mag alleen nog uranium verrijken tot 5%, en dat is veel te weinig om te kunnen gebruiken in een atoomwapen, of ook om zelf verder te verrijken. Het moet het eerder al met 20% verrijkte uranium ontmantelen en inspecties toestaan bij haar nucleaire faciliteiten. Maar zowel Israel, een aantal Arabische landen waaronder Saudi-Arabië, en Joodse groepen zijn zeer negatief over de deal. Zij wijzen er daarbij ook op dat Iran een geschiedenis heeft van het omzeilen van afspraken en het om de tuin leiden van inspecteurs en onderhandelaars. Men zegt vaak ter illustratie hiervan dat niet voor niets het schaken in Iran is uitgevonden. 

 

RP

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Anatomy of Iranian nuclear deal

Jerusalem is disappointed but Tehran isn't off the hook yet, with six months to prove its trustworthiness

 
November 24, 2013, 5:39 pm 
 

 

DUBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) — Moments after Iran and world powers signed a landmark nuclear deal on Sunday, US Secretary of State John Kerry was already looking ahead to the "even more difficult" efforts to probe Tehran's atomic capabilities and try to ease international concerns that they cannot be diverted for weapons development. Iran's President Hassan Rouhani, meanwhile, said his country is ready to "remove created doubts" about Iran's nuclear program, which Tehran insists is fully peaceful.

Both Kerry's predictions and Rouhani's promises will shape the next six months in the first step of an accord that could help redefine the politics of the region and reset relations between the US and Iran after nearly 35 years of mutual recriminations and suspicions.

Tough and expansive UN inspections are ahead. Iran also must keep up its end of the bargain with measures such as curbing uranium enrichment and halting work on a new reactor.

Here is a look at the demands, the details and the political ripples from the deal hammered out in Geneva:

Iran steps back

From a pure number-crunching standpoint, Iranian compliance would make enrichment levels and stockpiles insufficient to create a nuclear weapon or move quickly toward warhead capacity.

The centerpiece of the agreement is the degree of Iran's uranium enrichment, which is the process of converting concentrated uranium into nuclear fuel.

Iran has pledged to keep its enrichment at no higher than 5 percent. This is well below what's needed for weapons-grade material at more than 90 percent enrichment. It would allow Iran to make fuel for its lone energy-producing reactor, a Russian-built plant in Bushehr on the Persian Gulf coast. But it would keep the levels too low for a weapon or even a fast-track effort at so-called "breakout" toward warhead strength.

Iran already has a significant stockpile of higher-enriched uranium: an estimated 185 kilograms (407 pounds) of 20 percent-enriched uranium. This is the highest level acknowledged by Tehran. The Geneva deal calls for Iran, over the next six months, to either "dilute" the material below 5 percent or have it repurposed into powder — which makes it useable as nuclear fuel but very difficult to be further boosted. In recent years, Iran has repurposed an amount of 20 percent enrichment similar to its current stockpile.

Specialized centrifuges are needed in the enrichment process. The deal blocks the installation of any new centrifuges for the next six months. This means Iran could not significantly accelerate production of even the 5 percent enriched uranium.

Beyond enrichment, Iran also agreed to halt work on a planned heavy water reactor in Arak, about 255 kilometers (152 miles) southwest of Tehran. Heavy water is a compound used to cool nuclear reactors, which do not need enriched uranium to operate. Heavy water reactors also produce a greater amount of plutonium as a byproduct, which could be used to make warhead material. Iran does not currently possess the technology to extract the plutonium, and promised in Geneva not to seek it.

The UN steps in

Inspectors for the UN's nuclear watchdog agency have made frequent visits to Iranian facilities for years. The Geneva deal gives them faster and broader access as the linchpin of monitoring and enforcement.

Iran agreed to provide "daily access" to International Atomic Energy Agency teams at the two main enrichment sites: Natanz and Fordo. Natanz, about 160 miles (260 kilometers) southeast of Tehran, is the main enrichment facility. Fordo, built into the side of a mountain about 100 kilometers (60 miles) south of Tehran, was disclosed by Iran in 2009. The area is heavily protected by the Revolutionary Guard.

UN nuclear inspectors have toured both sites, but the Geneva pact would allow everyday access to review UN surveillance video.

The expanded UN reach also stretches to centrifuge construction and storage sites, uranium mines and mills and closer scrutiny of all aspects of the planned Arak reactor.

Another important concession by Iran is its pledge to address all concerns in UN Security Council resolutions on Tehran's nuclear ambitions. One key site is the Parchin military compound outside Tehran. Parchin has been suspected of housing a secret underground facility used for Iran's nuclear program, a claim denied by Iran. UN nuclear inspectors twice visited the site, but seek a third tour.

Win-win?

Before the deal was reached, Iran's president often said settling the nuclear standoff was a "win-win" proposition. In the short-term, it may turn out an easier ride for Rouhani than President Barack Obama, who faces conservative critics calling the deal an appeasement and America's main Mideast ally Israel denouncing it from every angle. A "historic mistake," complained Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who had campaigned for a complete halt to Iranian uranium enrichment. Netanyahu also repeated that Israel has the right to defend itself, and will do so if necessary in the face of Iranian threats to wipe it off the map.

Rouhani has his own hard-line opposition, which is increasingly uneasy about Iran's outreach to Washington. But Rouhani has the backing of Iran's top authority, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the deal is likely to elevate his government's image.

That's because Iran did not give up the basic elements of its enrichment program, which is seen as a symbol of Iran's self-promoted image as a technological leader in the Islamic world. Khamenei had set this as a "red line" in the talks. The decision of world powers to allow Iran's enrichment program to continue — while concentrating on output levels — gave Rouhani a major credibility boost at home and permitted the first-step accord to move forward.

Carrots, sticks and sanctions

For the West, the deal does not mark a major roll back of sanctions. Iran still faces widespread blocks from international banking networks and oil sales, which have cut the country's main currency source by more than half.

The deal does, however, offer some sanctions easing on gold and other precious metals, Iran's automobile and aviation industries and petrochemical exports. The world powers at the talks — the five permanent Security Council members plus Germany — further agreed to hold off any new nuclear-related sanctions for at least six months in exchange for Iranian adherence to the deal.

It also opens up $4.2 billion from oil sales to be transferred in installments over the next six months as various compliance stages are reached. That's still a very small sum in a country that was once one of OPEC's top exporters.

The White House estimated the total benefit for Iran at about $7 billion, which was described as a "fraction" of the financial hit from sanctions over the half-year period.

But the deal's first stage appeared structured more with reputation than relief in mind.

If Iran fails to abide by the guidelines, its international profile is left in tatters and chances for further sanctions' easing is lost. It also would likely escalate calls from Israel, Gulf Arab states and elsewhere for possible military action against Iran's nuclear facilities.

Times of Israel staff contributed to this report.