In deze analyse laat Aluf Ben zien hoe de Amerikaanse positie de laatste paar jaren subtiel is opgeschoven naar de Palestijnen toe. Bush' duidelijke uitspraken over een einde aan de bezetting en een aaneengesloten Palestijnse staat zijn niet meer dan redelijk, maar loslaten van het begrip 'Joodse staat' en een wat vage formulering over de vluchtelingen in plaats van de eenduidige verklaring dat deze niet naar Israël kunnen terugkeren zijn een slecht teken.
Dit zijn twee absolute voorwaarden voor Israël, die raken aan haar diepste wens: dat de Arabieren en Palestijnen, in ruil voor de bezette gebieden, voor eens en altijd hun streven om Israël te vernietigen c.q. in een Arabische staat te veranderen, zullen opgeven.
Ratna
----------
No "Jewish State," No Settlement Blocs:
"The King David Statement" and Bush's Developing Position
By Aluf Ben
Ratna
----------
No "Jewish State," No Settlement Blocs:
"The King David Statement" and Bush's Developing Position
By Aluf Ben
The Institute for National Security Studies
INSSINSIGHT January 16, 2008 - No. 42
INSSINSIGHT January 16, 2008 - No. 42
During his visit to Israel this month, President George W. Bush laid out his updated approach to an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. In a statement delivered at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem [see below this article], Bush fleshed out his vision of "two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security," on the eve of negotiations over "core issues" between delegations of the two parties.
The declaration basically adheres to the lines demarcated by Bush in his "vision speech" of June 2002, but a closer look at the details reveals some development and changes in his positions in comparison with previous "vision" documents: the Aqaba Conference speech of June 2003, the letter to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of April 2004, and the Annapolis Conference speech on November 2007.
A review of these changes suggests that they reflect an American effort to present a more balanced position by opening up some distance from previous positions that were viewed by some as biased in favor of Israel, particularly by eliminating the expression "Jewish state," the implied reference to settlement blocs and the reservations about settling Palestinian refugees in Israel (all of which appeared in the letter to Sharon), and also by defining the point of departure for negotiations as "the end of the occupation that began in 1967" rather than UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Nevertheless, Bush left considerable room for maneuver that will allow give-and-take between the two sides in discussions on the three core issues - border, refugees and Jerusalem.
"Jewish State"
The question of Israel's character and identity came onto the political agenda following the breakdown of the peace process at end of President Bill Clinton's term of office and Israel's fears about Palestinian demands to implement the "right of return." In his plan to end the conflict - the so-called "parameters" - Clinton spoke of "Palestine as the national home of the Palestinian people and the State of Israel as the national home of the Jewish people." During Bush's presidency, Israel demanded American recognition as the "Jewish state." The administration agreed and that position was first enunciated in Secretary of State Colin Powell's "Louisville speech" in November 2001. President Bush himself declared America's commitment to Israel as a Jewish state in Aqaba, in his letter to Sharon, and at Annapolis.
However, in his King David statement, Bush reverted to the older Clinton formula and spoke only of a "national home." The American commitment to Israeli security was separated and pronounced in another context. That change apparently stems from the vigorous opposition of Palestinians and Arab states to recognition of a "Jewish state" after Israel raised the matter in the weeks leading up to the Annapolis Conference. On the eve of his departure to Annapolis, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that "the point of departure for any negotiations with the Palestinians will be recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people." Olmert also said that the leaders of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas and Salem Fayyad, "want to make peace with Israel as a Jewish state." The Palestinian rejection of the concept of "Jewish state" seems to be grounded in two concerns: the implicit renunciation of the "right of return" and the future status of Israeli Arabs.
Refugees
In his 2004 letter to Sharon, Bush spelled out more detailed principles for an "agreed, just, fair and realistic" resolution of the refugee problem, which, in his view, needed to found through the creation of a Palestinian state and "the settlement of refugees there, and not in Israel." But in an interview to Israel's Channel 2 Television before his departure to the region as well as in a press conference at the Prime Minister's residence in Jerusalem, Bush spoke of the "right of return" as one of the core issues. In so doing, he adopted Palestinian terminology for the refugee issue that raises strong objections in Israel. In the King David declaration, Bush contented himself with a more ambiguous formula: "We have to look forward to the creation of a Palestinian state and of new international mechanisms, including compensation, to resolve the refugee issue."
Borders
In the King David statement, Bush repeated the position, first expounded in his 2004 letter to Sharon, according to which the border ought to be based on the 1949 Armistice Lines "with agreement modifications that will reflect the current realities." However, he deleted the section in the letter that specifically referred to "existing Israeli population centers" as the embodiment of current realities, left that issue somewhat vague, and simply repeated the insistence that Israel needs to enjoy "recognized, secure and defensible" boundaries and the Palestinian state needs to be "viable, contiguous, sovereign and independent."
Source of Authority
Both the Annapolis Declaration and the King David statement reflect an American effort to stay away from the "sacred" declarations, agreements and concepts of the past. These latest proclamations, for example, make no reference to Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 or to the Oslo Agreements, which all appeared in every previous political document (e.g., the Bush speech of 2002, the Roadmap, and the letter to Sharon). On the other hand, Bush did stipulate this time that "the point of departure for negotiations on a permanent status agreement is clear - ending the occupation that began in 1967." In doing so, he went beyond previous references to "the end of occupation," either as a step that will contribute to Israel's future wellbeing (as in the 2002 speech) or as one of the objectives of the process (as in the Roadmap).
Jerusalem
In the King David statement, Bush referred to Jerusalem for the first time in his presidency but refrained from presenting a clear position and simply acknowledged that the political and religious concerns of both sides will make the discussions very difficult. He probably did that to avoid a confrontation with American Jewish organizations that made their rejection of the division of Jerusalem their primary reason for opposing the Annapolis process. Unlike his predecessor, Bush therefore did not elaborate a detailed plan or even stipulate general principles for the resolution of the Jerusalem issue.
_______________________
INSS Insight is published through the generosity of
Sari and Israel Roizman, Philadelphia
====================
For Immediate Release
Office of the White House Press Secretary
January 10, 2008
President Bush Discusses Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process
5:27 P.M. (LOCAL)
THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon. I'd like to, first, thank Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas for their hospitality during my trip here to the Holy Land. We had very good meetings, and now is the time to make difficult choices.
I underscored to both Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas that progress needs to be made on four parallel tracks. First, both sides need to fulfill their commitments under the road map. Second, the Palestinians need to build their economy and their political and security institutions. And to do that, they need the help of Israel, the region, and the international community. Third, I reiterate my appreciation for the Arab League peace initiative, and I call upon the Arab countries to reach out to Israel, a step that is long overdue.
In addition to these three tracks, both sides are getting down to the business of negotiating. I called upon both leaders to make sure their teams negotiate seriously, starting right now. I strongly supported the decision of the two leaders to continue their regular summit meetings, because they are the ones who can, and must, and -- I am convinced -- will lead.
I share with these two leaders the vision of two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security. Both of these leaders believe that the outcome is in the interest of their peoples and are determined to arrive at a negotiated solution to achieve it.
The point of departure for permanent status negotiations to realize this vision seems clear: There should be an end to the occupation that began in 1967. The agreement must establish Palestine as a homeland for the Palestinian people, just as Israel is a homeland for the Jewish people.
I underscored to both Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas that progress needs to be made on four parallel tracks. First, both sides need to fulfill their commitments under the road map. Second, the Palestinians need to build their economy and their political and security institutions. And to do that, they need the help of Israel, the region, and the international community. Third, I reiterate my appreciation for the Arab League peace initiative, and I call upon the Arab countries to reach out to Israel, a step that is long overdue.
In addition to these three tracks, both sides are getting down to the business of negotiating. I called upon both leaders to make sure their teams negotiate seriously, starting right now. I strongly supported the decision of the two leaders to continue their regular summit meetings, because they are the ones who can, and must, and -- I am convinced -- will lead.
I share with these two leaders the vision of two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security. Both of these leaders believe that the outcome is in the interest of their peoples and are determined to arrive at a negotiated solution to achieve it.
The point of departure for permanent status negotiations to realize this vision seems clear: There should be an end to the occupation that began in 1967. The agreement must establish Palestine as a homeland for the Palestinian people, just as Israel is a homeland for the Jewish people.
These negotiations must ensure that Israel has secure, recognized, and defensible borders. And they must ensure that the state of Palestine is viable, contiguous, sovereign, and independent.
It is vital that each side understands that satisfying the other's fundamental objectives is key to a successful agreement. Security for Israel and viability for the Palestinian state are in the mutual interests of both parties.
Achieving an agreement will require painful political concessions by both sides. While territory is an issue for both parties to decide, I believe that any peace agreement between them will require mutually agreed adjustments to the armistice lines of 1949 to reflect current realities and to ensure that the Palestinian state is viable and contiguous. I believe we need to look to the establishment of a Palestinian state and new international mechanisms, including compensation, to resolve the refugee issue.
I reaffirm to each leader that implementation of any agreement is subject to implementation of the road map. Neither party should undertake any activity that contravenes road map obligations or prejudices the final status negotiations. On the Israeli side that includes ending settlement expansion and removing unauthorized outposts. On the Palestinian side that includes confronting terrorists and dismantling terrorist infrastructure.
I know Jerusalem is a tough issue. Both sides have deeply felt political and religious concerns. I fully understand that finding a solution to this issue will be one of the most difficult challenges on the road to peace, but that is the road we have chosen to walk.
Security is fundamental. No agreement and no Palestinian state will be born of terror. I reaffirm America's steadfast commitment to Israel's security.
The establishment of the state of Palestine is long overdue. The Palestinian people deserve it. And it will enhance the stability of the region, and it will contribute to the security of the people of Israel. The peace agreement should happen, and can happen, by the end of this year. I know each leader shares that important goal, and I am committed to doing all I can to achieve it.
Thank you.
END 5:32 P.M. (Local)
--------------------------------------------
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis
Website: www.imra.org.il
Geen opmerkingen:
Een reactie posten